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ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION: The purpose of this investigation was to better understand process
inefficiencies in a Level II trauma center through the identification and classification of
flow disruptions. Data-driven interventions were systematically developed and
introduced in an effort to reduce disruptions threatening the optimal delivery of trauma
care.
METHOD: Medical human factors researchers observed disruptions during resuscitation
and imaging in 117 trauma cases. Data was classified using the human factors taxonomy
Realizing Improved Patient Care through Human-centered Operating Room Design for
Threat Window Analysis (RIPCHORD-TWA). Interdisciplinary subject matter experts
(SMEs) utilized a human factors intervention matrix (HFIX) to generate targeted
interventions designed to address the most detrimental disruptions. A multiple-baseline
interrupted time-series (ITS) design was used to gauge the effectiveness of the
interventions introduced.
RESULTS: Significant differences were found in the frequency of disruptions between
the pre-intervention (n=65 cases, 1137 disruptions) and post-intervention phases (n=52
cases, 939 disruptions). Results revealed significant improvements related to ineffective
communication (x2 (1, n=2076) = 24.412, p=0.00, x2 (1, n=1031) = 9.504, p=0.002, x2 (1,
n=1045) = 12.197, p=0.000); however, similar levels of improvement were not observed
in the other targeted areas.
CONCLUSION: This study provided a foundation for a data-driven approach to
investigating precursor events and process inefficiencies in trauma care. Further, this
approach allowed individuals on the front lines to generate specific interventions aimed at
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mitigating systemic weaknesses and inefficiencies frequently encountered in their work
environment.
Keywords: trauma care, process efficiency, interventions, patient safety
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction and Literature Review
“If you don’t understand what is causing the problem, you will continue, forever and
forever, to have to solve the problem.” – Robert Zinser, CEO, International Federation of
Gynecology and Obstetrics
Traumatic injury is a major public health problem in the United States. Each year
more than 192,000 people lose their lives to trauma (Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC), 2015). In the last decade alone, the number of trauma deaths has
increased by 22.8%, while the U.S. population increased by only 9.7%, making traumatic
injury the leading cause of death for all Americans from birth to age 46 (Rhee et al.,
2014). There is a great economic burden associated with fatal injuries as well. In 2013,
injury-related deaths exceeded $214 billion in combined medical and work-lost costs,
which is approximately one-third of the total direct and indirect costs associated with all
injuries (Florence, Simon, Haegerich, Luo, & Zhou, 2015).
The alarming increase in death rates associated with traumatic injury as well as
the considerable value of the services offered by the nation’s trauma centers, compels
researchers to gain a better understanding of the challenges facing providers in the
effective and efficient delivery of trauma care. Studies have shown that providing
treatment for the critically injured patient at an urban Level I trauma center reduces
mortality by 25%, as compared to treatment at a non-trauma center (MacKenzie et al.,
2006). Reports indicate significantly reduced mortality rates for patients properly triaged
and treated at a regional acute care facility such as a Level II trauma center, in
comparison to patient outcomes at a non-trauma center (Vickers et al., 2015). A
substantial proportion of trauma patients are treated in trauma centers designated as Level
II or lower. Therefore, expanding the research to include Level II trauma centers is
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paramount to gaining a more comprehensive understanding of the process inefficiencies
threatening the delivery of care to the traumatically injured patient.
Medical Error
The Institute of Medicine’s (IOM) To Err Is Human (Kohn, Corrigan, &
Donaldson, 2000) report described an incidence of 44,000 to 98,000 preventable deaths
annually. Since the release of the report 15 years ago patient safety has advanced in many
ways. For instance, there has been demonstrated improvements in specific areas such as
hospital-acquired infections. According to the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS), hospitals across the country have prevented 2.1 million hospitalacquired infections, saving 87,000 lives, and nearly $20 billion in healthcare costs from
2010 to 2014 (HHS, 2015).
Much of the work dedicated to improving the safety of patient care has focused
attention on the study of medical error. However, efforts to reduce these errors have
largely been unsuccessful. A recent review by James (2013) estimated the number of
deaths resulting from preventable medical errors in hospitals range from 210,000 to more
than 400,000 per year, which is more than four times the original IOM estimate. In fact,
Makary and Daniel (2016), extrapolating from several different investigations, placed the
total beyond 250,000 deaths per year, ranking medical errors as the third most common
cause of death in the U.S. (Makary & Daniel, 2016).
Medical Human Factors
Given these alarming figures, it isn’t surprising that healthcare professionals have
turned to the field of human factors to improve the safety and efficiency in the delivery of
care. In the last few years, human factors researchers have spent a great deal of time in

19

A PROSPECTIVE INVESTIGATION AT A LEVEL II TRAUMA CENTER
healthcare settings addressing medical mistakes, human error, and work system factors
using human factors engineering principles. The value of human factors and risk
management concepts are widely recognized in complex organizations such as the
military, nuclear power, and aviation. For decades, these high-risk industries have relied
on the interdisciplinary science of human factors to ensure the effectiveness, safety, and
ease of performance between humans and the elements of a system in the performance of
precise tasks (Human Factors and Ergonomics Society (HFES), 2016).
In recent years, numerous comparisons have been made between cockpit
operations and how it can translate to increased safety in medicine, particularly in the
operating room (OR). One such comparison stems from a 2005 report by the Joint
Commission that found communication failures (i.e., human factors) to be the root cause
of over 60% of sentinel events. Similarly, in years past, communication breakdowns
among crew members resulted in 70% of commercial aviation accidents. These
commonalities suggest that valuable lessons can be learned from aviation and has
prompted healthcare to attempt to mimic programs that have been credited with
improving safety in commercial aviation. For instance, adopting crew resource
management (CRM) and standardizing communications and tools may be an effective
strategy to reduce medical errors (Karl, 2009; Leonard, Graham, & Bonacum, 2004;
Lingard et al., 2004).
Traditionally, healthcare has focused on patient outcomes and sentinel event
reporting to aid in understanding adverse events and improving patient safety. However,
these data points lack detail concerning the specific nature of systemic issues (Blocker,
Eggman, Zemple, Wu, & Wiegmann, 2010; Henrickson Parker, Laviana, Sundt, &
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Wiegmann, 2009). Analysis of the system allows researchers to identify weaknesses and
inefficiencies that open the window of opportunity for errors and adverse events to occur.
This data serves as a much richer body of information on which to base the development
of remedial interventions.
Latent conditions present in the system range from failures in organizational
management to poor tool design to physiological performance limitations such as sleep
deprivation. These factors are often subtle and seemingly minor in their effects and in
isolation they may have little to no direct impact on the system overall. However, their
accumulation, or multiplicative effect, has a strong relationship to negative outcomes and
potentially threaten the delivery of patient care (Dankelman & Grimbergen, 2005; de
Leval, Carthey, Wright, Farewell, & Reason, 2000; Reason, 1990; Wiegmann &
Shappell, 2003). In this vein, it makes sense that healthcare would look for other metrics
to better address patient and system safety.
Flow Disruptions
Process inefficiencies have come to be called flow disruptions (FDs). Wiegmann,
ElBardissi, Dearani, Daly, and Sundt (2007) defined FDs as deviations from the natural
progression of a task that potentially compromise the safety of the process and/or task.
Research suggests that efficient care improves patient survival. Flow disruptions, on the
other hand, threaten this efficiency, presenting distractions, impairments, lost time, and
workarounds that divert attention from the task at hand. In essence, FDs are symptomatic
of underlying latent failures somewhere in the system (Blocker et al., 2012).
Flow disruptions, in the present context, were first identified in the cardiovascular
operating room (CVOR) and often consisted of communication failures, external
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interruptions, and equipment and technology issues. Results from these studies have been
intriguing from a process efficiency standpoint, empirically linking an accumulation of
FDs, even seemingly minor ones, to surgical errors down the line. Specifically, teamwork
and communication failures were found to be the strongest predictors of surgical errors
(Wiegmann et al., 2007).
This approach assumes that FDs, or a lack thereof, is indicative of an effectively
performing system (Healy, Olsen, Davis, & Vincent, 2007). However, this approach
suffers from a lack of clearly identifiable outcomes and may be misleading when drawing
conclusions. For example, there could be multiple miscommunications occurring during a
procedure that do not necessarily impact the patient. Furthermore, while multiple team
members may experience numerous disruptive events while providing care to the patient,
these events do not necessarily affect the procedure itself. Likewise, an anesthesiologist
receiving multiple text messages over the course of a CVOR surgery, however, these
disruptions do not necessarily interrupt the surgeon or the progress of the procedure. This
reveals the difficulty faced in isolating those FDs that truly pose discernable threats to
patient safety as well as the overall process of patient care. Flow disruptions are not
necessarily major events that immediately or directly impact performance. Rather, they
are often minor events that can accumulate over time. From a human factors perspective,
any number of minor disruptive events that occur during the course of patient care may
have a negative impact on the provider’s ability to counteract subsequent major events.
Therefore, even the most trivial disruption matters (Palmer et al., 2013; Wong et al.,
2007).
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Given the potential relationship between FDs and errors, it may be better to
conceptualize the accumulation of these FDs as threat windows (Boquet et al, 2017b;
Cohen et al., 2016). Threat windows can be operationally defined as the aggregates of
FDs and process inefficiencies that plague a system which may open the window for
errors and adverse events to occur (Boquet et al., 2017b; Cohen et al., 2016).
By conceptualizing FDs and process inefficiencies as threat windows, researchers
are better equipped to understand potential threats to patient safety by looking at the
cumulative sum of disruptions experienced during the delivery of patient care and
conceivably intervene before an error reaches the patient (Boquet et al., 2017b; Cohen et
al., 2016).
Human Factors Taxonomies
There are a variety of approaches researching system threats that could potentially
affect patient outcomes and safety. Researchers have used a data collection taxonomy
known as the Systems Engineering Initiative for Patient Safety (SEIPS) to classify a
multitude of hazards in the healthcare setting, most notably, during observations in
cardiac surgical cases (Blocker et al., 2010; Blocker, 2012; Carayon, Hundt, Karsh, &
Gurses, 2006; Wiegmann et al., 2007). The SEIPS model is comprised of five elements:
1) tools and technology, 2) organization, 3) person, 4) task, and 5) environment.
Typically, the source of an FD exists when one or more of these interconnected
components breaks down (Blocker et al., 2012).
Other researchers have utilized the Surgical Flow Disruption Tool (SFDT) to
systematically categorize and measure surgical FDs, or latent factors that contribute to
adverse events, and their impact on patient safety. The SFDT is an observational
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taxonomy derived from the SEIPS framework, which incorporates Reason’s (1990)
model of human error as well as the work of Wiegmann and Shappell (2003). The SFDT
consists of: 1) environmental factors, 2) teamwork, 3) technology and instruments, 4)
technical factors, 5) training and procedures, and 5) an “other” category. Although it was
originally designed for observing cardiac surgical cases (Blocker et al., 2010; Henrickson
Parker et al., 2009), it has been found to be a valid tool for use in other healthcare
domains, including trauma care. Application of the SFDT in trauma allowed researchers
to identify the clinical phases of treatment (resuscitation, imaging, or trauma OR) that
had a high disruption frequency (Blocker et al., 2012; Blocker et al., 2013; Catchpole et
al., 2013; Catchpole et al., 2014; Shouhed et al., 2014). Blocker et al. (2012) expanded
the SFDT and further categorized the type of FDs according to: 1) equipment
(malfunctions, improper use, unfamiliar equipment, maintenance); 2) communication
(misunderstanding, communication unheard, case related communication, extraneous
conversation); 3) external interruptions (extraneous people, phone calls, or intercom
messages that did not relate directly to the procedure at hand); 4) coordination (personnel
exchanges, improperly configured equipment, not adhering to surgeon or team
preferences, and requesting or providing assistance to fellow team members); 5)
environment (problems with noise, temperature, lighting); 6) patient factors (disruptions
related to the patient’s unique anatomy such as an excessive amount of unanticipated
adhesions or scar tissue); 7) technical skills (including poorly executed tasks,
misinterpretation of relevant information); and 8) training (teaching a new skill,
correcting an improper action, posing questions to test the knowledge of the team,
student, or trainee); and 9) other (not specified).
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Another taxonomy used to identify interruptions in healthcare evolved from an
analysis of studies found in the interruption literature from other high-risk industries. The
authors also noted that only a small number of these types of taxonomies have been
developed (Brixey, Walji, Shang, Johnson, & Turley, 2004). The tool they developed for
describing instances of human interruption contained the following eight categories: 1)
source of interruption; 2) individual characteristics of the person receiving interruption;
3) method of coordination; 4) meaning of interruption; 5) method of expression; 6)
channel of conveyance; 7) human activity changed by interruption; and 8) effects of
interruption. The researcher’s preliminary taxonomy focused on the introduction of
technology, which contributes to new interruptions and the changing work of clinicians.
It is currently being used to code interruptions observed in an emergency department and
includes the following 11 categories: 1) signal, 2) technology, 3) initiator, 4) recipient, 5)
reason to interrupt, 6) cognitive, 7) frequency, 8) context/location, 9) environment, 10)
outcome, and 11) management techniques (Brixey et al., 2004).
Realizing Improved Patient Care through Human-centered Operating Room Design
(RIPCHORD)
Realizing Improved Patient Care through Human-centered Operating Room
Design (RIPCHORD) was originally developed by a team of collaborators consisting of
industrial engineers and healthcare architects with human factors expertise from Clemson
University as well as cardiothoracic anesthesiologists from the Medical University of
South Carolina (MUSC). RIPCHORD was initially designed as an architectural
framework for identifying and classifying workflow disruptions in the CVOR (Palmer et
al., 2013). The researchers in this study were not interested in exploring medical errors
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but rather in documenting workflow as it related to human factors and potential threats to
patient safety. They were specifically observing disruptions to the flow of operations.
After observing the first surgery, they organized the observational data into human
factors clusters or similar groupings. The aggregate analysis yielded six distinct clusters.
These clusters became the RIPCHORD major categories: 1) communication, 2) usability,
3) physical layout, 4) environmental hazards, 5) general interruptions, and 6) equipment
failures. The six clusters were then further differentiated into 33 subgroupings using
affinity clustering, which ultimately became the RIPCHORD minor categories. The
subgroups were validated and refined using an additional nine surgeries to develop the
final taxonomic structure, known as RIPCHORD (version 1.0). Palmer et al. (2013)
concluded that they had “developed a robust taxonomy to describe the quantity and
location of flow disruptions encountered in a cardiac OR which can be used for future
research and patient safety improvements” (p. 11).
Research Objectives
The purpose of this current study is to investigate FDs threatening the efficient
delivery of patient care in a Level II trauma center. More specifically, this investigation
seeks to answer four questions:
Q1: Can an FD taxonomy previously used only in the CVOR be successfully
employed to identify and classify disruptions in trauma care?
Q2: Do differences in threats exist between different clinical phases of treatment in
trauma care (resuscitation and imaging)?
Q3: Can this information be used to develop targeted, data-driven interventions in
trauma care?
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Q4: Do these implemented interventions address and potentially reduce the frequency
of those disruptions threatening the optimal delivery of trauma care?
This current study employed a multiple-baseline interrupted time-series (ITS)
design and was divided into four phases: 1) Baseline 1/pre-intervention, 2) Baseline 2/
pre-intervention, 3) Intervention, consisting of the introduction of targeted strategies, and
4) Post-intervention. In a multiple-baseline ITS design data is typically collected at
multiple time points. Specifically, researchers collect several observations (O) over a
period of time that spans before and after an intervention, or treatment (X), in order to
determine if the intervention had an effect. To address threats of internal validity and
increase the likelihood of more valid conclusions two waves of measurement were made
prior to the implementation of interventions, thus, establishing a baseline. This method is
called a double-pretest design, or a multiple-baseline design. This type of ITS design
attempts to control for selection-maturity in that the groups may be different in some way
before the interventions were introduced. If the intervention program (post-intervention
phase) and the comparison group (pre-intervention phase) are maturing at different rates
this could be noted as a change from baseline 1/pre-intervention to baseline 2/preintervention. This pre-test series allows researchers to directly examine the possibility of
differences in maturation and potentially attribute post-intervention differences to the
intervention program (Trochim, 2005). This type of experimental design is considered a
strong quasi-experimental design as it resembles experimental designs but must use
quasi-independent variables rather than true independent variables (IVs). In other words,
subjects cannot be randomly assigned to either an experimental group or a control group.
Moreover, researchers cannot control which group receives the treatment. One advantage
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of an ITS design is that it is considered the best quasi-experimental approach for
evaluating longitudinal effects of interventions as it allows researchers to evaluate the
impact of a quasi-independent variables under naturally occurring conditions (Bordens &
Abbott, 2014).
Pre-intervention and post-intervention phases served as one IV and clinical phase
of treatment (resuscitation and imaging) was the second IV. The targeted minor
categories within the major categories of the expanded RIPCHORD taxonomy served as
the dependent variables (DVs). In effect, disruption data served as an objectively
measurable outcome and the basis for continuous improvement.
The strength of this current study was the ability to combine science and practice
into a living, breathing document. This method allowed researchers to present data in
real-time; tracking and monitoring results in a quantitative, data-driven manner. A
comprehensive, systematic methodology such as this may prove more successful and
lasting in deploying the right interventions to mitigate threats to the delivery of lifesaving trauma care. A schematic of the ITS design is pictured below (see Figure 1.1).

Figure 1.1. Multiple-Baseline Interrupted Time-Series (ITS) Design
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CHAPTER 2
PRE-INTERVENTION PHASE
Introduction
Unlike the surgical setting, a limited number of investigations have evaluated FDs
in trauma care. While surgery often follows a predictable and lengthy course, the same is
not true for trauma care. Trauma resuscitation efforts are unpredictable and fast-paced,
producing an environment where healthcare professionals must quickly and accurately
evaluate and diagnose potentially life-threatening injuries in unstable patients with
incomplete histories. This process is information laden, multi-disciplinary team
dependent, and relies heavily on clinical skill and the efficiency of the system (Gruen,
Jurkovich, McIntyre, Foy, & Maier, 2006; Sarcevic, 2009). The multi-disciplinary team
that typically responds to a trauma alert includes: 1) a trauma surgeon, 2) an emergency
physician, 3) specialty surgeons (e.g., neurology, orthopedic, ophthalmologic), 4) surgical
and emergency residents, 5) emergency department nurses and technicians, 6) a
laboratory technician, 7) a radiology technologist, 8) an orthopedic technician, 9) a
critical care nurse, 10) an anesthesiologist or certified registered nurse anesthetist, 11) a
respiratory technician, 12) an operating room nurse, 13) security officers, 14) a chaplain
or social worker, and 15) a scribe, according to the American College of Surgeons'
Committee on Trauma (ASC-COT) and as outlined in Resources for Optimal Care of the
Injured Patient (2014). As defined by Kozlowski and Bell (2003), a team is composed of
two or more individuals that exist to perform organizationally relevant tasks and share a
common goal through their specific interdependent roles and tasks. Gruen et al. (2006)
explains how trauma care also involves concurrent and competing tasks, long hours, and
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inexperienced medical residents who often work after hours in busy emergency
departments, making it the “perfect storm” for the occurrence of medical error (p. 371).
Previous investigations of disruptions in trauma care found communication and
coordination issues make up approximately half of all FDs in Level I trauma centers
(Blocker et al., 2012; Blocker et al., 2013; Catchpole et al., 2013; Catchpole et al., 2014;
Shouhed et al., 2014). There are few other occupations where effective communication
and coordination is as crucial in saving lives, yet these findings are not surprising
considering the inefficiencies and weaknesses of the systems within which trauma teams
must work every day. An interdisciplinary team of researchers used prospective study
methods to identify system issues throughout the entire trauma care process (multiple
trauma resuscitation bays, imaging rooms, and ORs) at a Level I center, and then used
FDs as a metric to develop evidence-based interventions. Their analysis of identified FDs
suggested an implementation of targeted interventions related to coordination problems,
communication failures, and equipment issues (Blocker et al., 2012; Blocker et al., 2013;
Catchpole et al., 2013; Catchpole et al., 2014; Shouhed et al., 2014). Additionally, the
researchers conducted process mapping, interviews, and safety culture questionnaires to
define problematic areas and identify solutions. From these interactions, a short list of
subsystem interventions was developed and deployed, which included equipment storage,
medication packs, employing a whiteboard, pre-briefing, and teamwork training.
Observational measures were re-initiated to gauge the effectiveness of the interventions.
At the Level I trauma center where the study was carried out, researchers found that this
type of human factors subsystem approach reduced FDs, treatment time, and length of
patient stay (Catchpole et al., 2014).
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Despite sustained efforts in safety and quality, preventable deaths in trauma care
continue to occur at a rate of 2 to 22% (Pucher et al., 2013). However, some estimates of
preventable trauma-related death rates may be as high as 50% (Cales & Trunkey, 1985;
Chua, D’Amours, Sugrue, Caldwell, & Brown, 2009). Pucher et al. (2013) conducted a
retrospective error analysis in order to identify not only the incidence of preventable error
in trauma care but also the underlying causes of these types of errors. The majority of
errors identified occurred during the initial phase of trauma patient assessment and care.
Similar to the findings of numerous studies in healthcare, the largest proportions of errors
were attributed to human error (Hoyt et al., 1994; Gruen et al., 2006; Chua et al., 2009).
Furthermore, most of these errors were categorized as either a process or structural
failure. While only 12.1% of errors were identified as structural failures (e.g., staffing
issues, lack of equipment, or equipment malfunctions), process errors, or active failures
accounted for 87.9%. Process errors were identified as the most common recurring error
and included issues such as failure of assessment, diagnosis, or decision making, as well
as technical or communication errors. The researchers also found a high prevalence of
omission errors (62%), or latent failures, which typically are a result of cognitive lapses
such as recognition or attention failures. They suggested that understanding the nature of
the errors may be helpful in implementing measures to reduce them. Additionally, they
cited Reason (1995; 2002), proposing that protocols and checklists are an effective means
for preventing lapses and errors of omission (Pucher et al., 2013).
Trauma Center Designations
There are four levels of trauma care facilities in the U.S. The quality of care and
clinical outcomes at various levels of trauma centers are expected to be similar.
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Furthermore, all designated trauma centers must meet specific standards for the provision
of clinical care to the injured patient as specified by the ongoing verification program
sponsored by ASC-COT and outlined in Resources for Optimal Care of the Injured
Patient (2014). The volume of patients and the severity of injury are the major criteria
distinguishing Level I trauma centers from Level II trauma centers and lower. These
differences warrant a separate set of ACS criteria (ASC-COT, 2014). Table 2.1 outlines
the key trauma center requirements by level (see Table 2.1).
Table 2.1 Key Trauma Center Requirements by Level
Level I
Must admit at least 1200 patients annually or have 240 admissions with an Injury
Severity Score (ISS), an established medical score to assess trauma severity, of more than
15, which is considered a major trauma (or polytrauma)
A surgically directed critical care service must be led by a surgeon boarded in surgical
critical care and critically ill trauma patients should be cared for in a designated Intensive
Care Unit (ICU) by an ICU physician team
24-hour in-house availability of the attending surgeon
A surgeon will be in the emergency department on patient arrival, with adequate
notification from the field (the maximum acceptable response time is 15 minutes for the
highest-level activation, tracked from patient arrival)
Trauma surgeon on call must be dedicated to a single trauma center while on duty as well
as a published backup call schedule for trauma surgery must be available
Must participate in a residency training program and fellowships in trauma/surgical
critical care/acute care surgery
Must publish 10 to 20 trauma-related, peer-reviewed journal articles within a three-year
period and demonstrate trauma-related scholarly activities
Required to be a leader in education and outreach activities designed to help improve
outcomes from trauma and prevent injury by publicly and professionally disseminating
information
Must participate in regional disaster management plans and exercises
Level II
Same requirements as Level I trauma centers
Except that volume and severity requirements do not apply
Except that research and educational activities do not apply, but are strongly encouraged
Must participate in regional disaster management plans and exercises
Level III
Must have transfer agreements with Level I or Level II trauma centers
Must have continuous general surgical coverage
A surgeon must be in the emergency department on patient arrival, with adequate
notification from the field (the maximum acceptable response time is 30 minutes for the
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highest-level of activation, tracked from patient arrival)
Must participate in regional disaster management plans and exercises
Level IV
Must have transfer agreements with higher-level trauma centers in the region
Must have 24-hour emergency coverage by a physician or midlevel provider
A physician (if available) or midlevel provider will be in the emergency department on
patient arrival, with adequate notification from the field (the maximum acceptable
response time is 30 minutes for the highest-level of activation, tracked from patient
arrival)
The emergency department must be continuously available for resuscitation, with
coverage by a registered nurse and physician or midlevel provider, and it must have a
physician director (providers must maintain current Advanced Trauma Life Support®
certification and should attend trauma-related continuing medical education (CME) of at
least 8 hours yearly)
Must participate in regional disaster management plans and exercises

According to the Florida Department of Health (2017), the state of Florida has 19
trauma service areas and a total of 33 trauma centers. Of these centers, 10 are Level I, 21
are Level II, and two are pediatric facilities. The majority of research has been
concentrated in Level I trauma centers, mainly due to ACS criteria research requirements
as well as the inherently large patient pool afforded by these institutions. Despite Level I
trauma centers garnering the bulk of the attention in clinical and patient safety research, a
significant number of trauma patients are treated in Level II trauma centers or lower.
Some research has suggested there is improved survival for trauma patients treated at a
Level I center versus a Level II or lower center (Cudnik, Newgard, Sayre, & Steinberg,
2008; Demetriades et al., 2005; Demetriades et al., 2006; Glance, Osler, Mukamel, &
Dick, 2012; Nirula, Maier, Moore, Sperry, & Gentilello, 2010; Scarborough et al., 2008).
Others research has found no significant difference in mortality between Level I and
Level II trauma centers (Recinos et al., 2009; Rogers et al., 2011).
As previously mentioned, the literature describes one research study that focused
exclusively on FDs and process inefficiencies in trauma care at a Level I trauma center

33

A PROSPECTIVE INVESTIGATION AT A LEVEL II TRAUMA CENTER
(Blocker et al., 2012; Blocker et al., 2013; Catchpole et al., 2013; Catchpole et al., 2014;
Shouhed et al., 2014). This current study, on the other hand, investigated process
inefficiencies observed in a Level II trauma center. Because of the unique differences
between Level I and Level II trauma centers, it is reasonable to assume that process
inefficiencies observed at a Level I trauma center may not reflect those seen in a Level II
trauma center. Understanding the challenges unique to centers other than those
designated as Level I is just as important in order to ensure quality of care at those
respective facilities. The empirical study of FDs in a Level II facility broadens the scope
of inquiry, increasing an understanding of potential interventions these types of facilities
can employ to improve life-saving trauma services. Furthermore, utilizing a fine-grained
taxonomy such as RIPCHORD, not previously used in any trauma domain, better
describes the quantity, location, and variety of FDs encountered throughout trauma care.
Measuring and Identifying FDs
To enhance trauma systems in a manner that ensures lasting success in mitigating
the process inefficiencies threatening optimal delivery of care, researchers must first
understand the nature and frequency of FDs. A robust approach to the measurement of
FDs and the threats they pose can identify problems unique to a particular clinical
treatment area such as resuscitation or imaging (Boquet et al., 2017b), or to a specific
surgical task, role, or position such as the anesthesiologist, perfusionist, or circulating
nurse (Cohen et al., 2016). Furthermore, it may prove arduous to implement targeted
interventions on a local level without using an appropriate and accurate method of
measuring and identifying process inefficiencies in the first place (Healy et al., 2008).
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Evaluating a socio-technological system such as trauma services requires
researchers to use unique measurement methods to precisely detect a wide-range of
objects, processes, and conditions of the system (Healy et al., 2008). This current study
submits that the RIPCHORD taxonomy is best equipped to describe and categorize the
FDs encountered in trauma care.
Since its inception, the RIPCHORD taxonomy has been used in the CVORs of
multiple hospitals to identify FDs (Abernathy, 2015; Barbeito et al., 2014; Cohen et al.,
2016; Palmer et al., 2013). Throughout its application, the RIPCHORD framework has
undergone several iterations and further development by researchers at Embry-Riddle
Aeronautical University (ERAU). The most current version of RIPCHORD has been
expanded to accommodate threat window analysis and is now called Realizing Improved
Patient Care through Human-centered Operating Room Design for Threat Window
Analysis (RIPCHORD-TWA) (Boquet et al., 2017b; Cohen et al., 2016). RIPCHORDTWA is comprised of six major categories for classifying human factors related
disruptions: 1) communication, 2) coordination, 3) equipment issues, 4) interruptions, 5)
layout, and 6) usability. Further classification of the data into subcategories (i.e., minor
categories, nanocodes) enables fine-grained analysis and provides the researchers with a
greater level of detail associated with the observed threats (see Tables 2.2 and 2.3).
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Table 2.2 RIPCHORD-TWA Taxonomy
Communication (verbal and non-verbal)

Interruptions (Other)

Confusion

Alerts

Environmental Noise

Distractions

Ineffective Communication

Equipment/Supplies

Lack of Response

Interaction with Biohazards

Lack of Sharing

Searching Activity

Nonessential Communication

Spilling/Dropping

Simultaneous Communication

Task Deviation
Teaching Moments

Coordination

Layout

Charting/Documentation

Connector Positioning

Personnel Not Available

Equipment Positioning

Personnel Rotation

Furniture Positioning

Planning/Preparation

Inadequate Space

Protocol Failure

Permanent Structure Positioning

Unknown Information

Wires/Tubing

Equipment Issues

Usability

Anesthesia Equipment

Barrier Design

General Equipment

Computer Design

Perfusion Equipment

Surface Design

Surgeon Equipment

Equipment Design
Packaging Design
Data Entry (non-computer)
Design

Table 2.3 RIPCHORD-TWA Definitions of the Six Major Categories and the 37 Minor
Categories
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Communication (verbal and non-verbal)
Ineffective Communication – Communication between two or more individuals that
does not achieve its desired goal (i.e. not covered by the other categories).
o includes (example of when someone doesn’t know the name of someone else
and can’t communicate efficiently with them)
Lack of Response – The failure of an individual to respond to communication
resulting in delay.
o receive no answer regardless of follow up; this includes “did not respond, had
to repeat”
Confusion – Ambiguous or unclear communication resulting in a lack of
understanding.
o this category has to deal with comprehension not hearing
Simultaneous Communication – Two or more individuals communicating at the
same time resulting in the repetition of information and/or miscommunication.
Nonessential Communication – Communication irrelevant to the procedure that is
taking place during periods of time where attention should be focused on the task at
hand.
o this includes anything that is not professional in nature; also includes any nonessential communication in the room regardless of who is involved
Environmental Noise – The increasing sound level in the OR disrupts communication
and/or adversely affects concentration on the current task.
Lack of Sharing – Relevant information is withheld or not shared with other
personnel.
Usability
Computer Design – Design issues associated with computer software/hardware and
peripheral devices (e.g., programs, pointing devices, monitors, etc.).
Equipment Design – Design issues associated with equipment other than computer
systems.
Surface Design – Design issues associated with textures, colors, and other designcontrolled attributes.
Barrier Design – Design issues associated with donning protective equipment (e.g.,
gloves, gowns, etc.) and/or erecting barriers for maintaining sterile fields.
Packaging Design – Design issues associated with unwrapping, untying, or
opening/closing packaging containing supplies and instruments.
Data Entry (non-computer) Design – Design issues associated with hard-copy data
entry devices (e.g., forms, checklists, etc.).
Layout
Connector Positioning – Lack of outlets, connections and/or the inefficient use of
existing outlets or connections such that movement and/or continuation of a task is
hindered.
o about where an outlet is placed or inefficient use of outlet
Equipment Positioning – Medical devices, machines, and tools positioned such that
movement and/or continuation of a task is hindered.
o e.g. TEE machine, pump machine that is on the IV pole
Furniture Positioning – Room furnishings (e.g., chairs, the patient bed, desks, trash
can) positioned such that movement and/or continuation of a task is hindered.
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o e.g. the ICU bed, trashcan, chairs, IV pole, Pyxis machine,
Permanent Structures Positioning – The layout of permanent structures (e.g.,
doorways, light switches, etc.) such that movement and/or continuation of a task is
hindered.
o this category is reserved for items that always exist in the room (i.e. the room
always has these items in it and are in a fixed location)
Inadequate Space – Lack of sufficient space for personnel to operate effectively
and/or the inefficient use of space through clutter, untidiness, congestion, and
blockage.
o this also includes not having a proper place to put particular equipment
Wires/Tubing – The entanglement or misplacement of wires and tubes which
interferes with movement and/or continuation of a task.
Interruptions (Other)
Distractions – Non-essential personnel and other interruptions that draw attention
away from the current task.
o includes things that can be ignored or something that diverts the attention of
the person
Teaching Moments – Staff may pause to deliver reprimands and/or corrective
measures during the procedure.
o at a teaching hospital, a teaching moment in and of itself is not a flow
disruption unless the teacher elected an inopportune time to mentor
Searching Activity – Miscellaneous items become missing in the OR and are pursued
when they are needed immediately (e.g., missing sponges).
Task Deviation – Personnel leaves the primary task to start another task.
o includes texting, answering a phone call, when another personnel interrupts
someone to do another task that is pertinent to the procedure
Alerts – Human or technological alert to a potential hazard (this category includes
false alarms).
Equipment/Supplies- Equipment and/or supplies that must be retrieved due to an
unforeseeable need (e.g., incorrect aortic valve size, supplementary equipment).
Spilling/Dropping – When materials are dropped or spilled on the floor, resulting in
the staff member being diverted away from their current task.
Interaction with Biohazards – Incidents which involve the interaction of OR staff
with sharps, cleaning up fluids (bodily or other), and contaminated equipment.
Coordination
Personnel Rotation – A break or disruption in the procedure caused by the planned or
unplanned relief of personnel which unduly impacts the flow of the surgery.
Personnel Not Available – Team members not present or otherwise unavailable
during the procedure
Unknown Information – Information which every staff member should be
knowledgeable of yet forgets and interrupts others to obtain the information (e.g.,
lack of familiarity with equipment, procedures, or protocol).
Protocol Failure – Break or breach in protocol that affects the ability of the group to
function as a cohesive/efficient team.
Charting/Documentation – Issues surrounding the documentation of patient care for
a given medical procedure (e.g., medication dosing/labeling, lab values, etc.).
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Planning/Preparation – The failure to establish a common set of goals and/or
procedures to accomplish a given task (e.g., having the necessary equipment to
complete the procedure).
Equipment Issues
Surgeon Equipment – Surgeon equipment which malfunctions during surgery.
Anesthesia Equipment – Anesthesia equipment which malfunctions during surgery.
Perfusion Equipment – Perfusion equipment which malfunctions during surgery.
General Equipment – General (hospital) equipment which malfunctions during
surgery.

Taxonomies such as RIPCHORD-TWA are beneficial to healthcare research in
that they offer the ability to conduct a fine-grained analysis, which provides an ideal level
of resolution necessary to develop targeted interventions that address true problems in the
system. Thus, it presents the opportunity to shift away from a reactive approach and
towards a more proactive approach to aid in the understanding and reduction of potential
threats impacting patient outcomes. Without a reliable method of measuring and
identifying the threats that impair and interfere with a caregiver’s performance, it would
be a challenge to truly drive any “real” local improvements. In aviation, this is called
managing safety, which has been promoted to an advanced level, known as Safety
Management Systems (SMS). Being proactive is one characteristic of an SMS, as
explained by Stolzer, Halford, and Goglia (2008), “SMS practitioner in charge of such a
program does not have to wait for events to happen, but rather uses every technique
available to discover the information necessary to anticipate areas of increased risk,
before they happen” (p. 35).
Method
Population
Experienced medical human factors researchers prospectively observed a sample
of trauma cases at a Level II trauma center. All observations were collected at an East
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Central Florida community hospital with 678 licensed beds and three dedicated trauma
resuscitation bays (expandable to six) located in the Emergency Department (ED). The
ED has a total of 110 treatment rooms. The trauma center serves two counties and has a
catchment area of over 1,300 square miles. On average, the hospital receives 500-600
trauma activation alerts annually. Below is a photograph of one of the trauma
resuscitation bays (see Figure 2.1).

Figure 2.1. Trauma Resuscitation Bay
Given the critical condition of incoming trauma patients, it was not possible to
obtain their consent to participate in the study. The study was approved by the hospital’s
Research Oversight Committee as a quality improvement project. It was considered
exempt from Institutional Review Board (IRB) review as the focus was on disruptions
involved in the trauma care process rather than clinical outcomes of the patient. In

40

A PROSPECTIVE INVESTIGATION AT A LEVEL II TRAUMA CENTER
accordance with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of
1996 and Protected Health Information (PHI) Privacy Rule, all health information
pertaining to the patient was protected. There was no effort made on the part of the
researchers to collect personal and/or identifying information specific to either the
patients undergoing treatment or the hospital personnel providing care. Data extraction
beyond that which was collected on-site was performed by the Principal Investigators
(PIs) holding clinical privileges at the hospital. Furthermore, all data extracted was deidentified by the PIs in accordance with HIPAA guidelines and was concerned only with
demographics and processes associated with the delivery of care. Hospital staff and
trauma team members were aware of the presence and research goals of the observers.
Specific demographics, including gender, age, mechanisms of injury (MOI), and
Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS) scores, were recorded for each patient. GCS is the most
accepted clinical method for assessing the initial level of consciousness in trauma patients
as well as trends in responsiveness, which is useful for prognosis after acute brain injury.
It uses three categories, eyes (E), verbal (V), and motor (M), to summarize the severity of
the patient's condition using a scale from 3 to 15. A numerical sum of 15 on the scale
indicates the highest response observed in a patient and lower scores are associated with
deep unconsciousness (Teasdale et al., 2014).
Procedure
Data collection. Experienced medical human factors researchers observed and
recorded FDs during a total of 65 complete (“wheels in” to “wheels out”) trauma cases.
FDs are deviations from the natural progression of a task that potentially compromise the
safety of the process and/or task (Wiegmann et al., 2007). FDs were operationally defined
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as those events that resulted in a disturbance in a team member’s progress or any other
delay. Researchers had either medical and/or human factors background and underwent a
comprehensive educational training process to ensure they could properly identify and
capture FDs. In addition, the hospital adheres to strict ethical standards for the use of
human participants in conducting research; therefore, researchers were required to
complete the IRB training, an online training module through the Collaborative
Institutional Training Initiative (CITI) Program.
Beginning on April 29, 2014, researchers observed trauma cases during normal
and peak operational times. This hospital’s geographic location makes it subject to
informally defined peak operational times, where the hospital experiences a potential
influx of additional trauma patients as a result of an increase in the tourism population.
Events that take place locally include Bike Week, Biketoberfest, various NASCAR
racing events, and Spring Break. These special events can result in substantially higher
trauma patient volume.
Prospective data collection began at the time the patient arrived in the trauma
resuscitation bay. The resuscitation bay is the designated area for providing emergency
resuscitative efforts in order to stabilize the injured patients. Immediately following
successful resuscitation efforts, the majority of trauma patients are taken to imaging. The
imaging suite consists of a Computed Tomography (CT) scan room and viewing hallway
where healthcare personnel wait while a CT scan obtains in-depth images of the patient.
These images help providers gain a better understanding of the patient’s clinical status
and injuries. Data collection continued throughout imaging and terminated upon
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disposition to surgery, the medical floor unit, or the ED. Below are photos of the
imaging/CT scan room and the viewing hallway (see Figures 2.2 and 2.3).

Figure 2.2. Imaging/CT Scan Room
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Figure 2.3. Imaging/CT Viewing Hallway
Observers recorded the time the patient was wheeled into the trauma resuscitation
bay and the time they were wheeled out. Likewise, the time was noted when the patient
was wheeled into and out of imaging. For recording purposes, the patient’s transport time
between resuscitation and imaging was still considered under the auspices of
resuscitation since an official handoff to imaging had not yet occurred.
FD observations were documented in real-time in a free-response format using
paper and pencil or digitally recorded using an electronic tablet. Observations and time
spent in resuscitation and imaging were then transferred to a Microsoft Excel Workbook
for consensus coding and subsequent statistical analysis.
Data coding and classification. FDs were classified using the human factors
taxonomy, RIPCHORD-TWA (Boquet et al., 2017b; Cohen et al., 2016). RIPCHORD-
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TWA is comprised of six major categories for classifying human factors related
disruptions: 1) communication, 2) coordination, 3) equipment issues, 4) interruptions, 5)
layout, and 6) usability. There are multiple subcategories (i.e., minor categories,
nanocodes) within each major category.
At least two or more medical human factors researchers consensus coded each
observation into the RIPCHORD-TWA taxonomy. The coding process was iterative and
was carried out in an independent fashion for each observation recorded. First,
researchers determined if the individual observation was considered an FD. The decision
as to whether or not to code the observation as an FD in the first place was made in
consensus. In other words, the researchers had to reach a unanimous agreement. Next, a
specific major and minor RIPCHORD-TWA category was assigned for each FD via
consensus coding. During the coding process, researchers consulted a table which
included definitions and examples of the six major categories and the multiple minor
categories (see Table 2.3).
Data analysis. Descriptive statistics were calculated, including frequency of FDs
and percentage of FDs by category and treatment area observed (resuscitation or
imaging). Likewise, inferential statistics were calculated in regards to comparing
frequency data between the clinical phases of care (resuscitation and imaging). The time
elapsed during the case, whether in resuscitation or imaging, as well as the number of
threats that occurred over an elapsed period of time were also calculated. In order to
measure the potential impact of the observed threats, ratios were calculated to measure
through-put: the cumulative number of disruptions observed overall as well as by phase
(resuscitation and imaging), divided by the total elapsed time to treat a patient (patient
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contact minutes) also broken down by phase (resuscitation and imaging). Ratios provided
an estimate of how often FDs occurred per minute, as a means to gauge the “window of
opportunity” for potential adverse events to occur.
Results
Analysis of FD Data
Of the total sample of 65 trauma cases, the average age of the patient (male=50,
female=15) was 41.2 (s=20.4). The mean GCS score of the sample cases was 12.78
(s=3.9). A total of 38 (58.5%) of the trauma cases occurred during the first shift
(7:00a.m.-7:00p.m.) and 27 (41.5%) occurred during the second shift (7:00p.m.7:00a.m.). A total of 32 (50%) of the trauma cases were observed during peak operational
periods that correlated with special tourism events (i.e., Biketoberfest, Bike Week).
Additionally, four (6%) of the observed cases were considered multiple traumas, meaning
more than one trauma patient arrived at the same time and were treated simultaneously by
multiple trauma teams. The breakdown for MOI was as follows: falls (15 or 23%), motor
vehicle crashes (10 or 15%), motorcycle crashes (26 or 40%), stab wounds (1 or 1.5%),
assaults (2 or 3%), gunshot wounds (3 or 5%), burns (1 or 1.5%), and other/unspecified
(7 or 11%), which included cases such as a pedestrian struck by a motor vehicle, a suicide
attempt, or a drug overdose, for example (see Table 2.4).
A total of 1,137 disruptions were identified during the 65 observed cases (2,468
patient contact minutes). This translated to nearly 17.5 disruptions per case (s=10.9),
meaning approximately one disruption occurred every two minutes. The average total
treatment time per patient was close to 38 minutes (s=17.6). A total of 545 disruptions
were identified in resuscitation alone (1,068 patient contact minutes), with treatment time
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averaging just over 16 minutes (s=11.46), which translated to more than eight disruptions
per case (s=6.6). In imaging, a total of 592 disruptions were identified (1,400 patient
contact minutes), with treatment time averaging 21.5 minutes (s=9.8), which translated to
nine disruptions per case (s=6.6). Furthermore, the overall ratio of the number of FDs per
minute, or the through-put measures, was 0.46 per minute. More specifically, the ratios
were 0.51 per minute in resuscitation and 0.42 per minute in imaging.
Table 2.4 Pre-Intervention Phase Patient Demographics
A
g
e
1 31
2 16
3 40
4 30
5 48
6 8
7 70
8 58
9 13
10 28

S
e
x
M
M
M
F
F
F
M
M
M
M

11
12
13
14
15
16
17

58
69
70
62
71
27
26

M
F
M
M
M
M
M

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

25
7
65
44
35
1
24
63
28
26

F
M
M
M
M
F
F
M
F
M

Pt

Mechanism
of
Injury
Fall
Fall – sports
Fall
Motor vehicle crash
Fall
Fall
Fall
Fall
Fall
Laceration – machine tool
(other/unspecified)
Motor vehicle crash
Fall
Fall
Motor vehicle crash
Other/Unspecified
Motorcycle crash
Scooter (motorized/
motorcycle crash)
Motor vehicle crash
Fall
Motorcycle crash
Motorcycle crash
Motorcycle crash
Burn
Motor vehicle crash
Assault
Motor vehicle crash
Fall

G
C
S
6
15
14
14
15
15
3
15
11
15

E VM

4
4
4
4
4
4
1
4
4
4

1
5
5
4
5
5
1
5
1
5

1
6
6
6
6
6
1
6
6
6

1st
1st
1st
1st
2nd
1st
1st
1st
1st
1st

14
15
15
15
15
15
15

4
4
4
4
4
4
4

4
5
5
5
5
5
5

6
6
6
6
6
6
6

1st
1st
1st
1st
1st
1st
1st

15
15
3
14
9
15
15
14
14
6

4
4
1
4
2
4
4
4
4
4

5
5
1
4
3
5
5
4
4
1

6
6
1
6
4
6
6
6
6
1

2nd
1st
1st
2nd
2nd
2nd
2nd
2nd
2nd
2nd

Event

Biketoberfest
Biketoberfest
Biketoberfest
Biketoberfest
Biketoberfest
Biketoberfest
Biketoberfest

Multiple
Shift
Trauma?
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28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35

21
52
32
60
1
49
29
38

M
M
M
M
F
M
M
F

36 72
37
21

M
M

38 21
39
53

M
M

40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61

19
59
16
29
58
63
37
31
77
55
23
69
54
63
27
39
37
82
48
44
50
21

F
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
F
M
M
M
M
M
M

62 30
63 56
64 30

M
F
F

65 69

F

Penetration (stab wound)
Motorcycle crash
Motorcycle crash
Assault
Fall
Motorcycle crash
Motor vehicle crash
Vehicle vs. pedestrian
(other/unspecified)
Motorcycle crash
Self-harm; blunt
(other/unspecified)
Gunshot wound
Hanging
(other/unspecified)
Gunshot wound
Fall
Motor vehicle crash
Motor vehicle crash
Fall
Gunshot wound
Motorcycle crash
Motorcycle crash
Motorcycle crash
Motorcycle crash
Motorcycle crash
Motorcycle crash
Motorcycle crash
Motorcycle crash
Motorcycle crash
Motorcycle crash
Motorcycle crash
Motorcycle crash
Motorcycle crash
Motorcycle crash
Motorcycle crash
Vehicle vs. pedestrian
(other/unspecified)
Motorcycle crash
Motor vehicle crash
Vehicle vs. pedestrian
(other/unspecified)
Motorcycle crash

5
4
5
5
5
4
5
5

15
14
15
15
15
12
15
15

4
4
4
4
4
3
4
4

15
14

4 5 6
4 4 6

2nd
1st

14
3

4 4 6
1 1 1

1st
1st

15
15
3
7
15
15
8
15
15
14
15
14
6
15
15
3
15
15
13
11
14
15

4
4
1
1
4
4
1
4
4
4
4
4
1
4
4
1
4
4
4
3
4
4

2nd
1st
1st
1st
1st
1st
1st
1st
1st
2nd
2nd
1st
2nd
2nd
1st
2nd
2nd
1st
1st
2nd
2nd
2nd

15
15
3

4 5 6
4 5 6
1 1 1

Bike Week
Bike Week
Bike Week

15

4 5 6

Bike Week

5
5
1
2
5
5
1
5
5
4
5
4
1
5
5
1
5
5
4
4
4
5

6
6
6
6
6
5
6
6

6
6
1
4
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
4
6
6
1
6
6
5
4
6
6

Biketoberfest
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Bike Week
Bike Week
Bike Week
Bike Week
Bike Week

Biketoberfest
Biketoberfest
Biketoberfest
Biketoberfest
Biketoberfest
Biketoberfest
Biketoberfest
Bike Week
Bike Week
Bike Week
Bike Week
Bike Week
Bike Week
Bike Week
Bike Week

Yes
Yes

Yes

2nd
2nd
1st
2nd
2nd
2nd
2nd
1st

2nd
1st
1st
Yes

1st
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Of these 1,137 disruptions, communication issues represented 32% of the total,
interruptions made up 26%, and coordination issues were third most frequent at 21%.
Layout, usability, and equipment issues comprised 14%, 5%, and 2% of the disruptions,
respectively (see Figure 2.4).

Figure 2.4. Overall Breakdown of Major Categories During the Pre-Intervention Phase
Further analysis examined the difference in disruptions between resuscitation and
imaging. While the pattern of results was similar to that seen during the preliminary
analysis, some differences were observed. Although communication disruptions occurred
evenly in both phases of care (32%), interruptions were observed more frequently during
resuscitation (28%), whereas disruptions resulting from coordination problems were more
prevalent in imaging (26%) (see Figure 2.5).
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Figure 2.5. Overall Breakdown of Major Categories by Resuscitation and Imaging
During the Pre-Intervention Phase
In order to obtain a more detailed understanding of the types of disruptions
populating each major RIPCHORD-TWA category, fine-grained analysis of the data was
conducted. Within the major category of communication, disruptions largely consisted of
the following three minor categories: nonessential communication (37%), lack of
response (25%), and ineffective communication (24%). The remainder of disruptions
observed were divided among confusion (5%), simultaneous communication (4%), lack
of sharing (3%), and environmental noise (2%) (see Figure 2.6).

Figure 2.6. Communication Breakdown During the Pre-Intervention Phase
The two most heavily populated minor categories within interruptions were:
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spilling/dropping (27%) and distractions (24%). These were followed by
equipment/supplies (15%), teaching moments (11%), alerts (10%), searching activities
(9%), task deviation (5%), and interaction with biohazards (0%) (see Figure 2.7).

Figure 2.7. Interruptions Breakdown During the Pre-Intervention Phase
Minor categories making up the majority of coordination issues consisted of:
planning/preparation (34%), charting/documentation (22%), unknown information
(18%), and personnel not available (16%). These categories were followed by protocol
failure (9%) and personnel rotation (0%) (see Figure 2.8).

Figure 2.8. Coordination Breakdown During the Pre-Intervention Phase
Disruptions related to layout included wires and tubing (43%), inadequate space
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(38%), equipment positioning (14%), connector positioning (2%), furniture positioning
(2%), and permanent structures positioning (1%) (see Figure 2.9). The minor category
distribution in the usability category was computer design (30%), data entry (noncomputer) design (28%), equipment design (24%), barrier design (15%), packaging
design (4%), and surface design (0%) (see Figure 2.10). The only minor category
populated in the major category of equipment issues was general equipment (100%) (see
Figure 2.11).

Figure 2.9. Layout Breakdown During the Pre-Intervention Phase

Figure 2.10. Usability Breakdown During the Pre-Intervention Phase

52

A PROSPECTIVE INVESTIGATION AT A LEVEL II TRAUMA CENTER

Figure 2.11. Equipment Issues Breakdown During the Pre-Intervention Phase
The table below provides specific examples of the types of observations coded in
each respective RIPCHORD-TWA major/minor category (see Table 2.5).
Table 2.5 Examples of Specific FDs Observed and Coded in RIPCHORD-TWA
Major Category

Minor Category
Confusion

Environmental
Noise

Communication
(verbal and
non-verbal)

Ineffective
Communication
Lack of
Response
Lack of Sharing
Nonessential
Communication
Simultaneous
Communication

Coordination

Charting/
Documentation

Example
Trauma surgeon says "bilaterally". "What side?"
says the scribe
Trauma surgeon made a hand gesture to the
charge nurse from across the room asking them to
turn down the Vocera; charge nurse didn’t
understand; trauma surgeon said “turn down the
extraneous noise in the room.”
Needed an X-ray of the forearm/wrist; radiology
tech said “I’m going to do …., You want me to
do ….?”; physician responded, “I want you to do
the right stuff.”
Scribe yelled out to team, “Do we have a BP
reading?”; no response
Scribe calls MRI on the unit phone that is directly
across from CT scan only to find out that MRI is
already aware of trauma patient on their way
Nurses discussing a test they were studying for
Everyone trying to update the scribe with the
medications they had given; scribe said “Hold on!
Hold on! I am doing too many things!”
Scribe was asking trauma surgeon about
“missing” information on flow sheet while patient
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Personnel Not
Available
Personnel
Rotation

Planning/
Preparation

Protocol Failure

Equipment
Issues

Unknown
Information
Anesthesia
Equipment
General
Equipment
Perfusion
Equipment
Surgeon
Equipment
Alerts

Distractions

Interruptions
(Other)

Equipment/
Supplies
Interaction with
Biohazards
Searching
Activity
Spilling/
Dropping
Task Deviation
Teaching
Moments

was in CT scan
Team was looking for the trauma surgeon; asking
about his whereabouts
ED physician asked for radiologist to look at
scans; operator went to look for radiologist; he
returned to report that the radiologist was out to
lunch
Resident and team were locked out of CT room;
resident walked around to the side entrance of the
imaging suite to let patient and team into room
from the inside
Staff started to work on patient before report was
done. Trauma surgeon asked them to “Wait, hear
them out”
Nurse asks if blood stays with the patient; ED
physician responds “yes please”
[No specific events observed/recorded]
Nurse said, “[ED tech], I need a new pump and I
need a new pump quick! This one’s broken.”
[No specific events observed/recorded]
[No specific events observed/recorded]
Trauma surgeon asked nurse to adjust the Foley;
it was not in correctly
The nurse was called on the Vocera to assist with
another situation; she asked if they could call
someone else because she was still with a trauma
patient
The runner (ED tech) was asked/told to go get
more blood again
Radiology tech asked another tech to wipe down
machine because it had blood on it
Team member asked radiology tech for a nasal
cannula; radiology tech pointed out where they
were in the CT hallway
The surgical attending was kicking trash/stuff on
the floor out of the way so that he could brace
himself properly
Scribe says "I need two units of blood now"; ED
tech must stop blood draw to get blood from
pharmacy
One radiology tech explaining to another
radiology tech how to operate the X-ray machine;
had to provide direction
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Connector
Positioning
Equipment
Positioning
Furniture
Positioning

Layout

Inadequate
Space
Permanent
Structures
Positioning
Wires/Tubing
Barrier Design

Computer
Design

Usability

Data Entry
(non-computer)
Design
Equipment
Design
Packaging
Design
Surface Design

Team had to move one IV pole/ stylus to get to
another one; however, when they tried to pull on
it they realized it wouldn’t move freely because it
was connected to the outlet
Someone has to move a cart out of the way to
allow radiology tech to move out with equipment
Difficulty opening Omnicell drawers all the way
because a desk (not currently being used) was in
the way
7 team members are crowded around monitor in
corner by trauma bay #1 door looking at X-rays
As patient is leaving trauma bay to go to CT the
bed gets snagged on door and has to be reversed
Staff adjusting lines prior to transferring to CT
machine
Team member is stuck in their Personal
Protective Equipment (PPE) and needs someone
to help her get it undone in the back
Radiology techs looking at images and questions
if “[the patient’s] too low”; the other one says
“No, I think you’re fine”; then radiology tech tells
the one operating the computer that it’s not a
touch screen; radiology tech says “Oh, that
explains it”
Scribe visibly frustrated with the layout of the
trauma flow sheet (regarding the location of
certain items in particular)
Belmont rapid infuser rate drops because it is
running on battery
A team member walked over to help the ED
physician open/pull out the chest tube kit (in
general there was a lot of equipment used and it
took a lot of time to open each of these kits/sets
of equipment)
[No specific events observed/recorded]

Similar to the analysis of the major categories, the fine-grained analysis revealed
some differences between resuscitation and imaging that are notable. The most prevalent
types of communication disruptions observed in resuscitation were lack of response
(36%) and ineffective communication (31%), which occurred almost twice as often in
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resuscitation than in imaging (14% and 17%, respectively). On the other hand,
nonessential communication (55%) represented the largest threat to communication in
imaging, but was observed less frequently in resuscitation (28%) (see Figure 2.12).

Figure 2.12. Communication Breakdown by Resuscitation and Imaging During the PreIntervention Phase
With respect to interruptions, the most frequently occurring disruption in
resuscitation was spilling/dropping (40%) as compared to imaging (12%). Distractions
posed the largest threat to the team in imaging (39%), but not during resuscitation (10%)
(see Figure 2.13).

Figure 2.13. Interruptions Breakdown by Resuscitation and Imaging During the PreIntervention Phase
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In both resuscitation and imaging, breakdowns in coordination most often took
the form of issues related to planning/preparation (43% and 29%, respectively). However,
issues with charting/documentation (29%) occurred just as often as those related to
planning/preparation in imaging. Following planning/preparation issues, unknown
information (22%) was the next largest coordination issue in resuscitation. In imaging,
personnel not available (20%) was the next most frequently occurring disruption (see
Figure 2.14).

Figure 2.14. Coordination Breakdown by Resuscitation and Imaging During the PreIntervention Phase
There were several differences involving the specific types of layout issues
involved in resuscitation and imaging. Inadequate space was the largest contributor to
disruptions in resuscitation (48%) and it continued to be somewhat of a factor in imaging
(28%) as well. On the other hand, wires and tubing issues comprised of 65% of the
disruptions in imaging, whereas these issues were not as prevalent in resuscitation (20%)
(see Figure 2.15).
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Figure 2.15. Layout Breakdown by Resuscitation and Imaging During the PreIntervention Phase
The final two major categories, usability and equipment issues were both lightly
populated overall, representing only 5% and 2% of disruptions, respectively. With respect
to usability, the most populated minor category was computer design (38%) in
resuscitation, followed by equipment design (27%). However, the most prevalent
disruptions in imaging were related to data entry (non-computer) design issues (71%)
compared to only 8% in resuscitation (see Figure 2.16). Finally, equipment issues were
made up entirely of general equipment issues for both resuscitation and imaging and
occurred almost evenly in both treatment areas (see Figure 2.17).
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Figure 2.16. Usability Breakdown by Resuscitation and Imaging During the PreIntervention Phase

Figure 2.17. Equipment Issues Breakdown by Resuscitation and Imaging During the PreIntervention Phase
Frequency Comparisons
Frequency data was compared between the clinical phases of care (resuscitation
and imaging) using chi-square statistic (x2) goodness of fit tests. Alpha levels were
adjusted accordingly to maintain the family-wise error rate at p<=.05. The chi-square
statistic (x2) refers to comparing the expected values (Ei) with the values that are
collected (Oi) and is one way to show a relationship, or contingency, between two
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categorical variables. A significant chi-square indicates that the two variables are
significantly related. A chi-square test (x2) is the statistic of choice when the DV is a
frequency count, however, it is sensitive to sample size in that no cell has an expected
value less than one and no more than 20% of the cells can have an expected cell
frequency less than five (Bordens & Abbott, 2014; Boslaugh & Watters, 2008). The
formula for the chi-square statistic (x2) is depicted below (see Figure 2.18).

Figure 2.18. Chi-square statistic (x2)
Major categories by phases of care (resuscitation and imaging). For the major
category communication, a chi-square goodness of fit test indicated there was not a
significant difference in the frequency of communication disruptions identified in the
resuscitation phase of clinical care (32%) as compared with the imaging phase (32%), x2
(1, n=1137) =0.038, p=0.846.
For the major category coordination, a chi-square goodness of fit test indicated
there was a significant difference in the frequency of coordination disruptions identified
in the resuscitation phase of clinical care (17%) as compared with the imaging phase
(26%), x2 (1, n=1137) =14.087, p=0.000.
For the major category equipment issues, a chi-square goodness of fit test
indicated there was not a significant difference in the frequency of equipment-related
disruptions identified in the resuscitation phase of clinical care (2%) as compared with
the imaging phase (2%), x2 (1, n=1137) =0.513, p=0.474.
For the major category interruptions, a chi-square goodness of fit test indicated
there was not a significant difference in the frequency of interruption disruptions
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identified in the resuscitation phase of clinical care (28%) as compared with the imaging
phase (24%), x2 (1, n=1137) =3.385, p=0.66.
For the major category layout, a chi-square goodness of fit test indicated there
was not a significant difference in the frequency of layout disruptions identified in the
resuscitation phase of clinical care (15%) as compared with the imaging phase (14%), x2
(1, n=1137) =0.052, p=0.819.
For the major category usability, a chi-square goodness of fit test indicated there
was a significant difference in the frequency of usability disruptions identified in the
resuscitation phase of clinical care (7%) as compared with the imaging phase (3%), x2 (1,
n=1137) =9.626, p=0.002.
Minor categories by phases of care (resuscitation and imaging). Once 37
minor categories are broken down into treatment areas, the data sets become smaller or
more sparsely distributed, therefore, in order to avoid skewing the data, the chi-square
test included only those minor categories with an observed cell frequency of five or more.
For the minor category ineffective communication, a chi-square goodness of fit test
indicated there was a significant difference in the frequency of ineffective
communication disruptions identified in the resuscitation phase of clinical care (31%) as
compared with the imaging phase (17%), x2 (1, n=1008) =10.890, p=0.001.
For the minor category lack of response, a chi-square goodness of fit test
indicated there was a significant difference in the frequency of lack of response
disruptions identified in the resuscitation phase of clinical care (36%) as compared with
the imaging phase (14%), x2 (1, n=1008) =24.178, p=0.000.
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For the minor category confusion, a chi-square goodness of fit test indicated there
was not a significant difference in the frequency of confusion disruptions identified in the
resuscitation phase of clinical care (5%) as compared with the imaging phase (6%), x2 (1,
n=1008) =0.006, p=0.940.
For the minor category nonessential communication, a chi-square goodness of fit
test indicated there was a significant difference in the frequency of nonessential
communication disruptions identified in the resuscitation phase of clinical care (17%) as
compared with the imaging phase (55%), x2 (1, n=1008) =35.633, p=0.000.
For the minor category personnel not available, a chi-square goodness of fit test
indicated there was a significant difference in the frequency of personnel not available
disruptions identified in the resuscitation phase of clinical care (9%) as compared with
the imaging phase (20%), x2 (1, n=1008) =10.477, p=0.001.
For the minor category unknown information, a chi-square goodness of fit test
indicated there was not a significant difference in the frequency of unknown information
disruptions identified in the resuscitation phase of clinical care (22%) as compared with
the imaging phase (16%), x2 (1, n=1008) =0.037, p=0.848.
For the minor category protocol failure, a chi-square goodness of fit test indicated
there was not a significant difference in the frequency of protocol failure disruptions
identified in the resuscitation phase of clinical care (14%) as compared with the imaging
phase (5%), x2 (1, n=1008) =2.231, p=0.135.
For the minor category charting/documentation, a chi-square goodness of fit test
indicated there was a significant difference in the frequency of charting/documentation
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disruptions identified in the resuscitation phase of clinical care (12%) as compared with
the imaging phase (28%), x2 (1, n=1008) =14.493, p=0.000.
For the minor category planning/preparation, a chi-square goodness of fit test
indicated there was not a significant difference in the frequency of planning/preparation
disruptions identified in the resuscitation phase of clinical care (43%) as compared with
the imaging phase (29%), x2 (1, n=1008) =.013, p=0.909.
For the minor category general equipment issues, a chi-square goodness of fit test
indicated there was not a significant difference in the frequency of general equipmentrelated issues identified in the resuscitation phase of clinical care (100%) as compared
with the imaging phase (100%), x2 (1, n=1137) =0.280, p=0.597.
For the minor category distractions, a chi-square goodness of fit test indicated
there was a significant difference in the frequency of distractions disruptions identified in
the resuscitation phase of clinical care (10%) as compared with the imaging phase (39%),
x2 (1, n=1008) =17.320, p=0.000.
For the minor category teaching moment, a chi-square goodness of fit test
indicated there was not a significant difference in the frequency of teaching moment
disruptions identified in the resuscitation phase of clinical care (10%) as compared with
the imaging phase (11%), x2 (1, n=1008) =0.430, p=0.512.
For the minor category searching activity, a chi-square goodness of fit test
indicated there was not a significant difference in the frequency of searching activity
disruptions identified in the resuscitation phase of clinical care (11%) as compared with
the imaging phase (7%), x2 (1, n=1008) =3.279, p=0.070.
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For the minor category task deviation, a chi-square goodness of fit test indicated
there was not a significant difference in the frequency of task deviation disruptions
identified in the resuscitation phase of clinical care (5%) as compared with the imaging
phase (5%), x2 (1, n=1008) =0.099, p=0.753.
For the minor category alerts, a chi-square goodness of fit test indicated there was
not a significant difference in the frequency of alert-related disruptions identified in the
resuscitation phase of clinical care (7%) as compared with the imaging phase (13%), x2
(1, n=1008) =0.751, p=0.386.
For the minor category equipment/supplies, a chi-square goodness of fit test
indicated there was not a significant difference in the frequency of equipment/supplies
disruptions identified in the resuscitation phase of clinical care (16%) as compared with
the imaging phase (14%), x2 (1, n=1008) =2.236, p=0.135.
For the minor category spilling/dropping, a chi-square goodness of fit test
indicated there was a significant difference in the frequency of spilling/dropping
disruptions identified in the resuscitation phase of clinical care (40%) as compared with
the imaging phase (12%), x2 (1, n=1008) =38.568, p=0.000.
For the minor category inadequate space, a chi-square goodness of fit test
indicated there was a significant difference in the frequency of inadequate space
disruptions identified in the resuscitation phase of clinical care (48%) as compared with
the imaging phase (28%), x2 (1, n=1008) =7.087, p=0.008.
For the minor category wires/tubing, a chi-square goodness of fit test indicated
there was a significant difference in the frequency of wires/tubing disruptions identified
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in the resuscitation phase of clinical care (20%) as compared with the imaging phase
(65%), x2 (1, n=1008) =15.996, p=0.000.
Discussion
Analysis of data collected during the pre-intervention phase revealed that the
trauma team experienced an average of 17.5 disruptions per case, translating to one
disruption every two minutes. Communication related disruptions were most prevalent,
followed by interruptions and issues related to coordination. These results were similar to
related research in various healthcare domains (Blocker et al., 2012; Blocker et al., 2013;
Catchpole et al., 2013; Catchpole et al., 2014; Shouhed et al., 2014; Wiegmann, et al.,
2007). Disruptions associated with layout, usability, and equipment comprised the
remainder of disruptions.
While the identification of the major types of disruptions is important, this alone
does not provide the detail necessary to generate targeted, data-driven interventions. To
accomplish this, a fine-grained analysis was performed by classifying the data into minor
RIPCHORD-TWA categories. Additionally, in order to move away from the “one size
fits all” paradigm, the data analysis was further separated by treatment phase
(resuscitation or imaging).
The fine-grained analysis revealed three categories that accounted for the majority
of communication-related disruptions in resuscitation and imaging: nonessential
communication, lack of response, and ineffective communication. Perhaps these issues
are related to the inherent differences in training received by nurses and physicians. As
explained by Thomas, Bertram, and Johnson (2009), nurses are generally taught to be
descriptive in their thought and language while physicians are trained to be concise in
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thought and speak using shorter narratives. For instance, lack of response and ineffective
communication posed a greater threat during resuscitation, whereas nonessential
communication occurred more frequently during imaging. This is not surprising, given
the nature of the treatment during those phases. In resuscitation, a multidisciplinary team
comprised of a minimum of 8-10 team members is responsible for stabilization of a
critically injured patient. This process occurs at a fast pace and demands that multiple
interactions occur concurrently, heightening the propensity for dropped requests. On the
other hand, once the patient is stable and situated in the CT scanner, there is more down
time, relatively speaking. This provides an interim of reduced intensity, which fosters a
relaxed environment that is more conducive to nonessential communication.
Nevertheless, the importance of remaining alert to sudden changes in patient status
during this time cannot be emphasized enough.
Within the major category of interruptions, the most populated minor categories
were spilling/dropping and distractions. These categories not only accounted for the
greatest number of disruptions, they were the most disparate between resuscitation and
imaging. The spilling and dropping of items occurred much more often during
resuscitation than imaging. The combination of fast-paced resuscitation efforts alongside
team member’s interaction with various equipment and supplies may explain the
prevalence of issues related to spilling/dropping. On the other hand, distractions
represented a greater threat during imaging. This is consistent with the high volume of
nonessential communication during this time. Additionally, team members wear a
portable communication device around their necks called a Vocera Communication
Badge, which is tied to a communication software platform that is internal to the hospital.
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Oftentimes, trauma team members, and more specifically, nurses, were interrupted by
their Vocera device with questions unrelated to trauma that were regarding their primary
patients in the ED. A major difference between the trauma teams working in a Level II
and Level I facility is the non-intact nature of the team. It is comprised of
multidisciplinary group of individuals that must quickly leave their principal duties to
respond to the unscheduled arrival of a trauma patient. Interestingly, these findings are
similar to those of studies conducted at a Level I trauma center, which found FDs to be
most prevalent during the imaging phase of patient care (Shouhed et al., 2014).
Disruptions related to the retrieval of equipment and/or supplies due to an
unforeseen need were the next most frequent issue in both treatment areas. It is difficult
to stock or carry every imaginable item that may be necessary when caring for a dynamic
and relatively unpredictable patient load. For example, in one trauma case, a pacifier was
retrieved from another location for an infant who was crying during the CT scan.
The importance of effective coordination is vital to the safe and efficient care of
trauma patients. Coordination is difficult to manage in a hectic trauma environment,
where space restrictions, time constraints, and the number of personnel involved pose
unique challenges to providing optimal patient care. Overall, the fine-grained analysis
indicated that planning/preparation issues occurred most frequently, with a substantial
number of these issues observed during resuscitation, however, they continued to be
present fairly often in imaging as well. This observation may again be a manifestation of
the unique team structure within a Level II center that does not have an intact, dedicated
trauma team. Therefore, at the outset of a trauma patient’s unscheduled arrival there may
be no clear leader in the trauma suite until the trauma surgeon arrives, possibly up to 15

67

A PROSPECTIVE INVESTIGATION AT A LEVEL II TRAUMA CENTER
minutes later. Related research in aviation suggests that “rostered” teams (i.e., non-intact
teams) are less effective than “fixed” teams. For instance, rostered teams, unlike fixed
teams, do not call each other out on safety infractions (Barach & Weinger, 2007).
Charting/documentation and personnel not available followed
planning/preparation in terms of frequency, however, both issues were more prevalent
during imaging. Unknown information disruptions occurred at about the same rate in
both phases of care. Charting/documentation functions rest largely on the shoulders of the
primary nurse/scribe, or nurse recorder. Trauma resuscitation efforts are complex and
time-pressured during the initial evaluation and treatment of severely injured patients.
Yet, the system relies heavily on handwritten records and manual data entry for recording
and time stamping events. All the while, most of the information is conveyed verbally in
an unorganized fashion (Sarcevic, 2010). It makes sense that during the time when the
patient is in the CT scanner the primary nurse/scribe would tend to play catch up and
often recruit the help of other team members to ensure that the trauma flow sheet (the
only record of patient care) is as error-free as possible.
Disruptions associated with personnel not available speak to one of the more
significant differences between a Level I and a Level II trauma center. This may also
account for the increase in disruptions related to personnel not available specifically in
imaging. After the patient is stabilized in resuscitation, personnel enlisted from other
departments may migrate back to their primary duty stations, rendering them unavailable
should the need for their services arise again. This speaks to the previously discussed
disruption related to equipment/supplies, which involves the need for personnel to
temporarily leave to retrieve an item or a medication due to an unforeseeable need.
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Disruptions related to wires and tubing issues posed the greatest threat to layout.
There was a greater frequency of these types of disruptions in imaging as compared to
resuscitation. This is consistent with the observation that medical personnel must not only
physically move the patient into a confined space but also manage auxiliary clinical
equipment. On the other hand, inadequate space and equipment positioning posed more
of an issue during resuscitation than during imaging. This finding is understandable
considering the large number of personnel operating in a limited space around the patient.
This issue was exacerbated by the continuous need to reposition equipment (e.g., portable
X-ray machines) so that medical personnel could accomplish their individual clinical
tasks.
The last two major RIPCHORD-TWA categories, usability and equipment issues
were substantially less populated than the other categories (54 and 20 total disruptions,
respectively), which makes it difficult to draw definitive conclusions based on the results
of the data analysis.
Minor Categories Selected for Data-driven Intervention
Systematic analysis of the data and guidance from experienced human factors
researchers helped guide trauma administrators in deciding which types of disruptions
would be selected for intervention development. Results were communicated to the
Trauma Services Manager (TSM) and the Trauma Program Medical Director (TPMD) to
help them make an informed decision.
Overall, considering the rank of communication failures as the most populated
major category for FDs, it was deemed beneficial to identify one or two of its minor
categories to target for intervention development. Nonessential communication
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disruptions (37%) occurred at the highest rates within communication. Therefore, it was
recommended that nonessential communication be considered for future intervention
development. Although lack of response was the next most frequently occurring minor
category (25%), it was decided instead to explore interventions for ineffective
communication disruptions (24%). It was postulated that targeting specific issues related
to ineffective communication, which is formally defined in RIPCHORD-TWA as
“communication between two or more individuals that does not achieve its desired goal
(i.e., not covered by the other categories),” would most likely have a magnifying effect.
Rather than focusing narrowly on a single, very specific type of communication issue, it
was believed that efforts to improve communication in general would have a positive
influence on other areas of communication, and therefore, deliver “bigger bang for the
buck,” so to speak.
The next most populated major category was interruptions and within this
category, disruptions related to spilling/dropping (27%) occurred the most often overall
but to a much lesser degree in imaging. Whereas distraction-related disruptions (24%)
occurred only slightly less than spilling/dropping in general, it posed a greater threat
during imaging. As mentioned previously, resuscitation efforts tend to be hurried and
fast-paced, which may explain the prevalence of issues related to spilling/dropping in this
treatment area. Perhaps the introduction of a large mobile trash container to encourage a
more convenient way to throw away packaging and other materials may be a simple
solution. On the other hand, distractions can be more insidious. It is formally defined in
RIPCHORD-TWA as “non-essential personnel and other interruptions that draw attention
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away from the current task.” Therefore, it was recommended to include distractions as an
area to explore in regards to intervention development.
Coordination was also a highly populated major category and the most prevalent
disruption (37%) within coordination was planning/preparation. Planning/preparation is
formally defined in RIPCHORD-TWA as “the failure to establish a common set of goals
and/or procedures to accomplish a given task (e.g., having the necessary equipment to
complete the procedure).” Therefore, it was recommended that planning/preparation be
added to the list of minor categories that would be used to develop data-driven
interventions.
In summary, based on results of the fine-grained analysis and input from the TSM
and the TPMD, four minor categories were ultimately selected for data-driven
intervention development: 1) ineffective communication, 2) nonessential communication,
3) distractions, and 4) planning/preparation. These four targeted areas were deemed to
potentially have the greatest positive impact on quality and efficiency of patient care. It
was determined that these categories were highest in priority and, due to time and
practical limitations, should be the first and only four categories addressed in the initial
stages of the iterative process.

71

A PROSPECTIVE INVESTIGATION AT A LEVEL II TRAUMA CENTER
CHAPTER 3
INTERVENTION DEVELOPMENT
Introduction
Implementing quality improvement interventions and ensuring their success has
always posed a challenge in healthcare. Case in point, two recent studies reported that
mandated surgical checklists in Ontario, Canada and in Intensive Care Units (ICUs) in
Brazil had no beneficial effect in reducing in-hospital mortality (Authors/Writing Group
for the CHCKLIST-ICU Investigators and the Brazilian Research in Intensive Care
Network (BRICNet), 2016; Urbach, Govindarajan, Saskin, Wilton, & Baxter, 2014). Yet,
beginning with Haynes et al. (2009), which included Gawande, general and endocrine
surgeon and author of The Checklist Manifesto, and a number of other studies conducted
since that time, researchers have demonstrated that checklists are remarkably successful
and have been shown to reduce surgical complications and mortality by more than 30%
(Leape, 2014). Even so, it is not surprising that some quality initiatives fail due to
breakdowns in the implementation process and a lack of understanding that the “how” is
just as important as the “what” (Sundt, 2011; Wiegmann, 2015). Too often,
organizational decision makers, consultants, researchers, and the like create solutions and
deploy intervention ideas utilizing a “throw spaghetti at the wall and see what sticks”
approach, rather than seeking out an in-depth understanding of the intervention itself as
well as the complex and dynamic forces at work in the implementation process.
Wiegmann (2015) proposed a sociotechnical systems approach, which involves
dynamic interactions among system variables (i.e., people, tasks, technology,
environment, workplace factors) and transitions through specific phases of development
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to achieve intervention success. To sum it up, Leape (2014) labels intervention failures as
“a social problem of human behavior and interaction” and suggests “…successful system
change requires demonstrating the need for change, engaging institutional leadership,
collecting data, and most important, providing training in teamwork so that everyone
feels respected and accountable. The WHO [World Health Organization] recommends
adapting the surgical safety checklist to suit local needs, an approach that furthers team
building and a sense of ownership” (p. 1063). Leape (2014) offers this insight based on
his familiarity with a number of successful patient safety initiatives over the years. In
particular, he points to successful endeavors by Pronovost and colleagues with the
Keystone ICU project (Pronovost & Goeschel, 2005) and catheter-related bloodstream
infections (Pronovost et al., 2006). Pronovost and Goeschel (2005) outlined a five-step
approach for the introduction of safer care interventions in the ICU that reduced the risk
of medical errors. They contend that their model and interventions could be replicated in
any setting, with any advocates willing to embrace major change (Pronovost & Goeschel,
2005).
Previous studies in a Level I trauma center (Blocker et al., 2012; Blocker et al.,
2013; Catchpole et al., 2013; Catchpole et al., 2014; Shouhed et al., 2014) studied FDs
throughout the entire trauma care process (multiple trauma resuscitation bays, CT
imaging rooms, and ORs) and attempted to apply a “total systems analysis” to deploy
“complex subsystem interventions” (i.e., sociotechnical interventions), which included
task-, team-, environment-, and equipment-related solutions (Catchpole et al., 2014, p.
E2). Their analysis suggested targeted interventions related to coordination problems,
communication failures, and equipment issues. In addition to using FD observations to
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define problematic areas marked for improvement and to identify solutions, the
researchers conducted process mapping, interviews, and safety culture questionnaires.
From these interactions, a short list of subsystem interventions was developed and
deployed such as equipment storage, medication packs, employing a whiteboard, prebriefing, and teamwork training. Observational measures were re-initiated to gauge their
effectiveness. They found that this type of human factors subsystem approach reduced
FDs, treatment time, and length of patient stay (Catchpole et al., 2014).
Similarly, Hildebrand (2014) investigated the relationship between non-routine
events (NREs) which can be defined synonymously with FDs and team briefing
characteristics, in addition to variations in their communications in gynecological
surgery. The findings indicated that improving orientation briefings prior to surgical
procedures as well as variations within the team briefing (i.e., who was present, who led
the briefing, the timing of the briefing, the amount of communication), were associated
with fewer FDs observed during subsequent surgical procedures (Hildebrand, 2014).
However, it is unknown if either of these studies experienced long lasting clinical
benefits utilizing their respective interventional approaches.
Another compelling framework for guiding the development of interventions is
Haddon’s Matrix. This framework originated over 40 years ago and was used to apply
basic principles of public health to the problem of traffic safety. It is a conceptual model
that can be used to generate a list of prevention strategies in order to address a variety of
injuries or other public health problems (Runyan, 1998).
Just as this investigation has generated substantive data and empirical evidence,
devising comprehensive interventions to mitigate identified inefficiencies should also
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follow suit. In order to best capitalize on the unique potential for successful patient safety
initiatives, an evidence-based, system-wide collaboration approach was decidedly
paramount. Rather than using a traditional interventional approach, which tends to fall
flat in the real world, the researchers utilized an interventional technique that is driven by
empirical findings and relies on input from multidisciplinary healthcare professionals.
This method allowed practitioners on the front line to implement customized
interventions to problems they face on a regular basis. The benefit of this method was
that it allowed the "people in the trenches," or those individuals who have intimate
knowledge of existing threats to safety, to weigh in with respect to improving
performance in their own workplace. Fortunately, a more systematic methodology for
generating intervention and prevention strategies in this manner already existed.
Human Factors Intervention Matrix (HFIX)
The Human Factors Intervention Matrix (HFIX) is a system based on human
factor engineering principles that allows organizations to implement targeted, data-driven
interventions with the ultimate goal of reducing human error. This concept was
developed as an extension to the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System
(HFACS) framework conceived by Wiegmann and Shappell (2003). HFACS analyses
help identify underlying human factors issues that contribute to accident, incidents, and
near-misses in aviation as well as a number of other complex systems. By using the
HFACS framework to analyze aviation accidents one can identify areas in need of
improvement, and then, begin to develop interventions to address those specific
problems. This dynamic whole-systems approach to the safety management process,
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which includes generating interventions and prevention strategies, is portrayed in a flow
diagram below (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003) (see Figure 3.1).

Figure 3.1. HFACS System Management Process
Shappell and Wiegmann (2006) also provided a comprehensive systematic
methodology for identifying prospective interventions and ensuring the most expansive
assortment of interventions were considered to address the weak areas being targeted. It
is akin to the original Haddon Matrix method, which shows the host, agent, and
environmental factors set against the time sequence of an incident (Haddon, 1972).
Below is an illustration of the Haddon Matrix for a motor vehicle collision (Haddon,
1972) (see Figure 3.2).

76

A PROSPECTIVE INVESTIGATION AT A LEVEL II TRAUMA CENTER

Pre-event
(→ primary
prevention)

Host
Physical
Agent or vehicle
(person affected)
environment
Driving skill;
Car design &
Road design;
Time pressures handling;
Speed limits
(in a rush to get Anti-lock
home?);
brakes, etc.;
Inebriated?
Maintenance of
car

During the
Wearing
event
seatbelt?
(→ secondary
prevention)
Post-event
(→ tertiary
prevention)

Social environment

Reliance on
private, rather than
public
transportation
raises traffic load;
Compliance with
seatbelt laws
Air bags
Weather
Quality of
working?
conditions;
emergency
Size of car &
ice on road?
assistance;
crash resistance
Assistance from
bystanders
Tendency of car Emergency
Continued funding
to catch on fire vehicle access to for emergency
collision site
services

Ability to call
for help
(phone
available?);
Knows first aid?
Figure 3.2. Haddon Matrix for a Motor Vehicle Collision

The addition of a third dimension emphasized the multidisciplinary nature of potential
interventions and provided value criteria (e.g., feasibility) in the decision-making process
(Haddon, 1972; Runyan, 1998).
Along these same lines, the HFIX methodology ensures that factors affecting
human performance are addressed at multiple levels from multiple directions, thereby
promoting the development of effective interventions. This unique human factors
engineering process of developing and implementing targeted, data-driven interventions
utilizes SMEs. SMEs are those individuals on the front line of an organization as well as
administrative personnel. Together, the SMEs generate (e.g., brainstorm) intervention
strategies aimed at addressing specific human factors and accident causal issues. In other
words, this tool provides a systematic way of forcing individuals and groups to think
outside of the box (S. Shappell, personal communication, August 10, 2016). The HFIX
framework pits identified threats against five different intervention approaches, also
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known as traditional intervention approaches. These capture the underlying causal
mechanisms of human error and serve as fundamental ways to address the root causes of
errors and inefficiencies in systems design (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2006). The five
intervention approaches, or dimensions, are as follows (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2006):
1. Human/Crew-Centered: focuses on how the human can be improved or changes to
affect performance and reduce errors
2. Technology/Engineering-Centered: focuses on the use of tools/technology to
replace or augment human performance
3. Technical/Physical Environment-Centered: focuses on the threat to operational or
personal safety posed by a situation, event, or hazard
4. Task/Procedure-Centered: focuses on ways to change the nature of a task to reduce
errors
5. Organizational/Supervisory-Centered: focuses on how the organization can be
changed to improve performance and reduce errors
While generating specific interventions participants are encouraged to be as
specific, open, and free-thinking as possible and to not concern themselves with the
“how’s,” cost, feasibility, or effectiveness of implementing the intervention ideas.
According to Haddon (as cited in Runyan, 1998), “intervention feasibility” is an
important consideration, but it should not be contemplated until all other elements have
been thought out (p. 305). Haddon (as cited in Runyan, 1998) explained, “…by
considering feasibility too early, creativity may be stifled and options excluded that may,
in fact, be judged highly desirable by other criteria” (p. 305).
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While HFIX may prove useful in generating a number of comprehensive
intervention strategies, organizations cannot implement every single recommendation
conceived. Consequently, evaluation of each individual suggested intervention is
conducted during the next stage in the process. Participants in groups are asked to rank
the intervention ideas using the following five criteria: 1) Feasibility, 2) Acceptability, 3)
Cost, 4) Effectiveness, and 5) Sustainability (FACES). Each of these assessment criteria
are rated on a 5-point Likert scale, where 1 indicates “worst” and 5 indicates “best”.
FACES rankings can then be used to determine which interventions should be selected
for implementation (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2006). The criteria used to assess the
interventions is as follows (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2006):
1. Feasibility refers to raters considering the question “Can it be done?”
2. Acceptability refers to raters considering the question “Will operators accept it?”
3. Cost refers to raters considering the question “Can we afford it?”
4. Effectiveness refers to raters considering the question “Will it work?”
5. Sustainability refers to raters considering the question “Will it last?”
This process is designed to operate similarly to that of a matrix, which is why it is
so named. The final product is represented in a cubed structure such as the one presented
here (see Figure 3.3). This figure represents the threats identified against the intervention
approaches and evaluation criteria. Although this process may appear complex, in reality,
organizational decision makers utilize this third dimension all the time. Applying this
HFIX framework to map specific interventions onto a matrix can provide a broader
perspective while also enabling a more structured approach to intervention development
(Shappell & Wiegmann, 2006).
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Figure 3.3. Example of an HFIX Cube (HFIX3)
A key feature of the HFIX approach is to engender a feeling of investment and
accountability, ultimately, promoting a sense of ownership of the intervention tool by all
stakeholders in the process. The inability to include those at the “sharp end of spear,” or
worse yet, intentionally excluding their input, is one of the reasons why quality initiatives
often fail (Leape, 2014). For example, Leape (2014) responded to the Urbach et al.
(2014) study with strong criticism—98% of the Ontario hospitals self-reported using a
checklist, and of those who provided a copy of their checklist (92 out of 101 hospitals),
90% used an unmodified checklist. Leape (2014) insists that one cannot just “tick” off
items on a checklist instead it is more than that; it’s a tool for making sure teams
communicate. He goes on to suggest that more needs to be done to support “local” efforts
to implement checklists, including allowing those at the “sharp end” to make it their own
(Leape, 2014). This represents a fundamental belief in a commitment to empowerment
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and accountability for front line personnel (Stolzer, Halford, & Goglia, 2008). It is
imperative that researchers and developers design and apply the right tools and cultivate
the right environment to help caregivers attain their full potential. To that end, it is
evident that RIPCHORD-TWA is the “right” tool to employ to investigate FDs
threatening the efficient delivery of patient care in a Level II trauma center. It has
delivered on its promise to identify and classify disruptions in trauma care. With the
application of HFIX, another “right” tool for the job, it is expected that the information
gained from RIPCHORD-TWA can be used to develop targeted, data-driven
interventions to address and potentially mitigate those disruptions. Rather than using
HFIX to focus on accident investigation and error data, which was its original purpose,
this framework could be used proactively to study the rates of precursor events, a much
richer source of data, and ensure that organizations have sufficiently filled the gaps in
their safety, quality, and efficiency programs.
Method
Multidisciplinary Knowledge Elicitation (MKE)/HFIX Activity
A multidisciplinary knowledge elicitation (MKE) exercise was conducted on June
19, 2015 involving 19 SMEs and interdisciplinary personnel that included seven ED
nurses, four trauma surgeons, four ED technicians, three administrative personnel, and a
chaplain. Four human factors researchers facilitated the brainstorming exercise during
which intervention strategies were developed aimed at reducing the occurrence of the
four selected minor category threats to the trauma system: 1) ineffective communication,
2) nonessential communication, 3) distractions, and 4) planning/preparation. On May 29,
2015, an email was sent to ED staff inviting those interested in participating to attend the
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upcoming brainstorming session (see Appendix A). Participants were required to notify
the TSM if they were planning to attend. Participants were compensated with nonproductive pay by the hospital for their time. In advance of the meeting, respondents were
assigned to five groups in an effort to ensure that each group was representative of a
robust grouping of various hospital personnel and disciplines within trauma services.
Table 3.1 shows the group assignments and their roles (see Table 3.1).
Table 3.1 MKE Group Assignment and Roles

Group 1

Group 4

Trauma Surgeon (M.D.)

ED Nurse (R.N.)

ED Charge Nurse (R.N.)

Patient Access Manager

Chaplain

Trauma Services Manager (R.N)

ED Educator
Group 2

Group 5

Trauma Medical Director (M.D.)

ED Nurse (R.N.)

ED Nurse (R.N.)

ED Technician

Orthopedic Tech Manager (R.O.T.)

Radiology Technician

Trauma Registrar (R.N., Retired)
Group 3
Trauma Surgeon (M.D.)
ED Nurse (R.N.)
ED Educator
ED Technician

HFIX forms were created for each of the four specific areas targeted: 1)
ineffective communication, 2) nonessential communication, 3) distractions, and 4)
planning/preparation. Each process inefficiency form included its RIPCHORD-TWA
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taxonomy definition, a description of the HFIX dimension on which to focus on (Human,
Technology, Task, Environmental, or Organization), space to write up to 15 intervention
ideas, and columns to rank each intervention using the FACES criteria (see Appendix B).
A Microsoft PowerPoint presentation was delivered to provide a brief overview of the
research objectives as well as analyses and results of pre-intervention FD data observed.
Also, the purpose of the MKE and the HFIX model was explained and instructions were
given that included a detailed description of the five HFIX dimensions and FACES
criteria. Examples of specific FDs observed were also provided for each specific area
targeted and remained on the projector screen for reference throughout the exercise.
Copies of a detailed description of the five HFIX dimensions were available for reference
throughout the exercise (see Appendix C). Individual groups were asked to generate
various types of remedial approaches that centered around a specific process inefficiency
and were based on one of the five HFIX dimensions. Each group was given
approximately 15 minutes to write down as many ideas as possible. The forms were
rotated from one table to the next so that each group could repeat the process for a
different minor category process inefficiency and dimension. After all groups had the
opportunity to generate interventions for each specific process inefficiency and HFIX
dimension, forms were rotated again and the groups were asked to rank the generated
interventions on a 5-point Likert scale, from 1 being “worst” to 5 being “best” using
FACES. They were given approximately five minutes to discuss their rankings of each
intervention listed for a specific process inefficiency and dimension. The forms were then
rotated to another table so that the next group could repeat the process on a different
process inefficiency and dimension. After all groups had the opportunity to rank all of the
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intervention ideas the meeting was adjourned. The entire process took approximately two
hours to complete.
A schematic was developed based on the HFACS and HFIX intervention
generation model to illustrate the unique process undertaken at this hospital. It was aptly
called the Safety Systems Management Process (SSMP). It borrows from the insights of
an effective SMS, which was grounded in quality management principles as well as
quality tools and methods aimed at reducing accident rates. An SMS must be a closedloop system that requires constant monitoring, evaluation, and feedback into the system
(Stolzer, Halford, & Goglia, 2008) (see Figure 3.4).

Figure 3.4. Safety Systems Management Process (SSMP)
The specific task of those participating in the MKE is represented in the HFIX
Cube (HFIX3) as shown (see Figure 3.5).
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Figure 3.5. Intervention Generation Task Represented in the HFIX Cube (HFIX3)
Intervention ideas and rankings from FACES were transferred to a Microsoft
Excel Workbook in rank order from highest to lowest. The highest-ranking qualitative
data was analyzed by the human factors researchers to derive themes, or patterned
responses, by comparing theme frequencies, identifying theme co-occurrences, and
organizing relationships between the differing themes. Researchers also provided
commentary regarding whether an idea represented a clear intervention targeted at the
intended process inefficiency or if it was not specific enough. Finally, the file was
reviewed with the TSM and the TPMD for intervention selection.
Results
MKE/HFIX Activity Results
A total of 97 interventions were generated during the brainstorming portion of the
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exercise. Based on results from the FACES ranking task, 34 potential interventions were
considered for implementation. Table 3.2 lists the highest ranked intervention ideas
targeting each specific minor category threat (see Table 3.2).
Table 3.2 Highest Ranked Interventions Generated as a Result of the MKE
Group
Targeted Threat
High Ranking Intervention
Submitting
EVAC report-charge nurse to give the latest report to
Task
trauma team prior to arrival; updates from the field
Clear role identification-will be helped with role sticker;
Task
in cases increased staff to help with additional tasks
Scribe tablet Bluetooth to a large computer screen at
Technical
patient's head of bed on wall for all individuals to see
documented info
Ineffective
Communication
Mobile work space with tablet and printer for unit clerk in
Technical
trauma bay and dump into Meditech
Clear chain of command/leadership of physicians or
Human
nurses. Hierarchy of priorities/team captains
Human
Standard response to acknowledge communication
Communication improvement of the organization to the
Human
Trauma staff.
Leadership in the trauma room that addresses nonessential
communication and refocuses task. Hold people
Task
accountable. Semi-sterile environment in terms of
conversation.
Pre-arrival checklist includes a point about giving a
secondary contact for nurses involved in the trauma to
Task
prevent Vocera calls mid-trauma. "DO NOT DISTURB"
button.
After action review that includes assessment of
Task
nonessential communication (even in the absence of audio
visual ability)
Nonessential
Calling center-to hold all non-emergency call or all other
Communication
Technical
calls until a "All clear trauma"-avoid non-essential
communications
CT contact person to walk in trauma room to get the
Technical
essential info: what CT, essential lab values
Technical
I-stat results-to be given to CT staff by phlebotomist
Human
Roles of each team member defined
Transition care-nurses stay for overlap with change of
Human
shift
When MDs, lab, RAD, RN swipe badge a "clock in time",
Organizational individuals name, and credentials show up on scribe’s
tablet and on the large screen at patient’s head of bed wall
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Task
Task
Task
Task
Planning/
Preparation

Task
Technology
Technical
Technical
Organizational
Organizational
Organizational
Technical
Technical
Technical
Technical

Distractions

Organizational
Organizational

Organizational
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(reduces the scribes need to ask names)
Planning-pre arrival huddle/briefing. Charge nurse query
for as many details as possible from EVAC prior to arrival
Preparation-checklist for charge/triage nurse to get as
much info as possible prior to arrival
Coordination-letting scribe and staff know who was called
AND were they summoned, time AND plan; T.S.
role/requirement; Staff/team prompt T.S. if info missing
Coordination-call list in CT; board or list
Immediate debrief in ISC/nurses station-time permitting
after a trauma for correctly and incorrectly done,
opportunities for improvement
Large digital clock that talks and says, "5 min in", "10
min in", etc. to keep track of time
Circulating nurse to grant or deny entry
Physical barrier that prohibits unnecessary/unauthorized
entry to the area
Make sure OR room is Always open for TA until "TA all
clear"
Needle-less system-to give tetanus, instead of drawing up
meds
Thyroid covers-increase number
Distractions-nonessential communication in CT-not
allowed
Nonessential conversation in trauma bay-observers are
silent; no conversation not related to patient-all team
members to enforce
Charge nurse selects any nonessential personnel to remain
Garbage thrown in bin
Charge nurse or foreman/circulator to manage capacity of
the room
Physician policy of refraining [from] usage of cell phones
for non-trauma related purposes
Vocera group for only trauma group. Pre-arrival you are
removed from POD groups and have only trauma. Postdeparture you add yourself back to your POD groups.
Vocera can do NOT DISTURB.

For practical reasons, all 34 highest ranked interventions could not be introduced
simultaneously. For robust evaluation purposes and at the request of the TPMD, it was
established that no more than five interventions were to be implemented at one time. A
thorough review of the 34 highest ranked interventions was undertaken to identify
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recurring intervention ideas suggested by the MKE participants and to develop possible
themes.
A review of the highest ranked interventions included comparing theme
frequencies, identifying repeated and recurrent themes, and organizing relationships
between different themes. This thematic analysis revealed that 19 out of 34 interventions
followed a pattern and revolved around four central themes. Table 3.3 depicts the
clustering of individual highest ranked interventions that revolved around co-occurring
themes (see Table 3.3).
Table 3.3 Clustered Interventions Revolving Around Repeated and Recurrent Central
Themes
Group
Targeted FD
Intervention
Submitting
Theme 1: Identifying roles and clarifying duties of trauma team members; introducing a
role identification system
Clear role identification-will be helped with role
Ineffective
Task
sticker; in cases increased staff to help with
Communication
additional tasks
Nonessential
Human
Roles of each team member defined
Communication
Theme 2: Importance of leadership and leadership effectiveness within the trauma team
Ineffective
Clear chain of command/leadership of physicians
Human
Communication
or nurses. Hierarchy of priorities/team captains
Leadership in the trauma room that addresses
Nonessential
nonessential communication and refocuses task.
Task
Communication
Hold people accountable. Semi-sterile
environment in terms of conversation
Charge nurse selects any nonessential personnel
Distractions
Technical
to remain
Charge nurse or foreman/circulator to manage
Distractions
Organizational
capacity of the room
Theme 3: Integrating a checklist to structure pre-arrival trauma patient information,
including plan of action and expectations as well as the initiation of an after action review
or debrief
EVAC report-charge nurse to give the latest
Ineffective
Task
report to trauma team prior to arrival; updates
Communication
from the field
Nonessential
Pre-arrival checklist includes a point about
Task
Communication
giving a secondary contact for nurses involved in
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the trauma to prevent Vocera calls mid-trauma.
"DO NOT DISTURB" button
After action review that includes assessment of
Nonessential
Task
nonessential communication (even in the absence
Communication
of audio visual ability)
Planning-pre arrival huddle/briefing. Charge
Planning/Preparation Task
nurse query for as many details as possible from
EVAC prior to arrival
Preparation-checklist for charge/triage nurse to
Planning/Preparation Task
get as much info as possible prior to arrival
Immediate debrief in ISC/nurses station-time
Planning/Preparation Task
permitting after a trauma for correctly and
incorrectly done, opportunities for improvement
Theme 4: Utilizing specific and standard communication practices during trauma care
Ineffective
Standard response to acknowledge
Human
Communication
communication
Ineffective
Communication improvement of the
Human
Communication
organization to the Trauma staff
Leadership in the trauma room that addresses
nonessential communication and refocuses task.
Nonessential
Hold people accountable. Semi-sterile
Task
Communication
environment in terms of conversation
*This suggestion also overlapped with the theme
surrounding leadership
Calling center-to hold all non-emergency call or
Nonessential
Technical
all other calls until a "All clear trauma"-avoid
Communication
non-essential communications
Distractions-nonessential communication in CTDistractions
Technical
not allowed
Nonessential conversation in trauma bayDistractions
Technical
observers are silent; no conversation not related
to patient-all team members to enforce
Physician policy of refraining [from] usage of
Distractions
Organizational
cell phones for non-trauma related purposes

This review was presented to the TSM and TPMD, who selected the following
four highest ranking interventions for implementation: 1) introduction of a role
identification system utilizing stickers to identify team member roles and names; 2) a
formal leadership and teamwork training; 3) a pre-arrival checklist/brief and debrief; and
4) establishment of standardized communication protocols.
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Intervention Development
This phase of the study focused on the careful implementation of those specific
interventions that received the highest rankings and underwent systematic evaluation.
The data-driven interventions were: 1) introduction of a role identification system
utilizing stickers to identify team member roles and names; 2) a formal leadership and
teamwork training; 3) a pre-arrival checklist/brief and debrief; and 4) establishment of
standardized communication protocols.
Role identification and sticker system. The role identification system utilizing
stickers to identify team member roles and names was implemented shortly after the
MKE took place. The TSM created a .pdf. Microsoft PowerPoint file that explained the
sticker system and provided background information and directions. It was distributed via
email to all trauma team members on August 18, 2015. This was a common method for
the TSM to distribute information to the entire trauma team. Indeed, there were also a
number of other issues also discussed in the same distribution material. The Microsoft
PowerPoint file included the following updates: 1) how to use the elevators properly
when going to the Helipad; 2) backboard removal procedure; and 3) adoption of a more
common role identification congruent with many trauma centers verified by the ACS,
movement from Nurse A, B, and C to Primary Nurse, Fluids Nurse, and Procedures
Nurse including a diagram identifying each member’s role and duties. Efforts to improve
communication were also incorporated into this bulletin. Suggestions included addressing
team members by name to improve the teams’ communication as well as the physicians’
ability to know who is on the team and to better identify the intended recipient of a
request. In his book, The Checklist Manifesto, Gawande (2009) discusses the importance
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of making sure that everyone on the team knows one another’s names. Teams who know
members’ names work better together. Researchers found that when teams orientated
themselves in this manner, the communication ratings went up significantly. This method
of introducing themselves by name and role, especially with teams that are consistently
adding new people who may have never worked together (i.e., non-intact teams), enabled
team members to better assign roles and responsibility to avoid the tendency to work as
isolated units and diffusion of responsibility, meaning no one tends to help because the
responsibility is spread throughout the group (Darley & Latané, 1968). They also report
that when nurses had the opportunity to say their names and mention concerns at the
beginning of a surgical case, they were more willing to verbalize problems and offer
solutions (Gawande, 2009). In summary, the implementation of a role identification and
sticker system is a simple strategy that was put into practice to address those threats
related to communication and coordination disruptions, specifically, ineffective
communication and planning/preparation.
Pre-printed label stickers that had designated roles printed on them and a line to
write individual names were placed in the trauma resuscitation bay. A Sharpie pen was
attached to the label dispenser for writing team members’ names on the stickers. The
TSM discussed the sticker concept and reviewed the process and location of the stickers
in the pre-shift huddles on multiple occasions. Time constraints prohibited staff from
practicing the new procedure. Trauma surgeons were also given the same in-person
overview. Since the implementation of the sticker system was somewhat limited and
informal, the TSM decided the process needed to be covered more in-depth during the
leadership and teamwork training, which was planned for a later date and became known
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as the Nurse Leadership Training (NLT).
Nurse Leadership Training (NLT), pre-arrival checklist/brief and debrief,
standardized communication protocols. Following the MKE process and
recommendations, researcher efforts focused on creating an evidence-based leadership
and teamwork training. This training would be mandatory for all ED nurses since many
of them also serve in the role of trauma nurse. The objective of the comprehensive twohour training was to improve communication and collaboration and to highlight the
importance of enhancing nontechnical performance aspects of trauma care. Multiple
studies suggest that effective leadership is associated with better processes of care in
resuscitation and trauma care in general. For instance, studies have shown a correlation
between strong leadership and improvements in basic ventilation, chest compressions,
and more successful cardiopulmonary resuscitations. Trauma teams with a leader
demonstrated higher rates of task completion of their primary and secondary surveys (i.e.,
standards of care for the initial assessment of trauma patients) and reduced transit time to
CT (Ford et al., 2016). Additionally, teams with leaders who spend more time performing
procedures rather than prioritizing and delegating tasks to other team members are less
effective (Barach & Weinger, 2007). Moreover, since communication and coordination
disruptions were so prevalent in imaging, it was hypothesized that proceeding to imaging
with as much preparation and resources as possible such as a pre-arrival checklist/brief,
would help to reduce the frequency of these types of disruptions.
Most training programs do not address this broad spectrum of skills, and instead
tend to focus on advancing a medical professional’s technical skills (Arora et al., 2012).
These “soft skills” (communications, loss of situational awareness, problem
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solving, decision making, and teamwork) became known collectively as CRM and were
techniques embraced by aviation in the 1970s following a series of deadly accidents that
were found to be caused by pilot/crew error (Flin, O’Connor, & Crichton, 2008;
Helmreich, Merritt, & Wilhelm, 1999). Leadership and communication are essential
nontechnical skills that can directly affect the function and success of teams (Awad et al.,
2005; Xiao, Seagull, Mackenzie, & Klein, 2004). Failures in teamwork and
communication have been correlated with increased surgical errors and FDs in both the
OR and trauma care (Blocker et al., 2012; Blocker et al., 2013; Catchpole et al., 2013;
Catchpole et al., 2014; Shouhed et al., 2014; Wiegmann, et al., 2007). Strong leadership,
teamwork, and communication skills have been identified as key components in high
performing teams and improving patient outcomes (Leonard, Graham, & Bonacum,
2004; Lingard et al., 2004). Furthermore, a meta-analysis conducted by Salas et al. (2008)
maintained that team training is a relevant intervention for affecting team processes and
performance. A more recent meta-analysis by Hughes, et al. (2016) indicated that team
training is not only effective but also surpasses employees’ pre-training utility and
enjoyment expectations, induces learning, transfers learned material to the job, and leads
to improved organizational and patient results. Hughes et al. (2016) asserts, “Although
team training may receive less attention from healthcare managers because it is perceived
to be “soft skills” training, our results suggest that team training improves objective
criteria such as patient mortality, and surprisingly, stronger transfer of team training to
task performance than teamwork performance” (p. 25).
The customized training curriculum for the NLT included elements from a variety
of well-respected resources, including the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality’s
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(AHRQs) TeamSTEPPS® (AHRQ, 2016), Trauma Team Dynamics (Gillman, Brindley,
Blaivas, Widder, & Karakitsos, 2016), and Values Coach, Inc. (Tye, n.d.), all of which
are composed of teachable, learnable skills. The course outlined the roles and
expectations of the trauma nurses, introduced clearly defined tools to communicate and
plan, and included illustrative videos and simulation-based scenarios for practice.
Simulation-based training is a useful practice exercise to incorporate task and teamwork
skills. Core concepts of leadership, teamwork, and communication were integrated with
the science of human factors and its principles. Throughout the course, patient safety,
organizational culture, and culture change were emphasized. The NLT covered the
strengths and weaknesses of individual leaders in the trauma suite and how the trauma
process lends itself to the interchangeable assignment of a leader (Flin, O’Connor, &
Crichton, 2008; Sakran et al., 2012). This provided the opportunity to introduce a new
concept, namely that the primary trauma nurse would now be expected to fill the role of
team leader in the absence of the trauma surgeon. This designation was considered the
most logical one, because they already serve as the scribe, or nurse recorder, considered
the “coordinator” of the trauma suite, and is always present at the beginning of the case.
Another essential component of the leadership training was establishing effective
leadership goals, team expectations, and rules of engagement. Along those same lines,
nursing roles and responsibilities were revisited with a key focus on what characterizes
high-performing teams. This included the interplay between an individual’s positive
attitude, exceptional behavior, and enhanced cognition, also known as the ABCs of
teamwork (Salas, Rosen, Burke, & Goodwin, 2009; Weaver, Rosen, Salas, Baum, &
King, 2010).
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The training introduced specific communication protocols, information exchange
strategies, and embedded performance tools (EPTs). These EPTs included: 1) a team
readiness check-in checklist, 2) pre-arrival checklist brief/debrief, 3) call outs, 4) closedloop communication and read backs, 5) Concerned, Uncomfortable, Safety (CUS)
technique, 6) two-challenge rule, 7) redundancy and choice vocabulary, and 8) sterile
cockpit rule (i.e., elimination of nonessential communication) (see Appendices D-J).
These are tactics used regularly in high reliability organizations (HROs) such as aviation.
Research background as well as full descriptions, how-tos, examples, and practice
guidelines are available on AHRQs TeamSTEPPS® website. TeamSTEPPS® is
comprised of five core principles: 1) team structure, 2) leadership, 3) situation
monitoring, 4) mutual support, and 5) communication. Within these principles a variety
of skills, competencies, and tools are readily available to incorporate into training and
practice (AHRQ, 2016). Gawande (2009) explained how checklists, a classic tool
borrowed from aviation, can provide protection against such failures as faulty memory
and distraction. Checklists ensure that a procedure is performed the same way every time.
Recognizing the importance of adapting the checklist and pre-arrival brief to suit local
needs, the TSM worked in collaboration with medical human factors researchers to
customize the tasks on the checklist and verify that it was in line with human factors
checklist guidelines. Supplemental information regarding the proper way to utilize a
checklist, conduct an after action review, also known as a debrief, and avoiding
debriefing pitfalls were provided (Tannenbaum & Cerasoli, 2013). A recent metaanalysis by Tannenbaum and Cerasoli (2013) revealed effective debriefs boosted team
performance by an average of 25%.
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A key principle of the training was to address team dynamics and flatten the
hierarchy among team members through the use of unique communication tools. These
information exchange strategies were designed to empower individuals to speak up when
a concern arose and offer solutions. These new skills were simulated and practiced during
the training, using case scenarios, role-play, and prepared examples. Demonstrations
were integrated into the NLT that recognized the need for teams to compensate for one
another’s bias and weakness specifically in terms of how it relates to the concept of
inattentional blindness (Chabris & Simons, 2010). Other high-risk industries (e.g.,
aviation, military, maritime, nuclear power, auto racing) were also brought in as
exemplars and related to similar circumstances in trauma care (Catchpole et al., 2007;
FAA, 2016; NOVA, 2007; NTSB, 1996). In summary, the development of a formal
training program for trauma nurses, known as the NLT, that focused on the principles of
leadership, communication, and teamwork, and included such interventions as a prearrival checklist/brief and debrief and standardized communication protocols, was a
strategic measure aimed at minimizing the frequency of threats in all four specific
problem areas: 1) ineffective communication, 2) nonessential communication, 3)
distractions, and 4) planning/preparation.
NLT attendance was required for all ED nurses since many of them also serve in
the role of trauma nurse. Training sessions were taught by the TSM and scheduled at
various times to best accommodate the majority of employee schedules. Upon completion
of the training, nurses received a unique Trauma/Acute Care Team recognition pin that
communicated to others in the trauma suite that “I have taken the same leadership
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training as you and we speak the same language.” Nurses were compensated with nonproductive pay for attending and earned Continuing Education Units (CEUs).
Assessment of the NLT
After five training sessions were taught and 20 participants had completed the
training, the course contents and participants were assessed using a multi-method
approach. Immediate assessments were administered both before and after the training.
Participants completed a 12 question pre- and post-test to evaluate knowledge acquired
(see Appendices K and L). The test included several questions obtained directly from the
TeamSTEPPS® training curriculum (AHRQ, 2016). The TSM and medical human
factors researchers created the remaining questions to reflect the content offered in the
training. Responses to the pre- and post-tests were graded and recorded in a Microsoft
Excel Workbook by the medical human factors researchers including the participant’s
name and the date they attended the training. The average score for both the pre- and the
post-test was calculated as well as the average improvement from pre-test scores to the
post-test scores.
At the end of the training, participants completed an anonymous evaluation of the
training program (see Appendix M). Their responses and comments were sent directly to
the hospital’s CME Coordinator for processing. Overall results were compiled in order to
provide an overview regarding participants’ reactions to the training program in terms of
its content, delivery, and satisfaction on a 5-point Likert scale, in which 5 was “strongly
agree” and 1 was “strongly disagree”. Evaluators were asked to check specific items
related to what they learned from the presentation that would enhance patient care or
change practices. The assessment also included a question regarding commercial bias as
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well as a free response section.
Additional Interventions Introduced
Dating back to February 2015, a collection of system-wide interventions had been
steadily introduced to the delivery of trauma care as part of a “trauma optimization
project”, or TOP, as it was termed by the TSM. The presence of the ERAU researchers
was a catalyst for many of these changes, and as a direct result, a series of these
interventions were specifically identified during the MKE phase of the study and
subsequently enacted mostly due to their ease of implementation. However, others
evolved as a result of the ongoing review and discussion of FD observations and analyses
as well as the trauma center’s continued progress towards national ACS accreditation.
Table 3.4 includes a listing and description of the additional interventions introduced,
when they were implemented, and if they were directly related to the MKE (see Table
3.4).
Table 3.4 List of Additional Interventions Introduced
Date of
Count
Intervention
Implementation
1
1/1/2014
EMS handoff

2

2/1/2015

Required scribe to be an
RN

3

2/1/2015

3 RNs & 1 ED Technician

Comments
This is the expectation that all
team members should not move
the patient until EMS has
completed their report; this is
not an official policy but is
regularly emphasized; it was a
previous complaint by EMS;
has been "in place" since
approximately 1/1/14
Smith stated on 11/6/15 that
since putting an RN at the
scribe position flow sheet
documentation has improved
significantly
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4

2/5/2015

Trauma Update I

5

2/5/2015

Revised Flow Sheet I

6
7

2/5/2015
2/19/2015

Badge reader
Lighted scribe bedside
table in CT

8

3/6/2015

9

5/1/2015

Large mobile trash can in
resuscitation room
Clinical Coordinating
Team

10

6/19/2015

11

7/18/2015
MKE-related

12

8/1/2015

Multidisciplinary
Knowledge Elicitation
(MKE) Meeting
Boostrix prefilled syringe

Vocera App

PPT sent out by Smith; included
the following updates: minor
changes to the flow sheet,
difference between trauma
activation levels 1 and 2 and to
check box on flow sheet
indicating which activation
level, introduced new badge
reader to assist with flow sheet
documentation of team member
arrival times, reminder to
dispose of sharps properly,
suggested good preparation and
being well-familiarized with
equipment, difference between
massive transfusion protocol
(MTP) and "Emergency
Release" blood as well as
processing procedures, and a
reminder to wear PPE
Per Smith: "the trauma flow
sheet's been revised but the
changes are very few and not
significant in terms of flow"
Timestamps time of entry
A small adjustable spotlight
was permanently attached to the
bedside table used by scribe in
CT, which is dimly lit for
monitoring viewing purposes

Positioned in the ED to assist
clinical staff with clinical skills,
procedures, and equipment

This was the date we were
notified via email Smith was
ordering
Mainly for physicians to share
information with one another
regarding patients; HIPAA
protected; Smith stated he has
the app installed on his phone
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but has not learned to use it; to
his knowledge the physicians
are not currently using this
technology
13

8/12/2015
MKE-related

Trauma Update II

PPT sent out by Smith; included
the following updates: how to
use the elevators properly when
going to the Helipad, backboard
removal procedure, and
adoption of the more common
role identification congruent
with many trauma centers
verified by ACS: movement
from Nurse A, B, and C to
Primary Nurse, Fluids Nurse,
and Procedures Nurse, which
also displayed a diagram
identifying each member’s role
and duties, efforts to improve
communication, suggestions
included addressing team
members by their name to
improve the teams’, and in
particular, the physicians’
ability to know who is on the
team and to better identify who
to give an order to. This is
where the role identification
system utilizing stickers was
first introduced. It was
explained that pre-printed labels
with every role in the room
would be available with a spot
to write individual names name
on the sticker. A Sharpie pen
would be tied to the label
dispenser in order to easily add
name as the team is gowning up
with PPE. Since the information
was distributed without direct
guidance Smith decided to
discuss the sticker concept and
went over the process and
location of the stickers in the
shift huddles, however, they did
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not entail actual practice due to
time constraints.
4

8/12/2015

15

8/13/2015
MKE-related

Movement from trauma
nurse A, B, & C to
Primary Nurse,
Procedures Nurse, and
Fluids Nurse
Disposable pulse ox band
aids

16

8/18/2015
MKE-related

Sticker System & Role
Identification

17

9/1/2015
MKE-related

Ordered more thyroid
covers

18

9/11/2015

19

11/11/2015

Trauma Rounds (reinstituted)
Helipad training safety
items badge

20

11/20/2015

Revised Flow Sheet II

Rec'd an email from Smith on
this date "FYI: we added
disposable pulse ox band aids to
the trauma room today"
Per Smith: "I’ve been
discussing the label concept in
the morning huddles. They
don’t entail actual physical
practice due to time constraints
but we do go into the trauma
room to show them where they
are and then discuss the
process. I’m meeting with the
surgeons tonight to discuss with
them also (or really to remind
them!)." Covered in NLT
There was a recommendation to
order more thyroid covers,
which Smith did and he thinks
they were available in Sept.
2015. Update: we had a
discussion about this item on
1/21/16 and it reminded him
that he may need to order more
because he hasn't seen team
members wearing them lately
1100 in ISC Unit on Mondays,
Wednesday, and Fridays
Since 9/21/2015 we have
assisted Smith and the Aviation
Unit with creating the badge
and safety items
Sent an email out to trauma
team on 11/20/15 since they
were running low on previous
flow sheets so it couldn't wait
until Nurse Leadership Training
(NLT); minor changes
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21

11/24/2015
MKE-related

22

11/24/2015

23

1/18/2016
MKE-related

24

2/23/2016
MKE-related

25

2/23/2016
MKE-related

26

30

2/23/2016
MKE-related
2/23/2016
MKE-related
2/23/2016
MKE-related
2/23/2016
MKE-related
3/1/2016

31

3/4/2016

27
28
29

Digital Stopwatch/clock
(installed but not
instructed on how to use
remote yet)

This device has a remote that
someone has to be designated to
start the clock; Smith states the
instructions are not userfriendly so it is not regularly
used; need to get this device
working again. Update: On of
8/5/16 a PPT was sent out
explaining its purpose, how to
operate (instructions are in
trauma bay) and designating the
primary nurse to start
Applied for ACS
Which means the hospital has
consultative visit
approximately 1 year to comply
with ACS standards before
ACS will schedule a visit and
then within 6 to 12 months they
will have a final review.
Update: As of 2/7/17 Dr. James
stated they are not ready for
ACS verification
Two Barrier Arms
Update: As of 3/23/16 a 2nd
installed in J-Pod and
Barrier Arm was installed in the
imaging hallway
South end of the hallway (the
corridor leading to imaging)
Nurse Leadership
A total of 13 2-hour trainings
Training (1st one)
offered; 88 nurses completed by
6/21/2016 (last one)
Minimize nonessential
Covered in NLT/Sent an initial
communication in CT
email out to trauma team on
(initial email on 11/24/15) 11/24/15 in response to a
congestion issue in CT
Communication Protocol Covered in NLT
Team Readiness Check-In Covered in NLT
(Shift Huddles)
Pre-arrival brief
Covered in NLT
Debrief

Covered in NLT

New CT Scanner installed Dr. Johnson explains it has
in first room nearest to
better focus, clearer images,
trauma
less CT time, better quality, less
workstation work
Helipad training safety
Since 9/21/2015 we have
items poster
assisted Smith and the Aviation
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32

5/16/2016

Helipad recurrent training

33

6/7/16 & 7/5/16

Brief informal
presentation of NLT at
Trauma Committee
Meetings

Unit with creating the badge
and safety items
First one ever created and
instituted; plan to offer on an
on-going basis throughout the
year along with helipad training
for new trauma team members
Not all trauma surgeons present,
importance of new protocols
also mentioned by ED
representative at meeting on
8/2/16 and re-iterated by Smith
and ERAU team; NLT
Powerpoints have been sent
multiple times to trauma
surgeons

NLT Results
Beginning February 23, 2016, a total of 13 NLT training sessions were held at
varying times to accommodate the majority of the nurses’ schedules. A total of 88, or
99%, of trauma nurses completed the two-hour training. The number of participants
attending each session ranged from one to 11 and participants had varying years of
experience. Every course was taught by the TSM and was accompanied by at least one
medical human factors researcher to help supplement the course information.
Pre- and post-tests/knowledge assessments of NLT. A total of 68 (out of 88)
pre- and post-tests were collected and scored. Two participant’s scores were excluded
since they did not complete both tests. The average pre-test score was 74% (s=10.39) and
the average post-test score was 94% (s=6.98), which resulted in an average improvement
in the test scores of 20%.
A t-test for correlated samples was used to compare the two groups (pre-test and
post-test). The scores from these two groups encompassed basically two observations of
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the same variable on the same participants. The two means being compared were not
necessarily independent of one another, therefore, a dependent samples t-test took into
account any correlation between the scores (Bordens & Abbott, 2014). A dependent
samples t-test, was conducted to evaluate the difference between the pre- and post-test
scores. The test indicated the post-test scores were significantly higher than pre-test
scores, t (65)=-13.92, p ≤ .01, thus supporting the effectiveness of the training with
respect to knowledge acquisition.
On the post-test, Questions five and nine had a higher proportion of incorrect
answers than the other 10 questions, which prompted a further review. Regarding
Question five on the post-test, 21% answered the question incorrectly. Regarding
Question nine on the post-test, 18% answered the question incorrectly. In other words,
approximately 80% answered both questions correctly which does not justify eliminating
the questions all together.
Evaluation of NLT. The evaluation ratings on the quality of the course content
were calculated and submitted by the hospital’s CME Coordinator based on the responses
of individuals who attended the training program (see Appendix N). A total of 86 (out of
88) participants completed the evaluation form immediately following the training. The
questionnaire addressed four points in particular using a 5-point Likert scale where 5 was
“strongly agree” and 1 was “strongly disagree.” The four points were as follows:
1. Did the course meet the stated objectives? 94% responded that they “strongly
agreed.”
2. Was the course information current? 95% responded that they “strongly agreed.”
3. Was the educational level appropriate? 95% responded that they “strongly agreed.”
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4. Was the teaching method appropriate? 94% responded that they “strongly agreed.”
Given the data, it is evident that the overwhelming majority of nurses who took
the training felt that the information was relevant and useful to them in the performance
of their duties.
Discussion
MKE/HFIX Activity
New knowledge about how to precisely attempt to fix the obstacles these front
line practitioners cope with in their day-to-day work, especially while performing safety
critical tasks, was obtained by virtue of valuable SME input. The HFIX model proved to
be a useful tool for the development of effective intervention strategies rather than a swift
“knee jerk” reaction to fix a problem (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2006). This framework
offers several unique strengths that may prove beneficial in directly targeting the problem
areas. In comparison to other intervention strategies that have been publicized or touted
in journals, there is no doubt that the total package put forth in this investigation that
culminated with the application of the HFIX model stands out. First, HFIX offered a
broader perspective and a more structured approach to thinking “outside the box” when it
came to generating intervention ideas. It also ensured that a broad range of viable and
effective intervention strategies were explored. Additionally, it provided the ability to
map interventions onto five broad categories of interventions, which captures the
underlying causal mechanisms of potential human error. Second, it is known that the
prospective study identified the largest threats to safety within this trauma facility, which
were: 1) ineffective communication, 2) nonessential communication, 3) distractions, and
4) planning/preparation. HFIX helped to determine if the proposed and future
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intervention strategies had the potential to address those problems as well as mapping
exactly which types of human error might be affected by their implementation (Shappell
& Wiegmann, 2006). Third, this approach allowed those on the front line, who have
intimate knowledge of the existing threats to safety, to generate customized solutions to
the problems they face on a regular basis on the “shop floor” (i.e., the trauma suite).
Further, this approach fostered team building, a sense of ownership, and employee
empowerment and accountability (Leape, 2014; Stolzer, Halford, & Goglia, 2008).
Over 90 intervention strategies were conceived during the MKE, all of which
represented tailored solutions aimed at reducing the four specific types of threats
identified as most detrimental to the delivery of trauma care. The FACES ranking task
and the three-dimensional nature of the matrix, which are unique strengths of the HFIX
model, helped narrow down the list to 34 potential interventions. In other words, these
final 34 intervention strategies afforded stakeholders the best opportunity to fix their
identified problem areas and were based on both empirical findings as well as the
philosophical views of the “experts” involved. Obviously, not all 34 interventions could
be introduced simultaneously. Therefore, this number was reduced to a more manageable
collection of interventions by identifying co-occurring intervention ideas suggested by
the MKE participants and then developing central themes. This thorough review led to
the grouping of 19 out of 34 of the highest-ranking interventions into four central themes,
which were ultimately selected by the TSM and TPMD for full implementation. These
selected interventions were: 1) the introduction of a role identification system utilizing
stickers to identify team member roles and names; 2) a formal leadership and teamwork
training; 3) a pre-arrival checklist/brief and debrief; and 4) the establishment of
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standardized communication protocols.
All of the intervention strategies generated in the MKE and the final four
interventions selected for implementation revolved around a common theme. They are
about changing patterns of behavior rather than attempting to modify the individual’s
core personality. It is unacceptable for personality to be used as an excuse for unsafe
behavior at work. Instead, the chatty extrovert may have to learn to talk less and listen
more and the shy introvert may need to start sharing their thoughts about team goals and
planned actions. Equally, the insecure millennial may have to gain the confidence and
practice speaking up when they think the team leader is making an error (Flin, O’Connor,
& Crichton, 2008).
A comprehensive account of the development of these four highly specialized
interventions slated for implementation are described next in detail. A multitude of
resources were surveyed from psychological and human factors material as well as a vast
amount of healthcare literature and guidebooks from a wide range of HROs (e.g.,
aviation, military, maritime, mining, nuclear power, auto racing), which are organizations
who achieve exceptionally high levels of reliability (Hines, Luna, Lofthus, Marquardt, &
Stelmokas, 2008). Most importantly, in order to achieve success, an in-depth
understanding of the interventions as well as the complex interactions and dynamics
involved in the process is essential (Wiegmann, 2015).
By introducing these four data-driven interventions, the prospective collection of
disruption data in the post-intervention phase should reflect a change in practice
particularly as it relates to: 1) ineffective communication, 2) nonessential communication,
3) distractions, 4) planning/preparation. Comparison of disruption frequencies between
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the pre-intervention and post-intervention phases allowed researchers to gauge the
effectiveness of these interventions through real-time monitoring in a quantitative, datadriven manner. The thrust of this current study, and perhaps more important than the
actual results themselves, is that this successful process may serve as a model for others
to learn from and follow in their selection of appropriate intervention ideas and
implementation strategies. The SSMP provides a reliable tool for organizations to
measure their own risk so that they can begin thinking rationally and clearly while
planning their implementation strategies (Stolzer, Halford, & Goglia, 2008).
Shappell and Wiegmann (2006) conclude their discussion of the HFIX model
with a quote from Reason (2000) “[Human errors] are like mosquitos. They can be
swatted one by one, but they still keep coming. The best remedies are to create defenses
and to drain the swamps in which they breed” (p. 769). To take it a step further and
drawing on an analogy from Shappell and Wiegmann (2006), the RIPCHORD-TWA
taxonomy provides a view of the swamp and HFIX makes sure the right swamps are
drained.
Intervention Development
First, it is important to note the “experimental laboratory” borrowed for this
current study was a naturalistic setting where the researchers had little control over the
setup, environment, and inner workings of the people’s behaviors observed, the specific
tasks, or the future evolution of the project. The medical human factors researchers
provided guidance to key decision makers/administrators where necessary and
appropriate. For the most part, they were accommodating. However, ultimately, the
project catered to their time schedule, needs, and final decisions.
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The NLT course was created in an effort to improve communication and
collaboration and incorporated important concepts such as strong leadership, teamwork,
and communication. McCulloch, Rathbone, and Catchpole (2011) performed a systematic
literature review on the beneficial effects of teamwork and communication training for
healthcare staff and found weak evidence of improving safety or clinical care mainly due
to disparate measurement techniques and design limitations. However, the researchers
went on to suggest that those studies with a stronger intervention (i.e., high quality
teamwork training) provided more positive results and lasting improvements in technical
and clinical performance specifically in the reduction of errors. On the other end of the
spectrum, teamwork training based on CRM principles, at the very least, seemed to
improve cooperation and communication among team members over the long term (i.e.,
several months). There is no doubt that teamwork and communication training is a
complex intervention, and at this time, there are no clear recommendations as to the type
of training that should be provided and how (McCulloch, Rathbone, & Catchpole, 2011).
Perhaps this current study provides the scientific evidence that data-driven interventions
developed in a systematic manner will, in the end, produce real, trackable, and
measurable benefits.
The two-hour comprehensive course was designed using several resources which
included human factors principles and evidence-based fundamentals, including AHRQs
TeamSTEPPS® (AHRQ, 2016), Trauma Team Dynamics (Gillman et al., 2016), and
Values Coach, Inc. (Tye, n.d.), in addition to well-recognized research in the field. First
and foremost, the course illustrated the strengths and weaknesses of individual leaders in
the trauma suite, including the lack of leadership, which was previously identified in the
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pre-intervention phase of observation and data analyses as a possible source of observed
coordination disruptions. The trauma surgeon is considered the discernible team
“captain,” however, due the structure of this particular trauma system (i.e., Level II), the
trauma team is considered non-intact. Therefore, the trauma process lends itself better to
the interchangeable assignment of a leader, which lends to nomination of the nursing
staff, specifically the primary trauma nurse, who is assigned the task of scribe, or nurse
recorder (Flin, O’Connor, & Crichton, 2008; Sakran et al., 2012). This individual is
always present at the beginning of the case, whereas the trauma surgeon may not be.
Emphasis was placed on establishing rules of engagement, effective leadership
goals, and team expectations, including re-visiting nursing roles and responsibilities, with
a key focus on what comprises high-performing teams and the interplay between an
individual’s positive attitudes, exceptional behaviors, and enhanced cognitions, also
known as the ABCs of teamwork, during the delivery of trauma care (Salas et al., 2009;
Weaver et al., 2010). A plethora of demonstrations were presented to foster the
recognition of compensating for team members’ bias and weakness and how it relates to
the concept of inattentional blindness (Chabris & Simons, 2010).
Communication protocols and information exchange strategies were simulated
and practiced during the course, which integrated case scenarios, role play, and prepared
examples. The need for a nurse to assert communicative authority with hierarchical
figures such as trauma surgeons and ED physicians was rehearsed with an opportunity for
healthy feedback from both the instructor and peers. Other high-risk industries (e.g.,
aviation, military, maritime, nuclear power, auto racing) were looked to as exemplars and
compared and contrasted with trauma care. In particular, EPTs, which are used regularly
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to achieve high reliability and zero error rates, were introduced. These EPTs included: 1)
a team readiness check-in, 2) pre-arrival brief/debrief, 3) call outs, 4) closed-loop
communication and read backs, 5) CUS technique, 6) two-challenge rule, 7) redundancy
and choice vocabulary, and 8) sterile cockpit rule (i.e., elimination of nonessential
communication) (see Appendices D-J). Patient safety, organizational culture, and culture
change were also themes that were emphasized throughout the course curriculum.
In summary, the multiple methods employed to assess the NLT, the pre- and posttests and the evaluation questionnaire, provided supporting evidence regarding the
effectiveness of the training. The difference between the pre-test scores and the post-test
scores indicated that participants gained novel knowledge and learned new skills that will
lead to enhanced patient care and/or changed practices. Furthermore, the high evaluation
ratings and comments received indicated that attendees were very satisfied with the
content and delivery of the training.
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CHAPTER 4
POST-INTERVENTION PHASE AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSES
Introduction
To determine the effects of the four data-driven interventions the pre-intervention
threat windows data analysis was compared to data collected post-intervention. The
overarching question was: Have those areas regarded as high in disruption frequency and
most detrimental been mitigated by the systematic introduction of the selected
interventions? In other words, were the interventions effective in addressing and
potentially reducing those disruptions threatening the optimal delivery of trauma care?
The post-intervention phase of the study focused on evaluating the effectiveness
of the interventions put in place through prospective observation once again and
conducting subsequent analyses of FD data to measure the overall changes postintervention. If the results revealed that the interventions were not effective, the SSMP
model developed as part of this current study is iterative in nature, thus, researchers can
pinpoint exactly where the problems lie, then go back to the drawing board to generate a
series of new potential solutions in order to “try, try, and try again”, as the old adage
goes.
This prospective study previously identified several types of threats that are
known contributors to patient harm, most notably communication failures, interruptions,
and coordination breakdowns. Results of the pre-intervention phase indicated that these
types of threats were occurring at unacceptable levels in a Level II trauma center. While
the identification of the major types of FDs is clearly important, this alone does not
provide the level of resolution necessary to generate data-driven interventions. The
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researchers conducted a fine-grained analysis of the data by classifying it into minor
RIPCHORD-TWA categories, separating the data by phase of care (resuscitation and
imaging). Thus, four specific types of threats were isolated and deemed to have the most
detrimental impact on quality and efficiency: 1) ineffective communication, 2)
nonessential communication, 3) distractions, and 4) planning/preparation. In response,
four evidence-based interventions were generated and implemented, aimed at mitigating
those particular process inefficiencies threatening the delivery of optimal care to the
critical patient. After implementing carefully designed and developed, data-driven
interventions in a systematic manner, researchers anticipated observing, a quantifiable
reduction in those most prevalent and detrimental threats.
This current study emphasizes the utility of FD data in that it serves as an
objectively measurable outcome as well as the basis for seeking continuous improvement.
The FDs represented threat windows—left unchecked, these threat windows not only
have the potential to become routine and commonplace in the system, but they may also
negatively influence a caregiver’s ability to counteract subsequent disruptions or major
events (Boquet et al., 2017b; Cohen et al., 2016; Palmer et al., 2013; Wong et al., 2007).
Ultimately, this approach afforded researchers the ability to address inefficiencies
proactively. This technique serves to eliminate, or at the very least mitigate, the breeding
grounds for these threats, which have been correlated with the genesis of adverse events
and errors in the first place.
In recent years, the healthcare industry has placed great emphasis on analyzing
adverse events and errors and their relationship to negative patient outcomes, focusing
more on the outcomes than on processes. Despite enormous efforts, the medical
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community still struggles to reduce patient morbidity and mortality directly related to
preventable medical mistakes (James, 2013; Makary & Daniel, 2016). In other words,
concentrating the focus solely on outcomes and adverse events has failed to make
medicine “safer.” Naturally, the next step would be to understand why this is the case.
First, while these measures are noteworthy, they focus on incidents after they
have occurred and the patient has already been harmed (Hildebrand, 2014). This reactive
course of managing errors and adverse events is no different than treating an already sick
patient. It makes more sense to act proactively by identifying system weaknesses that
precede errors, rather than waiting for errors to occur. Much like a true SMS, the most
important role is not the analysis of a particular event, instead it is exposing the
precursors of such an event (Stolzer, Halford, & Goglia, 2008). Second, these reactive
measures often require large-scale studies and a high number of participants to see
significant results. Third, in the general scheme of things, sentinel events and reportable
medical errors are rare. In contrast, disruptions and threats occur much more frequently
and are observable during daily practice. Fourth, the stigma associated with the capture of
adverse events and errors has the potential to lead to blame, which may stifle exploratory
efforts by limiting the focus of the investigation to the “sharp end of the spear.” Finally,
outcome measures such as reductions in medical errors, adverse events, and mortality are
remote outcomes that are lagging indicators. Thus, they do not reveal much about the
real-time complications occurring on the ground and the effectiveness of the
interventions implemented (Hildebrand, 2014).
If we are to overcome these limitations, and contribute lasting improvements to
creating a safer healthcare system, the approach to solving the problem must change.
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Improving the “communication culture,” remediating flawed coordination, and
counteracting distractions are all imperative modifications because of their insidious
nature and pervasiveness. Patients deserve a healthcare without the worry of being
harmed by the system itself. Perhaps the approach taken in this current study, which is
armed with both quantitative and qualitative results as well as an overall process for
assessment, will inspire other healthcare domains to develop and support similar
programs.
Method
Population
Experienced medical human factors researchers re-commenced observations at
the same Level II trauma center, an East Central Florida community hospital. Due to the
critical condition of incoming trauma patients, it was not possible to obtain their consent
to participate in the study. The hospital’s Research Oversight Committee approved the
study as a quality improvement project. It was exempt from IRB review as the focus was
on disruptions involved in the trauma care process rather than clinical outcomes of the
patient. In accordance with HIPAA and the PHI Privacy Rule, all health information
pertaining to the patient was protected. There was no effort made on the part of the
researchers to collect personal and/or identifying information specific to either the
patients undergoing treatment or the hospital personnel providing care. Data extraction
beyond that collected on-site was performed by the PIs holding clinical privileges at the
hospital. Furthermore, all data extracted was de-identified by the PIs in accordance with
HIPPA guidelines and was concerned only with demographics and processes associated
with the delivery of care. Hospital staff and trauma team members were made aware of
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the presence and research goals of the observers (see Appendix O). Specific
demographics such as gender and age, MOI, and GCS scores were recorded for each
patient.
Procedure
Data collection. Beginning on July 8, 2016 and continuing through December 26,
2016 medical human factors researchers observed 52 complete (“wheels in” to “wheels
out”) trauma cases during normal and peak (i.e., Biketoberfest) operational times. The
researchers recorded FDs in the same manner in the previous 65 trauma cases observed.
FDs were operationally defined as those events that result in a disturbance in a team
member’s progress or any other delay. Researchers possessed medical or human factors
background or both and underwent a comprehensive educational process to ensure they
can properly identify disruptions and process inefficiencies. In addition, the hospital
adheres to strict ethical standards for the use of human participants in conducting
research, therefore, researchers were required to complete the IRB training, an online
training module through CITI.
Prospective data collection began at the time the patient arrived in the trauma
resuscitation bay. Data collection continued through imaging and terminated upon
disposition to surgery, the medical floor unit, or the ED. Observers recorded the time the
patient was wheeled into the trauma resuscitation bay and the time they were wheeled
out. Likewise, the time was noted when the patient was wheeled into and out of imaging.
For recording purposes, the patient’s transport time between resuscitation and imaging
was considered still under the auspices of resuscitation since an official handoff to
imaging has not yet occurred. Lastly, observers were provided with an observational
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template to assist them in documenting whether the implemented interventions were
carried out during the observed case, namely: 1) role identification system utilizing
stickers to identify team member roles and names, 2) quality of the pre-arrival brief, and
3) communication protocols (see Appendix P).
FD observations were documented in real-time in a free-response format using
paper and pencil or digitally recorded using an electronic tablet. Observations and time
spent in resuscitation and imaging were transferred to a Microsoft Excel Workbook for
consensus coding and subsequent statistical analysis.
Data coding and classification. Disruptions were classified once again using the
human factors taxonomy RIPCHORD-TWA (Boquet et al., 2017b; Cohen et al., 2016) by
at least two or more human factors researchers through consensus coding.
Data analysis. Descriptive statistics were calculated, including frequency of the
threats observed and percentage of disruptions by category. Likewise, inferential statistics
were calculated in regards to comparing frequency data between baseline1/preintervention and baseline 2/pre-intervention, pre-intervention and post-intervention
phases, and clinical phases of care (resuscitation and imaging). The time elapsed during
the case, whether in resuscitation or imaging, as well as the number of threats that
occurred over an elapsed period of time were also calculated. These through-put
measures provided an estimate of how often FDs occurred per minute, allowing
researchers to gauge the “window of opportunity” for potential adverse events to occur.
Additionally, observational data was reviewed to determine how often the role
identification stickers with names were donned, if the pre-arrival brief was conducted,
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and the quality of the pre-arrival brief. The pre-arrival brief was considered effective if
Steps 1, 2, and 3 were completed (see Appendix E).
Additional Interventions Introduced During the Post-Intervention Phase
Throughout the post-intervention phase, system-wide interventions continued to
be introduced as part of the “trauma optimization project,” or TOP. Table 4.1 includes a
listing and description of the interventions introduced, when they were implemented, and
if they were directly related to the MKE (see Table 4.1). One initiative that occurred
during this phase of the study stands out because it involved a major change within the
trauma program. Hospital administrators decided to end contractual services with the
long-standing trauma surgeon group and contract with a new trauma surgeon group. This
transition began on October 17, 2016, nearly halfway through the post-intervention phase
observational period. It is important to note that two of the trauma surgeons from the
original contracted group remained on staff, however, three new trauma surgeons joined
the team.
Table 4.1 List of Additional Interventions Introduced During the Post-Intervention Phase
Date of
Count
Intervention
Comments
Implementation
34
10/14/16
Emailed “Trauma at X: A Smith emailed to trauma
Change in Practice and a
surgeons and staff
Change in Culture”-a
reminder of NLT
practices
35

10/17/16

An administrative
contractual review
resulted in a transition
from the long-standing
trauma surgical team to a
new trauma surgical team
(2 original trauma
surgeons remained on
staff, however, 3 new
trauma surgeons joined
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the team)
36

11/6/16

37

11/16/16

38

1/12/2017

Created a “Welcome to X
Trauma” standard email
to introduce new trauma
surgeons to trauma
operating procedures and
expectations

Included brief information
regarding sticker system, prearrival brief and debrief, and
communication protocols;
described the trauma alert
criteria, arrival time, and badge
reader
Revised Shift HuddleIn response to team members
Readiness Check-In and
who had not completed helipad
an accompanying email to training that were assisting with
ED nursing staff
air transports on the roof;
explaining the new
additionally, team members
revisions to the Check-In were occasionally being
and how to
assigned to a trauma team w/o
being TNCC trained
Transitioning outline
Email outlined expectations for
created and sent to key
continuing the helipad trainings,
administrators by Smith
on-going chart review by the
in anticipation of his
trauma medical director,
resignation
“incentive shift” explanation,
routine review of administrative
policies and clinical practice
trauma guidelines, and
maintaining the
Multidisciplinary Trauma
Conferences, Trauma
Committee meetings, and PeerReview meetings

Post-Intervention Phase Results
Analysis of FD Data
Of the total sample of 52 post-intervention trauma cases, the average age of the
patient (male=38, female=14) was 52.5 (s=19.7). The mean GCS score of the sample
cases was 12 (s=5.1). A total of 32, or 62% of the trauma cases occurred during the first
shift (7:00a.m.-7:00p.m.), and 20, or 38% occurred during the second shift (7:00p.m.7:00a.m.). Six of the trauma cases, or 12%, were observed during peak operational times
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(i.e., Biketoberfest). Additionally, five of the observed cases, or 10%, were considered
multiple traumas, meaning more than one trauma patient arrived at the same time and
were treated simultaneously by multiple trauma teams. The breakdown for MOI is as
follows: falls (11 or 21%), motor vehicle crashes (15 or 29%), motorcycle crashes (7 or
13%), stab wounds (4 or 8%), gunshot wounds (1 or 2%), and other/unspecified (14 or
27%). Two cases labeled “other” MOIs involved two simultaneous cases of trauma
patients who were in a small airplane crash, one patient being the pilot, and the other
being the passenger. Nine of these “other” cases involved pedestrians or bicyclists that
were struck by a motor vehicle. The post-intervention phase data sample contained no
cases involving assault or burn patients (see Table 4.2).
A total of 939 disruptions were identified during the 52 observed cases (2,081
patient contact minutes). This translated to 18 disruptions per case (s=7.5), or
approximately one disruption occurred every two minutes. The average total treatment
time per case was 40 minutes (s=16). A total of 486 disruptions were identified in
resuscitation alone (954 patient contact minutes), with treatment time averaging just over
18 minutes (s=12.5); this translated to more than nine disruptions per case (s=6.3). In
imaging, there were a total of 453 identified disruptions (1,113 patient contact minutes),
with treatment time averaging just over 21 minutes (s=9.89); this translated to almost
nine disruptions per case (s=4.8). Furthermore, the overall ratio of the number of FDs per
minute, or the through-put measure, was 0.47 per minute. More specifically, the throughput ratios were 0.53 per minute in resuscitation and 0.42 per minute in imaging.
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Table 4.2 Post-Intervention Phase Patient Demographics
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32

67
68
69

67
25
68

70
71

61
58

72
73
74

8
51
57

75
76
77
78

58
44
49
86

79
80

40
57

81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89

22
58
18
90
71
43
53
81
23

90

16

91
92
93

84
51
45

94
95

65
63

Pt

S
Mechanism
G E V M
e
Of
C
Event
x
Injury
S
F Vehicle vs.
8
1 3 4
pedestrian
(other/unspecified)
M Motor vehicle crash
15 4 5 6
M Motor vehicle crash
3
1 1 1
M Scooter (motorized/
3
1 1 1
motorcycle crash)
F Gunshot wound
3
1 1 1
M Machine tool
15 4 5 6
(other/unspecified)
M Motor vehicle crash
15 4 5 6
F Fall
3
1 1 1
M Vehicle vs. bicycle
15 4 5 6
(other/unspecified)
M Motor vehicle crash
3
1 1 1
M Motor vehicle crash
15 4 5 6
F Motor vehicle crash
3
1 1 1
M Penetration (stab
11 4 1 6
wound)
M Motor vehicle crash
15 4 5 6
M Unknown
3
1 1 1
(other/unspecified)
M Motorcycle crash
3
1 1 1
M Fall
15 4 5 6
M Motor vehicle crash
15 4 5 6
F Motor vehicle crash
15 4 5 6
F Motor vehicle crash
15 4 5 6
F Fall
13 4 4 5
M Fall
15 4 5 6
F Motor vehicle crash
15 4 5 6 Biketoberfest
M Vehicle vs.
15 4 5 6 Biketoberfest
pedestrian
(other/unspecified)
M Sports
15 4 5 6 Biketoberfest
(other/unspecified)
M Fall
15 4 5 6 Biketoberfest
M Motorcycle crash
15 4 5 6 Biketoberfest
F Motorcycle crash
15 4 5 6 Biketoberfest
New Contracted Trauma Surgeon Group Took Over
M Motorcycle crash
3
1 1 1
M Vehicle vs.
3
1 1 1

Multiple
Trauma?

Shift
1st

1st
2nd
1st
2nd
1st
Yes
Yes

2nd
2nd
2nd
1st
1st
1st
1st
1st
2nd
2nd
2nd
2nd
1st
1st
1st
1st
1st
1st

2nd
Yes

1st
2nd
1st
1st
1st
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pedestrian
(other/unspecified)
96
52 M Penetration (stab
wound)
97
51 M Pedestrian vs. vehicle
(other/unspecified)
98
62 M Penetration/blunt
force (stab wound)
99
35 M Motorcycle crash
100 68 F Fall
101 32 M Motorcycle crash
102 65 M Vehicle vs.
pedestrian
(other/unspecified)
103 74 M Vehicle vs.
pedestrian
(other/unspecified)
104 31 F Vehicle vs.
pedestrian
(other/unspecified)
105 39 M Aircraft accident
(other/unspecified)
106 50 M Aircraft accident
(other/unspecified)
107 60 M Fall
108 23 F Motor vehicle crash
109 53 M Fall
110 61 F Motor vehicle crash
111 87 M Fall
112 63 M Motor vehicle crash
113 59 M Vehicle vs. bicycle
(other/unspecified)
114 66 M Fall
115 25 M Penetration (stab
wound)
116 78 F Motor vehicle crash
117 52 M Fall
Note. n=52 cases.
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4
4
1
4
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5
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1
5
5
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15
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4 5

6
6
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15

1 1
4 5

1
6
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1st

Of these 939 disruptions, post-intervention communication issues represented
32%, interruptions were comprised of 30%, and coordination issues were the third most
prevalent at 18%. Layout, usability, and equipment issues included 15%, 2%, and 2% of
the disruptions, respectively, in the post-intervention phase (see Figure 4.1).
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Figure 4.1. Overall Breakdown of Major Categories During the Post-Intervention Phase
Further analysis examined the difference in the post-intervention disruptions
between resuscitation and imaging. First, communication disruptions occurred less often
in resuscitation (27%) than in imaging (38%). Post-intervention coordination issues were
also less frequent in resuscitation (16%) than in imaging (21%). In fact, layout issues
(18%) rose slightly in the post-intervention phase surpassing coordination-related
disruptions in resuscitation. On the other hand, interruptions during the post-intervention
phase were more prevalent during resuscitation (34%) than in imaging (26%). Layout
issues (see Figure 4.2).
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Figure 4.2. Overall Breakdown of Major Categories by Resuscitation and Imaging
During the Post-Intervention Phase
In order to obtain a more detailed understanding of the types of disruptions
populating each major RIPCHORD-TWA category, a fine-grained analysis of the postintervention data was conducted. Within the major category of communication,
disruptions largely consisted of the following two minor categories: nonessential
communication (56%) and lack of response (25%). The remainder of the disruptions
observed were distributed among ineffective communication (8%), simultaneous
communication (5%), confusion (2%), lack of sharing (2%), and environmental noise
(2%) (see Figure 4.3).
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Figure 4.3. Communication Breakdown During the Post-Intervention Phase
The two most heavily populated minor categories within post-intervention
interruptions were: distractions (29%) and spilling/dropping (22%). These were followed
by teaching moments (15%), equipment/supplies (11%), alerts (11%), task deviation
(7%), searching activities (3%), and interaction with biohazards (2%) (see Figure 4.4).

Figure 4.4. Interruptions Breakdown During the Post-Intervention Phase
The two minor categories making up the bulk of post-intervention coordination
issues consisted of: planning/preparation (35%) and charting/documentation (35%).
These categories were followed by unknown information (12%), personnel not available
(11%), protocol failure (5%), and personnel rotation (1%) (see Figure 4.5).

125

A PROSPECTIVE INVESTIGATION AT A LEVEL II TRAUMA CENTER

Figure 4.5. Coordination Breakdown During the Post-Intervention Phase
Post-intervention disruptions related to layout included inadequate space (40%),
wires and tubing (37%), equipment positioning (13%), furniture positioning (6%),
permanent structures positioning (5%), and connector positioning (0%) (see Figure 4.6).
The minor category distribution in the usability category was computer design (55%),
equipment design (20%), barrier design (15%), packaging design (10%), data entry (noncomputer) design (0%), and surface design (0%) (see Figure 4.7). The only minor
category populated in the major category of equipment issues was general equipment
(100%) (see Figure 4.8).
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Figure 4.6. Layout Breakdown During the Post-Intervention Phase

Figure 4.7. Usability Breakdown During the Post-Intervention Phase
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Figure 4.8. Equipment Issues Breakdown During the Post-Intervention Phase
Differences between FDs in resuscitation and imaging were also observed. The
most prevalent type of post-intervention communication disruption observed in
resuscitation was lack of response (41%), however, it was not observed as often in
imaging (13%). However, in imaging, nonessential communication (76%) represented the
largest threat to communication, but not nearly as much in resuscitation (28%). Finally,
the next most prevalent communication issue was ineffective communication, but to a
much lesser degree, occurring more in resuscitation (15%) than in imaging (3%) (see
Figure 4.9).
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Figure 4.9. Communication Breakdown by Resuscitation and Imaging During the PostIntervention Phase
With respect to interruptions, the most frequently occurring post-intervention
disruption in resuscitation was spilling/dropping (29%), however, it occurred less
frequently in imaging (11%). Next, distractions posed the largest threat in imaging
(44%), but not quite as often in resuscitation (19%). Equipment/supplies (14%) and alerts
(14%) were the next most prevalent issues in imaging, occurring equally as frequently
(see Figure 4.10).

Figure 4.10. Interruptions Breakdown by Resuscitation and Imaging During the PostIntervention Phase
In resuscitation, breakdowns in post-intervention coordination were mostly
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related to planning/preparation (46%) as compared to 27% in imaging. On the other hand,
issues surrounding charting/documentation occurred most frequently in imaging (51%) as
compared to resuscitation (16%). Following planning/preparation issues, personnel not
available was the next largest coordination issue in resuscitation (13%), whereas it
represented 10% of the disruptions in imaging. Similarly, unknown information was the
next most prevalent disruption in imaging (13%), while it represented 11% of the
disruptions in resuscitation (see Figure 4.11).

Figure 4.11. Coordination Breakdown by Resuscitation and Imaging During the PostIntervention Phase
There were several differences involving the specific types of layout issues
involved in post-intervention resuscitation and imaging. Inadequate space was the largest
contributor to disruptions observed in resuscitation (57%), but was not necessarily a
major factor in imaging (11%). On the other hand, wires and tubing issues made up 68%
of the disruptions in imaging, whereas they were not as prevalent in resuscitation (18%).
Equipment positioning disruptions occurred slightly more often in resuscitation (14%)
than in imaging (11%). Finally, furniture positioning issues occurred evenly in both
resuscitation and imaging (6% each) (see Figure 4.12).
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Figure 4.12. Layout Breakdown by Resuscitation and Imaging During the PostIntervention Phase
The final two categories, usability and equipment issues were both lightly
populated, each representing only 2% of post-intervention disruptions. With respect to
usability, the most populated minor category was computer design (59%) in resuscitation,
followed by equipment design (18%), barrier design (12%), and packaging design (12%).
However, the most prevalent disruptions in imaging were equally distributed among
computer design, equipment design, and barrier design (33% each) (see Figure 4.13).
Finally, equipment issues were made up entirely of general equipment issues with
slightly more disruptions occurring in imaging (3%) than in resuscitation (1%) (see
Figure 4.14).
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Figure 4.13. Usability Breakdown by Resuscitation and Imaging During the PostIntervention Phase

Figure 4.14. Equipment Issues Breakdown by Resuscitation and Imaging During the
Post-Intervention Phase
Pre-Intervention and Post-Intervention Phases Comparative Analysis
Analysis of FD Data
The table below presents a side-by-side comparison of the patient demographic
data collected during both the pre-intervention and post-intervention phases (see Table
4.3).
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Table 4.3 Patient Demographics by Pre-Intervention and Post-Intervention Phases
Patient Demographic
Pre-Intervention Post-Intervention
Male
50 (77%)
34 (73%)
Gender
Female
15 (23%)
14 (27%)
Mean Age
41.2 (s=20.4)
52.5 (s=19.7)
Fall
15 (23%)
11 (21%)
Motor Vehicle
10 (15%)
15 (29%)
Crash
Motorcycle
26 (40%)
7 (13%)
Crash
Mechanisms of Injury
Stab Wound
1 (1.5%)
4 (8%)
(MOI)
Assault
2 (3%)
0
Gunshot Wound 3 (4%)
1 (2%)
Burn
1 (1.5%)
0
Other
7 (11%)
14 (27%)
Mean Glascow Coma Scale
12.78 (s=3.9)
12 (s=5.1)
(GCS)
Multiple Traumas
4 (6%)
5 (10%)
Biker Events
32 (49%)
6 (12%)
1st (12 hr)
38 (58.5%)
32 (62%)
Work Shift
2nd (12 hr)
27 (41.5%)
20 (38%)
Note. Pre-Intervention n=65 cases. Post-Intervention n=52 cases.
A total of 1,137 disruptions were identified during 65 observed cases (2,468
patient contact minutes) in the pre-intervention phase. A total of 939 disruptions were
identified during 52 observed cases (2,081 patient contact minutes) in the postintervention phase. This translated to nearly 18 disruptions per case, which was
approximately one disruption every two minutes. This was slightly more than the average
of 17.5 disruptions per case identified in the pre-intervention phase. The average total
treatment time per case increased slightly between the pre-intervention and postobservation phases (38 minutes and 40 minutes, respectively). Likewise, the average time
spent in resuscitation also increased by two minutes between the pre-intervention and
post-intervention phases (16 minutes and 18 minutes, respectively). However, the
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average treatment time in imaging remained effectively the same between the preintervention and post-intervention phases (21.5 minutes and 21.4 minutes, respectively).
With respect to the overall ratio of the number of FDs per minute, or the throughput measures, there was a slight increase in the overall ratio post-intervention compared
to pre-intervention phase (0.46 and 0.47, respectively). Similarly, the ratio in
resuscitation also revealed an increase during the post-intervention phase compared to the
pre-intervention phase (0.51 and 0.53, respectively). However, the ratios calculated for
imaging remained stable throughout both observational phases (0.42 and 0.42,
respectively).
The frequency of communication related disruptions during both the preintervention and post-intervention phases was 32%, therefore, overall, this threat was not
reduced. In the post-intervention phase, interruptions comprised 30% of the disruptions,
which represented a 4% increase compared to the pre-intervention phase. Coordination
issues continued to be the third most frequent disruption at 18% in the post-intervention
phase, a 3% decrease compared to the pre-intervention phase. Layout, usability, and
equipment issues comprised 15%, 2%, and 2% of the disruptions, respectively, in the
post-intervention phase. Compared to the pre-intervention phase, layout increased 1%,
usability decreased 3%, and equipment issues did not change (see Figure 4.15).
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Figure 4.15. Overall Breakdown of Major Categories Comparing Pre-Intervention and
Post-Intervention Phases
Further analysis examined the differences in disruptions between resuscitation
and imaging during the pre-intervention and post-intervention phases. Disruptions related
to the major category of communication occurred 5% less frequently in resuscitation
during the post-intervention phase, while there was a 6% increase in imaging.
Alternatively, post-intervention interruptions experienced a 6% increase in resuscitation,
and a 3% increase in imaging. Coordination issues observed post-intervention did not
differ notably in resuscitation, but occurred 5% less frequently in imaging (see Figure
4.16).
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Figure 4.16. Overall Breakdown of Major Categories by Resuscitation and Imaging
Comparing Pre-Intervention and Post-Intervention Phases
In order to gauge the effectiveness of the interventions introduced, the four minor
categories selected for intervention were examined more closely. The data points of
interest were isolated and a fine-grained analysis of the data was conducted for further
comparisons.
Within the major category of communication, there was a stark difference
between the data observed during the pre-intervention and post-intervention phases for
the minor category, ineffective communication, resulting in a 16% reduction in
disruptions. However, disruptions related to the minor category of nonessential
communication increased by 19% in the post-intervention phase. Regarding the minor
category of distractions within interruptions, there was an increase of 5% identified
during the post-intervention phase. Within coordination, planning/preparation disruptions
remained relatively unchanged as compared to pre-intervention data, only a minor
increase of 1% (see Figure 4.17).
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Figure 4.17. Breakdown of Selected Minor Categories Comparing Pre-Intervention and
Post-Intervention Phases
The fine-grained analysis revealed differences between resuscitation and imaging
during the pre-intervention and post-intervention phases. First, regarding ineffective
communication issues, there was a 16% decrease in post-intervention disruptions
occurring in resuscitation, and in imaging, a 14% decrease. However, there was a
substantial increase in the distribution of disruptions related to nonessential
communication. Researchers observed a 12% increase in resuscitation and a 21%
increase in imaging post-intervention. In regards to distractions, there was a 9% increase
in resuscitation and a 5% increase in imaging post-intervention. Coordination
breakdowns in the data indicated there was little change in planning/preparation issues in
both resuscitation and imaging (see Figure 4.18).
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Figure 4.18. Breakdown of Selected Minor Categories by Resuscitation and Imaging
Comparing Pre-Intervention and Post-Intervention Phases
Multiple-Baseline Comparative Analysis
Analysis of FD Data
Multiple measurements were made in an effort to establish a baseline and assess
process changes. The baseline 1/pre-intervention consisted of an initial 34 cases (576
disruptions). The baseline 2/pre-intervention consisted of the next 31 cases (561
disruptions). Once again, the four minor categories selected for intervention were
examined more closely. The data points of interest were isolated and a fine-grained
analysis of the data was conducted for further comparisons.
For the minor category ineffective communication, a decrease of 15% in
disruptions was observed in baseline 2/pre-intervention as compared to baseline 1/preintervention. However, disruptions related to the minor category of nonessential
communication increased by 29% during the baseline 2/pre-intervention segment.
Distraction-related disruptions increased 14% during the baseline 2/pre-intervention as
compared to baseline 1/pre-intervention. Planning/preparation disruptions remained
relatively unchanged between the baseline 1/pre-intervention and baseline 2/pre-
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intervention series, with a decrease of 2% (see Figure 4.19).

Figure 4.19. Breakdown of Selected Minor Categories Comparing Baseline 1/PreIntervention and Baseline 2/Pre-Intervention
The fine-grained analysis revealed differences between resuscitation and imaging
during the baseline 1/pre-intervention and baseline 2/pre-intervention series. First,
regarding ineffective communication issues, there was a decrease of 8% in baseline
1/pre-intervention disruptions occurring in resuscitation, and in imaging, a decrease of
18%. There was an increase of 8% in the distribution of disruptions related to
nonessential communication in resuscitation and an increase of 35% in imaging during
baseline 2/pre-intervention as compared to baseline 1/pre-intervention. There was little
change in the disruptions related to distractions in resuscitation between baseline 1/preintervention and baseline 2/pre-intervention, a decrease of only 1%. However, a 25%
increase in imaging occurred during the baseline 2/pre-intervention segment.
Planning/preparation issues in resuscitation saw a decrease of 9% during baseline 2/preintervention as compared to baseline 1/pre-intervention, however, in imaging these
disruptions remained about the same, only a minor decrease of 1% (see Figure 4.20).
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Figure 4.20. Breakdown of Selected Minor Categories Comparing Baseline 1/PreIntervention and Baseline 2/Pre-Intervention
Frequency Comparisons
Frequency data for the four minor categories selected for improvement was
compared between the pre-intervention and post-intervention phases overall as well as in
resuscitation and imaging using chi-square statistic (x2) goodness of fit tests. Next,
frequency data for the four specific areas targeted was compared between two waves of
measurement prior to the implementation of interventions, known as baseline 1/preintervention and baseline 2/pre-intervention, both overall and during the clinical phases
of care (resuscitation and imaging) using chi-square statistic (x2) goodness of fit tests.
Alpha levels were adjusted accordingly to maintain the family-wise error rate at p<=.05.
Pre-Intervention and Post-Intervention Phases Analysis
Overall. For the targeted minor category ineffective communication, a chi-square
goodness of fit test indicated there was a significant decrease in the frequency of
ineffective communication disruptions identified in the post-intervention phase (8%) as
compared with the pre-intervention phase (24%), x2 (1, n=2076) = 24.412, p=0.00.
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For the targeted minor categories of nonessential communication and distractions,
a chi-square goodness of fit test indicated there was a significant increase in the
frequency of both nonessential communication and distraction-related disruptions
occurring in the post-intervention phase as compared with the pre-intervention phase, x2
(1, n=2076) = 16.422, p=0.00; Pre (37%) < Post (56%) and x2 (1, n=2076) = 5.412,
p=0.02; Pre (24%) < Post (29%), respectively.
Finally, for the targeted minor category planning/preparation, a chi-square
goodness of fit test indicated that there was no significant difference between the
frequency of planning/preparation disruptions identified in the post-intervention phase
(35%) as compared with the pre-intervention phase (34%), x2 (1, n=2076) = 2.664,
p=0.103.
Phases of care (resuscitation and imaging). For the targeted minor category,
ineffective communication, a chi-square goodness of fit test indicated that there was a
significant decrease in the frequency of ineffective communication disruptions identified
during the post-intervention phase for both the resuscitation and imaging phases (15%
and 3%, respectively) as compared with the pre-intervention resuscitation and imaging
phases (31% and 17%, respectively), x2 (1, n=1031) = 9.504, p=0.002 and x2 (1, n=1045)
= 12.197, p=0.000, respectively.
On the other hand, for the targeted minor category nonessential communication, a
chi-square goodness of fit test indicated that there was a significant increase in the
frequency of nonessential communication disruptions identified during the postintervention phase for both the resuscitation and imaging phases (28% and 76%,
respectively) as compared with the pre-intervention resuscitation and imaging phases
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(16% and 56%, respectively), x2 (1, n=1031) = 4.708, p=0.030 and x2 (1, n=1045) =
19.654, p=0.000, respectively.
Regarding the targeted minor category distractions, a chi-square goodness of fit
test indicated that there was a significant increase in the frequency of distraction
disruptions during the post-intervention resuscitation phase (19%) as compared with the
pre-intervention resuscitation phase (10%), x2 (1, n=1031) =11.424, p=0.001. However,
there was no significant difference between the frequency of distraction-related
disruptions identified during the post-intervention imaging phase (44%) as compared
with the pre-intervention imaging phase (39%), x2 (1, n=1045) = 1.296, p=0.255.
Finally, for the target minor category, planning/preparation, a chi-square goodness
of fit test indicated there was no significant difference between the frequency of
planning/preparation disruptions identified during the post-intervention period for both
the resuscitation and imaging phases (46% and 27%, respectively) as compared with the
pre-intervention resuscitation and imaging phases (43% and 29%, respectively), x2 (1,
n=1031) = 0.741, p=0.389); Pre-intervention (43%) < Post-intervention (46%) and x2 (1,
n=1045) = 1.781, p=0.182); Pre-intervention (29%) > Post-intervention (27%),
respectively.
Multiple-Baseline Analysis
Overall. For the targeted minor category ineffective communication, a chi-square
goodness of fit test indicated there was not a significant difference in the frequency of
ineffective communication disruptions identified in the baseline 1/pre-intervention (32%)
as compared with baseline 2/pre-intervention (17%), x2 (1, n=1137) = 3.579, p=0.059.
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For the targeted minor category nonessential communication, a chi-square
goodness of fit test indicated there was a significant increase in the frequency of
nonessential communication disruptions occurring in the baseline 1/pre-intervention
(20%) as compared with baseline 2/pre-intervention (49%), x2 (1, n=1137) = 40.258,
p=0.00.
For the targeted minor category distractions, a chi-square goodness of fit test
indicated there was a significant increase in the frequency of distraction-related
disruptions occurring in the baseline 1/pre-intervention (16%) as compared with baseline
2/pre-intervention (30%), x2 (1, n=1137) = 8.822, p=0.03.
Finally, for the targeted minor category of planning/preparation, a chi-square
goodness of fit test indicated there was not a significant difference between the frequency
of planning/preparation disruptions identified in the baseline 1/pre-intervention (35%) as
compared with baseline 2/pre-intervention (33%), x2 (1, n=1137) = 2.851, p=0.091.
Phases of care (resuscitation and imaging). For the targeted minor category,
ineffective communication, a chi-square goodness of fit test indicated there was not a
significant difference in the frequency of ineffective communication disruptions
identified during the baseline 1/pre-intervention as compared with baseline 2/preintervention for resuscitation (34% and 26%, respectively), x2 (1, n=545) = 1.239,
p=0.266, as well as for imaging (29% and 11%, respectively), x2 (1, n=592) = 1.869,
p=0.172.
For the targeted minor category nonessential communication, a chi-square
goodness of fit test indicated there was not significant difference in the frequency of
nonessential communication disruptions identified during the baseline 1/pre-intervention
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as compared with baseline 2/pre-intervention for resuscitation (13% and 21%,
respectively), x2 (1, n=545) = 1.947, p=0.163. However, a chi-square goodness of fit test
indicated there was a significant increase in the frequency of these disruptions during the
baseline 2/pre-intervention as compared with baseline 1/pre-intervention for imaging
(32% and 67%, respectively), x2 (1, n=592) = 38.091, p=0.000.
Regarding the targeted minor category distractions, a chi-square goodness of fit
test indicated there was not a significant difference in the frequency of distraction
disruptions identified during the baseline 1/pre-intervention as compared with baseline
2/pre-intervention for resuscitation (10% and 9%, respectively), x2 (1, n=545) =.002,
p=0.962. However, a chi-square goodness of fit test indicated there was a significant
increase in the frequency of these disruptions during the baseline 2/pre-intervention as
compared with baseline 1/pre-intervention for imaging (25% and 50%, respectively), x2
(1, n=592) = 9.393, p=0.002.
Finally, for the target minor category planning/preparation, a chi-square goodness
of fit test indicated there was not a significant difference between the frequency of
planning/preparation disruptions identified during the baseline 1/pre-intervention as
compared with baseline 2/pre-intervention for resuscitation (47% and 38%, respectively),
x2 (1, n=545) = 0.428, p=0.513), as well as for imaging (29% and 30%, respectively), x2
(1, n=592) = 2.985, p=0.084).
Discussion
Analysis of data collected during the post-intervention phase revealed that the
trauma team experienced an average of 18 disruptions per case, which translated to one
disruption occurring every two minutes, roughly the same as the baseline phase. The
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patients observed during the post-intervention phase were, on average, 11 years older
than the pre-intervention sample (41.2 and 52.5, respectively). As the population ages and
lives longer, older individuals are more susceptible to trauma. From 2000 to 2010, the
age group that experienced the highest frequency of death due to traumatic injury was 45
to 55 (Rhee et al., 2014). In fact, patients of advancing age have higher rates of
complication and mortality than younger patients (Adams et al., 2012).
During the post-intervention phase, there were slightly more motor vehicle
crashes than during the pre-intervention phase (15 versus 10, respectively), but there were
fewer motorcycle crashes (7 versus 26, respectively). During the pre-intervention phase,
researchers observed trauma cases during four different biker events: Biketoberfest 2014
and 2015 and Bike Week 2015 and 2016. In contrast, the post-intervention observation
phase only encompassed one biker event: Biketoberfest 2016. Thus, not surprisingly,
there were not nearly as many biker event-related cases observed as compared to the preintervention phase (32 versus 6, respectively).
The number of other/unspecified trauma cases doubled during the postintervention phase as compared to the pre-intervention phase. Two of these “other” MOIs
involved patients who were in a small airplane crash and arrived simultaneously. Nine of
these “other” MOIs were motor vehicle-pedestrian/bicyclist crashes, which was six more
than the number of cases observed during the pre-intervention phase. Factors related to
these types of injuries and their severity could have contributed to the higher rate of
disruptions experienced by the trauma team. Previous research has found that higher risk
cases are potentially more affected by disruptions and generate a greater number of minor
failures than lower risk cases (Blocker et al., 2012; Blocker et al., 2013; Catchpole et al.,
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2007). A report prepared by the Governors Highway Safety Association (as cited in
Retting & Schwartz, 2017) found fatal pedestrian accidents increased by 11% in 2016,
which was the largest increase in more than two decades. According to the same report,
distracted driving and walking such as cellphone use and other electronic devices, was
the main cause of pedestrian fatalities (Retting & Schwartz, 2017).
The reported GCS scores, which are an indication of injury severity and level of
consciousness, remained relatively stable over both the pre-intervention and postintervention phases. Gender, work shift distribution, and number of multiple traumas also
remained fairly steady in comparison.
It is likely a sufficient level of stability in the pattern of disruptions was
established overall especially considering the improved design of adding a multiplebaseline analysis. Any change in the DV (FDs) was able to be evaluated relative to the
baseline values (baseline 1/pre-intervention and baseline 2/pre-intervention) and also
relative to a change in the comparison series (post-intervention phase). Specifically, as it
relates to ineffective communication there were no changes in the pre-intervention
observation data series, therefore, a change in FDs following the intervention may indeed
be due to the intervention introduced. Also, the sample of trauma cases captured during
both the pre-intervention and post-intervention phase seemed to represent the typical
“parent” trauma population with respect to patient demographics (e.g., age, gender, MOI,
GCS, work shift, event).
The role identification sticker system was one of the targeted interventions
developed in an effort to improve ineffective communication and help address
planning/preparation issues. In the majority of post-intervention phase trauma cases, the

146

A PROSPECTIVE INVESTIGATION AT A LEVEL II TRAUMA CENTER
trauma team members complied with the request to don a sticker that identified their role
and included their name. In 43 out of 52 cases (83%), most, if not all, trauma team
members wore a role identification sticker. In 40 cases out of 52 cases (77%), most, if not
all, trauma team members also included their name on the sticker. An example of one of
these observations states, “Dr. [X] reminded team to use the stickers (2-4 stickers were
applied as a result of this reminder); ultimately 6 persons wearing stickers, all with names
written down.” On the other hand, there were six cases, or 11.5%, where it was observed
that team members were not wearing stickers at all or, at best, only one or two members,
were wearing stickers. For example, it was observed and noted, “Most everyone was
wearing their PPE, but no stickers; although noticed tech [A] and tech [B] had stickers
on.” In three cases, or 6%, it was unknown (i.e., not recorded) if the team members
donned a sticker.
Next, the implementation of conducting a pre-arrival brief and debrief was one of
the targeted interventions developed in an effort to improve ineffective communication
and help address planning/preparation issues. Out of 52 trauma cases, it was observed in
24 cases (46%), that a partial pre-arrival brief was completed or attempted, meaning only
one or two of the three required steps were conducted (see Appendix E). An example of
one of these observations stated, “Nurse [X] mentioned doing briefing. Briefing was
completed a few minutes after nurse [X] mentioned that it would be a good idea; nurse
[X] prepped the team by giving details of the injury including mechanism, locations, and
severity of blood loss.” In six cases (11.5%), all three elements of a pre-arrival brief
(Steps 1, 2, and 3) were completed (i.e., an effective pre-arrival brief was conducted by
the team). For example, it was observed and noted, “Complete pre-arrival brief conducted
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w/ checklist in hand.” In 17 cases (33%), there was no pre-arrival brief conducted at all.
For instance, the observation simply stated, “Pre-arrival brief not conducted.” It was
unknown if a pre-arrival brief was conducted in five (10%) of the cases. This was due to
observers accompanying the trauma team to the helipad or arriving just prior to the
patient arrival, but not necessarily in time to witness whether a brief was conducted in the
trauma resuscitation bay. In other words, in just over half of the observed cases, a prearrival brief was conducted effectively or at least attempted.
Since observations began from the time the patient arrived in the trauma
resuscitation bay through imaging and ended upon disposition to surgery, the medical
floor unit, or the ED, researchers were unable to observe the team’s debriefing activities.
However, on two separate occasions researchers observed the team initiate a debrief
while awaiting the CT scan results. The debrief was conducted in the viewing hallway of
the imaging suite. Additional debriefs may have theoretically been conducted at the
conclusion of a trauma case post-surgery, or after the patient was transferred to the
medical floor unit or the ED. However, because researchers did not continue to follow the
patient beyond imaging, it is unknown how often a debrief occurred in these locations.
The rate of communication-related disruptions post-intervention continued to be
the most frequent, followed by interruptions and issues related to coordination. These
results were similar to those of others conducting related research in various healthcare
domains (Blocker et al., 2012; Blocker et al., 2013; Catchpole et al., 2013; Catchpole et
al., 2014; Shouhed et al., 2014; Wiegmann, et al., 2007).
Most notably, disruptions involving ineffective communication were relatively
nonexistent in the post-intervention observations, which may speak directly to the
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information exchange strategies presented in the NLT such as the simulation-based
practice scenarios, and the positive results of the training program (see Appendices G-J
and N).
The fine-grained analyses revealed that the majority of communication-related
disruptions in resuscitation and imaging continued to involve nonessential
communication, which occurred much more frequently during imaging. This was not
surprising, as previously discussed, given the distinct nature of trauma care during each
of these phases. Within the major category of interruptions, distractions continued to
represent more of a threat during imaging, which corresponds to the high frequency of
nonessential communication that also occurred during this time frame. Although
planning/preparation occurred equally as much during the post-intervention phase,
planning/preparation issues still persisted more often in resuscitation.
There were several factors that contributed to the decision to complete
observations by December 26, 2016. As previously mentioned, there was a major change
that occurred within the trauma program two and a half months after post-intervention
observations began. The long-standing contracted trauma surgeon group was replaced by
a new contracted group that consisted of mostly new trauma surgeons (only two trauma
surgeons from the original group remained on staff). By the end of the year, the number
of cases observed were almost evenly distributed between the two groups: 28 cases with
the previously contracted group and 24 with the new group.
Also, traditionally, there is a substantial amount of bedside nurse turnover in the
beginning of each new year at most hospitals. Consequently, it was presumed that at least
some out of the 88 ED/trauma nurses who participated in the NLT may either no longer
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be employed with the hospital or may have transferred to other units. The national nurse
turnover rate continues to rise, exceeding the national hospital turnover rate, which
leveled off in 2015. The nurse turnover rate increased to 17.2% in 2015, up from 16.4%
in 2014. Nurses working in emergency care experience one of the highest turnover rates
(NSI Nursing Solutions, Inc., 2016).
Additionally, the TSM submitted his resignation effective January 13, 2017. It
was unknown if the hospital anticipated asking the new manager that would be filling the
vacant position to present the NLT to new ED hires.
To capture a trauma activation from start to finish, researchers were scheduled to
be “on call” at the hospital around the clock in an attempt to observe as many cases as
possible. However, the sporadic nature of the trauma patient volume at this Level II
trauma center and researchers’ school schedules contributed to a lengthy process. This, in
addition to the overall time constraints and unforeseen circumstances specific to the
naturalistic setting of this current study posed significant challenges to the observational
research design and limited the overall sample size of the cases. Consequently, there were
13 fewer trauma cases observed post-intervention as compared to the pre-intervention
phase.
In addition to the “changing of guard”, or the replacement of the long-standing
contracted trauma surgeon group, another important factor to consider when comparing
results is the recipients of the training intervention. First, the physicians (i.e., trauma
surgeons, ED physicians, anesthesiologists, radiologists) did not receive the NLT content
in the same format as the ED nurses. Instead, the trauma surgeons and ED physicians
received the NLT content through Microsoft PowerPoints via email. Anesthesiologists
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and radiologists did not receive the training in any format. Also, at the request of the
TPMD, medical human factors researchers presented an abridged version of the NLT on
two separate occasions during the monthly Trauma Committee Meetings (June 7, 2016
and July 5, 2016). Unfortunately, not all the trauma surgeons were in attendance during
those meetings. When evaluating the results of the interventions, an important factor to
consider is that physicians need to be part of the whole process, from development to
rollout and any training in between. As noted by Thomas and Galla (2013), if physicians
do not “buy in” to the process, engage as champions, and believe in the value and
importance of teamwork, any attempts at team training will suffer.
Furthermore, ED technicians, who serve a key role as fundamental members of
the assembled trauma team, did not receive the NLT training at all. A number of other
team members such as lab, orthopedic, respiratory, and radiology technicians also did not
receive the NLT training as well. Thus, all technicians that were part of the trauma team
were, for all intents and purpose, unaware of the expectations presented in the training
concerning leadership, teamwork, and communication. This deficit in training may have
been most disadvantageous from the standpoint of the imaging phase of patient care.
Although trauma care requires multiple caregivers from varying disciplines to work
together as an effective team with the goal of saving a life and preventing harm, the
trauma team must enter and coordinate patient care while operating under the auspices of
the radiology unit in nearly every trauma case. In a sense, organizationally, it is the
radiology technicians and radiologists who “lead the charge,” so to speak, during this
phase of care.
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Providers from many different disciplines bring with them their own expectations,
norms, attitudes, and cultures and, in order to achieve effective team communication,
teams must overcome these barriers (Barach & Weinger, 2007). One way to achieve this
goal is to participate in team training. As previously mentioned, Salas et al. (2008) found
that team training was an effective intervention for influencing team processes and
performance. The increase in disruptions related to nonessential communication and
distractions observed in imaging may have been a direct result of the lack of team
training for every member of the team. Also, the stability of team membership is an
important aspect to consider since “team effect”, in a sense, may have indirectly
influenced the results. Recall that a Level II trauma team is non-intact, meaning the
makeup of the team is fluid, so it was not uncommon to observe, on average, only two to
three core members present in a case.
The good news, however, was that despite the lack of an intact team and
comprehensive team training, ineffective communication remained low throughout the
post-intervention phase. As part of the NLT curriculum, trauma nurses practiced team
communication and teamwork skills using low-fidelity simulation-based training as well
as role-playing in a relevant context. Embedding simulation training into the didactic
curriculum may explain why these desired team competencies, which included
communication protocols and information exchange strategies, transferred so well to the
floor of the trauma suite. Shapiro et al. (2004) found that simulation training improves
teamwork skills and behavior in the clinical environment and offers the opportunity for
participants to sustain the lessons they learned.

152

A PROSPECTIVE INVESTIGATION AT A LEVEL II TRAUMA CENTER
Although the overwhelming majority of nurses who participated in the NLT felt
the information was relevant and useful to them in the performance of their duties and the
pre-post-test scores supported the effectiveness of the training with respect to knowledge
acquisition, the changes observed were not expected and not consistent with the proposed
hypothesis in this current study. The data-driven interventions appeared to improve only
one selected minor category, ineffective communication, however, similar levels of
improvement were not observed in the other targeted areas.
Combining data-driven interventions and team training together led to marked
improvement post-intervention in the ineffective communication typically relied on by
the team members. These positive findings indicated a consistent pattern as far as the
implemented interventions having an effect on team performance and their non-technical
communication skills (i.e., ineffective communication). Yet, no significant difference was
found in the planning/preparation process before and after intervention. Even worse,
there was a trend towards increasing the process inefficiencies, or threats, experienced by
the team as it related to nonessential communication and distractions in the postintervention phase. The disruption data identified and classified suggested the NLT and
the data-driven interventions actually increased the rates of nonessential communication
and distractions substantially.
The initiatives introduced in the NLT were not “written in blood” by any means.
In other words, there was no enforcement of these new protocols from an organizational
standpoint. Case in point, the role identification stickers and names were worn during the
majority of the cases post-intervention, however, a pre-arrival brief was conducted
effectively or attempted in just over half of these cases. The pre-arrival brief was
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specifically implemented to address issues having to do with planning/preparation. Lack
of follow-through regarding the pre-arrival briefing may explain why there was little
change in the frequency of this threat.
By the same token, team members’ cell phones were not confiscated, nor were the
hospital communication devices (i.e., Voceras) turned off during the course of care for a
trauma patient. These are essential tools, but also tools that were routinely involved in
many of the distractions the trauma team experienced during any given case. To illustrate
this point, a count of how often the words “phone” and “Vocera” were found in the
Microsoft Excel Workbook yielded 200 entries, indicating healthcare professionals are
clearly experiencing multiple potential threats related to their personal electronic devices
in each case. The casual use of these personal communication devices introduces new
distractions in an already complex, high-stakes environment. While it may be difficult to
measure exactly how disruptive ringing phones, scrolling through Facebook, or Vocera
pages are to highly trained healthcare providers, there is no question these events break
their concentration and threaten situation awareness (SA). Smith and Hancock (1995)
defined SA as an “adaptive, externally directed consciousness” (p. 138). It is a dynamic
factor in an operator’s task environment that has the capacity to externally direct
consciousness and influence behavior. Within an operator’s multi-dimensional “risk
space” there are a number of elements that compromise safety (Smith & Hancock, 1995).
This is where these distraction-related threats have their greatest impact. Boquet and
colleagues (2017a) investigated a similar concept within surgical team performance
called “error space.” They proposed that these disruptions represented an aggregated
space, which disconnects the team from the task at hand, thus, increasing the demands on
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the cognitive resources healthcare providers need to stay better focused on the patient
status and the central task (Boquet, Cohen, Reeves, & Shappell, 2017a). One disruption
in isolation may not pose a threat to the delivery of trauma care, however, when these
disruptions accumulate, they create a window of opportunity for errors to occur (Boquet
et al, 2017b; Cohen et al., 2016).
In reality, each of the implemented interventions fell short of obtaining full
compliance to some extent. There is no ignoring the fact that this partial compliance
likely had a direct effect on the final results of the study.
Treatment time was not specifically pursued as an outcome measure or DV in the
study. However, results indicated that there was not a reduction in overall time elapsed
per case following the implementation of interventions. Treatment time increased by two
minutes on average in the post-intervention phase as compared to the pre-intervention
phase. Since there was not an overall reduction in FDs, it is not necessarily surprising that
length of case time followed suit. This provides further support for the assertion that an
excessive number of minor disruptions may increase the duration time of treatment.
When teamwork, leadership, communication, and coordination are improved
upon, it typically positively influences team outcomes in terms of their ability to
communicate, plan, and make decisions. One would expect these improvements to result
in more effective and timely patient care (Salas, Rosen, Burke, & Goodwin, 2009;
Weaver, Rosen, Salas, Baum, & King, 2010). Results of this current study indicated the
opposite effect in terms of duration of care. Although high performing teams may deliver
better quality care and improved patient outcomes, perhaps this trauma team, in
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particular, took more time to do so in the form of “good practices,” information exchange
strategies, correcting, informing, protocol compliance, clinical/technical proficiency, etc.
Nevertheless, results of this current study found that during the post-intervention
phase there were notable improvements, team members made special efforts to
communicate more clearly and unambiguously. This finding was related to the lower
incidence of ineffective communication disruptions observed during the post-intervention
phase. This improvement in the process inefficiency related to ineffective communication
are encouraging, particularly from a training standpoint. The results suggested that
RIPCHORD-TWA was able to detect improvements after team training. Considering the
brevity, feasibility, and success of the training, this provides support for a more widescale implementation of an inter-professional team training program.
Previous studies utilizing FDs as an outcome measure as well as attempting to
design distinct interventions to reduce their occurrence, reported promising results
(Catchpole et al., 2014; Hildebrand, 2014). However, little is known of the long-term
sustainability of these positive outcomes. The prospective study in trauma was conducted
in a Level I trauma center. Because of their unique differences, it is reasonable to assume
that process inefficiencies observed at a Level I trauma center may not generalize to
reflect those observed in a Level II trauma center. Therefore, this empirical study in a
Level II trauma facility broadens the scope of inquiry and increases the understanding of
potential interventions that these types of facilities can employ to improve life-saving
trauma services. Furthermore, these studies did not investigate multiple subcategories
within major categories. In the study, the minor categories of RIPCHORD-TWA lend
itself to a fine-grained analysis, allowing for greater resolution of the disruptions
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threatening the system. The robust, subcategory taxonomy recognizes the subtle
differences between underlying causes, thereby provides a richer source of data with
which to develop effective interventions.
What also makes this current study so unique lies not only in better delineating
the “what” that is being fixed, but also the “how”, and then, orchestrating the “who” that
is directing the fix (i.e., those on the front lines). It is well known that many quality
improvements do not succeed because program administrators, and the like, fail to realize
that the “how” is just as important as the “what” (Sundt, 2011; Wiegmann, 2015).
Routinely, they create solutions and preside over interventions by “simply closing their
eyes and hoping to hit the bullseye.” Instead, program administrators should have an indepth understanding of the intervention itself, increasing buy-in, and involving those at
the “sharp end of the spear” to better guide their focus and further guarantee hitting the
target.
Furthermore, findings from this current study were informative and made a
methodological contribution because they provided empirical evidence obtained from
direct observations in order to generate potential interventions. Since it is known that
errors are the consequences of systemic breakdowns, focusing on systemic factors may
be more fruitful than approaches that focus solely on who committed the error, an
individual’s clinical skill, or on the error itself. For obvious reasons, the systems
perspective is much more widely accepted by healthcare professionals especially when it
concerns prospective observations. By referring to individual events as FDs and not
errors, researchers are better equipped to study the real-time dynamics that threaten the
optimal delivery of patient care.
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Limitations
There were a number of limitations to this current study, most of which are
related to an ITS design and the drawbacks that affect both internal and external validity.
First, it is possible that the mere presence of the observer(s) confounded the
normal trauma team work flow. This is called the Hawthorne effect or observer effect, a
phenomenon in which individuals modify an aspect of their behavior in response to being
observed and are, therefore, less likely to behave naturally (Rice University, 2014). Some
steps were taken to deliberately diminish this effect. For example, observers’ uniforms
consisted of medical scrubs in order to blend in as much as possible. They attempted to
be as inconspicuous and unobtrusive as possible by observing the case and taking notes
from a distance to reduce the awareness of their presence.
Second, this current study was not double-blinded, meaning the researchers who
designed the study, also served as the observers, and were privy to the expected results.
This lack of blinding, may have led to observer bias and a potential overestimation of the
positive effects while ignoring the negative aspects during subsequent observations.
Attempts were made to combat this type of bias by thoroughly training observers in terms
of establishing clear criteria for what was to be recorded (Rice University, 2014).
Third, becoming more adept at recognizing FDs over time may have led to
capturing more detail and disruptions during the baseline 2/pre-intervention and the postintervention phase compared to the baseline 1/pre-intervention. Observers, especially
those who have been observing the trauma care process since the beginning of the study,
nearly three years in all, were able to “catch” a lot of disruptions at this point due to sheer
expectation, knowing clinically how a case progresses, and where the “hang ups” tend to
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occur. For instance, two of the researchers had been observing for all three years, one had
been observing for two and a half years, and one other had two years of observing
experience.
It is worth noting that the prospective post-intervention observations
demonstrated that the interventions were not employed all of the time. However, it could
be that they were deployed in the cases that the researchers did not directly observe.
In addition to utilizing human observers, human coders, although well-trained,
categorized the observations into a human factors taxonomy, RIPCHORD-TWA. Their
idiosyncrasies, biases, and inconsistencies may have affected the results as well.
Attempts to sustain the changes introduced by the training involved multiple
strategies aimed at reinforcing the core principles addressed during the training. For
example, researchers intended to hang a large poster on the wall in the trauma
resuscitation bay displaying the pre-arrival brief. This poster would have served as a
continuous visual reminder to use the preparation tools and communication protocols
introduced during the training. Unfortunately, the hospital’s marketing department made
numerous mistakes during the drafting stage of the poster, which delayed production.
Consequently, the poster was not completed or displayed in the trauma resuscitation bay.
On a related note, with the deployment of interventions targeting specific problem
areas, there is always a concern that a fix in one area may lead to an unforeseen
provocation somewhere else in the system. As specific FDs were targeted and possibly
mitigated, other marginal threats may have begun to take their place and occur more
frequently. Thus, the occurrence of threats may never be eliminated completely. Worse
yet, they could be replaced by other more potentially vexing issues. Data collected during
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the study points to a good example of this dilemma. Post-intervention
charting/documentation disruptions increased by 23% in imaging as compared to the preintervention phase. Perhaps efforts to improve team communication and ensure that
everyone on the team knows one another’s names meant they were also more willing to
verbalize patient information directly to the primary nurse/scribe than ever before.
Reciprocally, the team may have been more willing to support the tasks of the primary
nurse/scribe and ensure that information was documented efficiently and accurately.
Lastly, regarding external validity, the prospective investigation was limited to a
single medical facility. Thus, the ability to generalize the results to other hospitals
housing Level II trauma centers might be restricted due to differences in emergency
services systems. Also, this medical facility is located in an area with a unique population
demographic and serves a considerable number of transient clientele. It resides in the
“World’s Most Famous Beach” in the South, where a number of elderly and homeless
individuals live and bikers and tourists visit. Thus, patient population demographics may
limit the ability to generalize the results to other hospitals and their Level II trauma
centers.
Generally, a host of issues related to real-world conditions, non-compliance, and
organizational apathy, jeopardized the sustainability of the changes introduced by the
interventions. In and of themselves, these complications imparted their own set of
limitations to the follow-through of interventional implementation. It is difficult to
definitively say how much these types of limitations directly impacted the results. It is
believed that having had more control over the environment during the study could have
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widened the gap in the distribution of the data between the pre-intervention and postintervention phases.
Future Research and Direction
With the departure of the TSM, the hospital’s proposed plan for continued
training efforts is unknown at this time. It was planned for the future to include a
mandatory leadership/team training and orientation for new ED nurse hires. Plans also
included an annual mandatory refresher to support ongoing process improvement and aid
in the retention of knowledge, skills, and attitudes. Additionally, future plans considered
the development of a training program for all trauma team members (e.g., physicians,
technicians) with the intent of clarifying specific performance expectations and
presenting a clear message that patient safety is the highest priority. Also, it was
recommended by the human factors researchers that the department consider executing
unannounced mock drills for team members to practice their newly gained skills or to
strengthen skills. The novel information exchange protocols and pre-arrival
briefs/debriefs can be difficult and awkward at first because healthcare professionals have
been trained using a variety of communication styles. Practice allows them to move from
the awkward beginning stage of call outs and read backs to the point where effective
communication becomes second nature.
The results of this current study support the importance of implementing policies
and procedures restricting the use of cell phones and Voceras as well as imposing a
sterile cockpit rule in any procedural area of the trauma suite. The ACS’ Committee on
Perioperative Care (2008) issued a statement on the use of cell phones and personal
devices in the operating room and the distractions that can arise from this technology.
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From a human factors perspective, adopting formal policies, enforcement, and reporting
non-compliance are simple strategies to solving a pervasive problem.
Post-intervention phase observations indicated that the role identification sticker
system had become almost as standard for the trauma team as “gowning up” in their PPE.
However, many of the other interventions were far from being hard-wired into their
operations. Ongoing promotion, positive reinforcement by administration, and buy-in and
active participation on the part of the physicians will go a long way to help hard-wire the
process. Identifying nurse “champions” and empowering trauma nurses to transfer their
newly learned skills, potentially fostering cultural change to the entire ED, will also
improve these system processes. As change takes hold and these initiatives are adopted
consistently, all trauma team members will conduct operations in the same manner every
time, “no matter what the weather.”
The researchers have successfully adapted a robust human factors taxonomy,
previously used only in the CVOR, to identify and classify disruptions encountered in an
entirely different healthcare domain. As it currently stands, the descriptions of the FDs,
which may be applicable to other disciplines, cater to disruptions found in surgery
specifically the CVOR. Nevertheless, the RIPCHORD-TWA framework provides a
universal blueprint that concentrates on the human factors elements of a system. Future
studies should focus on the generic modification of this methodology across all
healthcare disciplines. Of special note, RIPCHORD-TWA does not distinguish between
“good” and “bad” disruptions, yet one may consider some minor pauses (e.g., clarifying
communication mix-ups, alerts, on-the-job training) as advantageous or “good practices”.
In fact, skilled teams often use these temporary halts to prevent adverse events. An
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example of this is a “time out,” which is performed in the OR just prior to the induction
of a patient or an invasive procedure. It involves active communication among surgical
teams using a standardized checklist. The “time out” checklist was part of an effort to
eliminate sentinel events such as wrong site and wrong person surgeries and is essential
for ensuring quality of care, reducing risk, and improving patient safety (Joint
Commission, 2017).
To illustrate this point, an example of what could be considered a “good”
disruption is an observation that was coded as a teaching moment under interruptions:
“Nurse begins to insert a Foley, trauma surgeon stops her and explains that best practices
require Foley to be inserted in ICU and why, trauma committee recommendation, etc.” It
was not documented how many of the disruptions observed in the study overall
represented “good practices.” Nor, were these types of disruptions singled out. Instead,
per the operational definition of FDs, “good” and “bad” FDs were combined together as
one and the same, although the argument could be made that not all FDs are created
equally.
The role of the primary nurse/scribe is the most complex and challenging in the
broader context of trauma teamwork. Perhaps future research should consider their work
requirements and the designing of technologies (e.g., computer-based data entry,
electronic medical records (EMRs)) that are better able to support the nurse recorder in
the documentation process. Developing more functional, accurate, and effective work
practices centered on the recorder’s tasks are essential not only for the primary
nurse/scribe, but also for the other team members who are busy with patient care.

163

A PROSPECTIVE INVESTIGATION AT A LEVEL II TRAUMA CENTER
Along these same lines, researchers may also be interested in examining the
influence of a given FD on the trauma team by attempting to measure the length of
disruptions (i.e., how long it took to resolve the disruption), the impact on surrounding
team members, and relationship to a specific discipline type (e.g., trauma surgeon, ED
physician, fluids nurse). They could also examine whether the FD can be directly linked
to an overt error or patient outcome as well as the mental effort required by the provider
to overcome the disruption (e.g., workload assessments, structured interviews,
metacognition debriefs).
One future study already underway involves using isolated communication and
coordination FD data to examine where the major threats lie. Based on this rich source of
information, the critical skills that should be directly targeted can be clearly determined.
The focus is on developing a more comprehensive and effective training program that is
compatible with the measurement tool and assessment model presented in the study.
Ultimately, this investigation will help engineer even more quality into the system and
provide on-going feedback from the process about the system deficiencies to enhance
team performance through improved training efforts.
Specified patient demographics were obtained for each case observed. Future
studies may utilize regression analyses to explore the significance of relationships
between FDs and various demographics collected, including patient age, gender, GCS
score, MOI, biker-related events (annual Bike Week and Biketoberfest), work shift,
physician providing care, air transport versus ground, multiple trauma patients received,
etc. For instance, investigating whether cases with critical patients with a poor prognosis
are correlated with a higher number of FDs would be a worthwhile analysis. Research
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indicates that case complexity requires a greater need for resources and higher pressures
on the team, which may accompany more severely injured patients (Shouhed et al.,
2014).
An abundance of qualitative data was collected in the format of unstructured,
free-response observational notes. These comprehensive notes provide a more in-depth
look at the problems facing the trauma teams during the continuum of patient care. The
narrative provides additional insights into the nature of the interactions and also reveals
numerous “good practices” among trauma team members. This data may provide the
foundation for further exploratory research as well as generate ideas for future
quantitative research.
A follow-up survey could be created and administered to gauge how well the
interventions are working from the perspective of hospital personnel. The purpose of the
survey would be to evaluate trauma team members’ perceptions, opinions, and awareness
of the trauma optimization project and obtain a better idea of whether the interventions
introduced are being sustained in practice. Survey questions may include the following:
1) Are the interventions improving your work? 2) Are they effective? 3) Do other staff
members comply? 4) Is there a real and noticeable difference in the frequency of process
inefficiencies occurring during care of a trauma patient? This survey would attempt to
address the subjective nature of the effects of the interventions. Quantitative results, or
the number of disruptions occurring per case, do not necessarily parallel the qualitative
consequences of intervention implementation. This survey would attempt to capture the
more abstract differences experienced by members of the trauma team. In other words, do
team members “feel” the difference? Do they truly perceive that they are operating in a
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more efficient manner and as a well-coordinated team? Could there be improvements to
the process? If so, what specifically would they suggest doing to mitigate process
inefficiencies they are experiencing? Elements of patient safety and quality, culture
change, leadership, communication, and teamwork could also be assessed using this
questionnaire. The hospital may choose to re-administer the survey over different points
in time to examine trends in patient safety initiatives and culture change.
In today’s technological world, combining video recording and big data analytics
is a viable data collection instrument that has significant advantages over prospective
observation. Intelligent video analytics, 360-degree video cameras, and social sensing
technology provide powerful tools for capturing workflow disruptions. Options include
expanded analytic hardware and software for detection, movement, and tracking,
repeated replays, and useful real-time feedback. Best of all, the video gathered can be
used as an effective learning and training tool for quality improvement. Audio and video
recording in the healthcare environment has its own set of challenges such as acceptance
from clinicians, medico-legal issues, patient confidentiality, privacy, employee
performance risks, and commiserating audiovisual capabilities. Some of these obstacles
can be overcome by properly introducing the system and encouraging participation,
especially by using clinician reviews, developing trust, reporting feedback, as well as
involving multidisciplinary experts (Mackenzie & Xiao, 2003). This innovative
technology has the potential for autonomous observation and coding, essentially
removing the human element from the data collection, measurement, and analysis. The
platform could also support additional technologies. For example, radio-frequency
identification (RFID) can be simultaneously introduced to identify and track individuals,
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objects, and any relevant biometrics (physical and behavioral characteristics), which
could deliver a wealth of information.
This prospective investigation has produced a promising model that may prove
helpful for any healthcare organization wishing to embark on their own journey towards
improvements in the process of patient care. The key to this current study was the
development of a measurement tool and assessment model, both of which generated
specific feedback that could be used to gauge and enhance team performance, based on
the foundations of safety science. Whether they are a public, community hospital such as
this one, a large-scale hospital system, or a small labor and delivery unit, front line staff
and administrators alike could benefit from tailoring aspects of this trauma optimization
project towards their own quality improvement projects to aid them in ensuring that they
are deploying the right interventions.
Considering the healthcare industry is still struggling to reduce patient morbidity
and mortality directly related to preventable errors and adverse events, it is evident that
current problem solving approaches must change. Systematically identifying threat
windows and presenting FDs as aggregates and multiplying the threats to safety and
quality of care exposes process inefficiencies earlier in the chain of events, thereby
affording researchers the opportunity to intervene well before a potential error or adverse
event occurs. This approach provides data-derived evidence for motivating action and
directing decision making regarding the “what” and the “how” to pursue improvement.
The “who” comes from engaged participants acting locally and focusing on fixing the
problems they encounter in the system where they must work. Improvements do not
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happen overnight or with one big fix, instead, it is a continuous, systematic cycle of “If at
first you don’t succeed, try, try, and try again.”
The Safety Systems Management Process (SSMP) model provides a visual guide
for others to use as they assess their own programs targeting process inefficiencies.
SSMP ensures that they are deploying the right interventions while aiming for real local
improvements (see Figure 4.21).

Figure 4.21. Safety Systems Management Process (SSMP)
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
As threats accumulate, along with the absence of adverse events associated with
them, these seemingly minor events begin to be perceived as unrelated to safety and
efficiency. Healthcare professionals working day-to-day with these process inefficiencies
may easily ignore their presence since they fail to blatantly exhibit any inherent potential
for detrimental consequences. They become an accepted way of doing things. To borrow
logic from Reason (1990) and Dekker (2006), at the end of the day this unknowing
intransience increases the likelihood of “drift” towards disorder.
The most important role for risk managers, and the like, of the future will not be
their retrospective analysis of a particular event and making a guess of how to prevent it
from reoccurring, instead it will be uncovering the precursors of such an event, obtaining
the information necessary to anticipate areas of increased risk, measuring the process, and
engineering quality into the system to intervene before errors and adverse events occur
(Stolzer, Halford, & Goglia, 2008).
This research has attempted to re-conceptualize FDs as potential threats to safety
and efficiency in a healthcare system. This approach gives standalone merited weight to
these events. By doing so, it reframes the problem in a manner that encourages healthcare
providers to intervene before these disruptions manifest into catastrophic errors that
reaches the patient.
However, this information has no value unless the organization learns from it.
Although healthcare aspires to be an HRO, it clearly has not adopted a “highly reliable”
systematic approach to accomplish this goal. To best drive prevention and reduce
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systematic medical errors, healthcare has to first move away from fear of retribution and
its punitive nature. Rather than a retrospective review of patient safety events and
reporting errors and near misses after the fact, or focusing on outcome-based initiatives, a
new process should be implemented that looks at all the factors that may cause an event
to happen in the first place. There is no question that healthcare providers are much more
amenable to this process and more willing to use this information to drive prevention.
The SSMP provides an audit trail for threats that have been discovered during the
analyses process. This discovery should lead to a preventative/corrective action to reduce
future threats. The SSMP offers a language for healthcare professionals to detect and
discuss the everyday process inefficiencies threatening the system in which they work as
well as a framework to generate their own ideas of how to mitigate them.
Compared to the pre-intervention data, the success was evident in regards to
ineffective communication and deploying targeted, data-driven interventions in a
systematic manner. Despite experiencing multiple real-world challenges that attempted to
despoil any potential change for the better, ineffective communication remained low
throughout. That is the beauty of the SSMP model. It is a living, breathing document that
can present the data in real-time. This comprehensive, systematic methodology allows
researchers, personnel, risk managers, quality regulators, and administrators to track and
monitor results in a quantitative, data-driven manner. How can an organization (or
individual, for that matter) truly improve if they do not know the baseline from which to
grow? Ultimately, the principal strength of this current study, and perhaps more
important than the actual results themselves, is combining science and practice by
employing RIPCHORD-TWA, the HFIX framework, and including multidisciplinary
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SME input, which may prove more successful and lasting in mitigating the real threats to
the delivery of trauma care. The benefit of this method is that it allows practitioners on
the front line to implement customized interventions to problems they face every day.
Next generation improvement must persistently gather data on the problems and rely on
tracking information and failures—for what can be measured can be managed.
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Appendix A
5/29/15
Dear Colleagues:
As many of you know, X Health has been engaged in a trauma optimization project with the Human
Factors Doctoral Program of Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University (ERAU). To date, the ERAU team
has collected large amounts of data surrounding the concept of flow disruptions in trauma care. And
now, wait 'till you see these data!
Data collected from trauma observations has been sorted and we have arrived to the point at which we
need team members in all the trauma-related disciplines to convene and come up with "interventions"
that might better optimize our delivery of trauma care here at X. We're asking for trauma care
volunteers to participate in a two-hour meeting on Friday, June 19th from 1:00pm - 3:00pm.
While we will indeed show you the data in this meeting, it won't end up being a lecture-type meeting;
instead, it will be an active, collaborative, and working meeting to "brainstorm" on ideas/processes that
we can implement to make trauma care better. How about we formally call this a "Multidisciplinary
Knowledge Elicitation" trauma meeting! That sounds cool, doesn't it?
If you are interested, please reply to this email and we will add your name to the list of potential
volunteers for selection. The deadline for submission is (preferably) June 15th. You will receive nonproductive pay for participating in this meeting. To ensure we have a well-balanced group of
disciplines, you will be notified via email if you are chosen to participate.
Thank you in advance for your participation.
Mr. Smith
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Appendix B
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Appendix C

TASK/PROCEDURE
Focuses on ways of changing operators’ task to reduce errors and
improve safety (task characteristics, timing, work pressures, feedback,
etc.)
How can the task be restructured so that it requires less reliance on
human memory (i.e., use checklists or technology that signals next step in
task)?
If the task is done simultaneously with other tasks (divided attention), can
it be done by itself? How can the mental workload/timesharing be
reduced?
How could errors in performing the task be reduced by having another
team member check/verify important steps in the procedure?
How could checklists be developed to guide the task or verify that the task
has been performed properly?
How could immediate feedback be integrated into the task to allow
operators to know when they have done things correctly or incorrectly?
How can procedures or checklist be redesigned to be clearer or more
user-friendly?
If the task allows for easy short-cuts, how could it be redesigned to
eliminate these shortcuts or reduce the likelihood that they are done?
How could procedures be re-written so that they are less ambiguous or
inapplicable to the safety critical tasks operators perform?
How could procedures be developed that restrict the performance of
safety critical tasks when there is time pressure to complete it?
When operators switch tasks, what procedures could be developed to
reduce negative transfer?
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If compliance with safe work practices goes unrewarded, how can a
reward system be developed to ensure that compliance is reinforced?
If a task is repetitive, monotonous, or boring, how could it be made more
interesting? How could “time on task” be changed to reduce vigilance
decrements or mental lapses in attention?
Could operators be rotated off the tasks, checked for errors, or monitored
more closely? Could the pacing or ordering of a particular task be
modified to reduce opportunities for error? How could a task be modified
to reduce the demands on the operator’s physical or perceptual
limitations?
How could the task be redesigned so that its requirements are within
reasonable bounds/limits of all persons performing the job (e.g., force,
speed, precision, requirements, etc.)?
Are the various tasks performed appropriately grouped into jobs? How
could similar tasks be more effectively grouped/assigned to operators so
that they are performed by operators with the same skills?
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Trauma Team Readiness Check-In
To be Conducted by Primary Nurse during shift huddle
with Trauma Teams 1 & 2 in the Trauma Resuscitation Suite
• Who is the trauma team today?
• Who are the on-call trauma physicians today?
• Confirm the Daily Checklists: Trauma Suite (Primary Nurse);
Helipad (ED Tech)
• “Does anyone have anything to add or any concerns? If so, speak
up!?” AND “Is everyone in agreement?”
Introspective questions to consider:
Is your fellow trauma colleague…
• Punctual? Prepared?
• Does s/he contribute or just disengaged?
• Does s/he disagree?
• Is s/he committed to decisions?
• Does s/he support the team’s decisions after the fact?
• Is s/he toxic to the mission, values, and vision of the trauma team?
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Pre-Arrival Brief
1. First statement: Team member introductions (names/roles): “I am
NAME and my role is ROLE.”
2. Case Preparation
• Mechanism of injury / predicted injury patterns
• Anticipated treatment plan
• Alert other areas (e.g. Blood Bank, CT)
3. Last statement: “Does anyone have anything to add or any
concerns? If so, speak up!?” AND “Is everyone in agreement?”
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Debrief
1. Set the stage
“This is a quick opportunity for learning and continuous improvement.
Let’s take a look at how we handled the case.”
2. Ask the team for their observations
• What happened?
• What did we do well?
• What challenges did we face?
• What should we do differently or focus on next time?
• What could help us be more effective?
3. Add your observations/recommendations and confirm understanding
4. Summarize any agreed upon actions or focus for the future
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Call Outs
• A strategy used to communicate to the entire team simultaneously
(in the following example, used to communicate with one person,
specifically the scribe)
• Helps team members anticipate next steps
• Helps create a shared mental model
• Receiver (with name) should either verbally or non-verbally
acknowledge the transmission, such as with a nod of the head
• With eye contact!
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Closed-loop Communication & Read Backs
• Require the sender to verify the information that is being
received by the other team member
• Some communication takes place during times of escalating
stress, such as in a rapid response event. In these sorts of
situations, effective and efficient communication is crucial for
successful patient outcomes.
• Receivers repeat back requests
• Senders request check backs and acknowledge the
information is correct
• With eye contact!
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CUS Technique
• Concerned, Uncomfortable, Safety
• Provides a framework
• When used, everyone understands the issue and the
magnitude.
• State your concern first. Then state why you are
uncomfortable. If the conflict is not resolved, state that there
is a safety issue. If the safety issue is not acknowledged, a
supervisor should be notified.
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Two Challenge Rule
• Invoked when an initial assertion is ignored.
• You are hereby empowered to question any potential breach
of safety.
• It is your responsibility to assertively voice your concern at
least two times to ensure that it has been heard.
• The member being challenged must acknowledge.
• If the outcome is still not acceptable
• Take a stronger course of action
• Use supervisor or chain of command.
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TRAUMA NURSE LEADERSHIP COURSE
PRE TEST

1. In the concept of leadership, the assignment of a leader is not interchangeable
under any circumstances?
True
False
2. Why is assertive authority an important skill to learn and demonstrate when
appropriate during the resuscitation of the severely injured patient?
A. Because the physician doesn’t really know what he or she is doing so the nurse
has to tell them, especially if they aren’t board certified.
B. Because a nurse might observe something unsafe which other hierarchical
members of the team do not identify.
C. Because studies have shown the nurses are right more times than physicians so
it’s important to come down on the physicians with more authority.
D. Because the aerospace and aviation fields do it, so that really means we should.
Everything in aviation works in medicine anyway.
3. In the interest of care, quality, and safety, it is expected and mandatory that:
A.
B.
C.
D.

Conflict is avoided at all cost.
People always do the right thing.
Members speak up if they are concerned.
Leaders not make mistakes.

4. Who is the leader in trauma teams?
A.
B.
C.
D.

Doctor
Nurse
Patient
It depends on circumstances

5. The best communication tool or method to get critical information to the whole
team is:
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A.
B.
C.
D.

Call Out
Read Back
Write it on the white board
Write it in the orders

6. After a trauma case, the most helpful pathway towards team performance
improvement involves:
A.
B.
C.
D.

The leader telling everyone what they did wrong.
Meeting as a team to debrief the event.
Attending the autopsy.
Blaming the people who made the mistakes.

7. Why is it important to rely on the skills, knowledge, and abilities of the other team
members?
A.
B.
C.
D.

Because it’s less work with more people (aka social loafing).
Because you know who to go to later on when you need to borrow money.
Because others’ contributions can compensate for your inattentional
blindness.
It doesn’t matter, good teamwork is not important at all.

8. Choose the best option below that best describes the communication strategy of
CUS?
A.
B.
C.
D.

Communication, Unilateral decision making, Superiority.
Concerned, Utilitarian, Satisfactory
Communication, Understanding, Safety
Concerned, Uncomfortable, Safety

9. Which of the following statements regarding the use of checklists in the delivery
of acute trauma care is FALSE?
A.
B.
C.
D.

A well-designed checklist can be completed by a trauma team in less than
two minutes.
Checklists are designed for new procedures or practitioners with
relatively low experience.
Checklists create standardization of quality but not technique.
Checklists help ensure that every item is completed every time.

10. The team is making great progress with the procedure until the nurse recognizes
that the doctor is clearly making a dangerous mistake and asking for an unusually
high dose of Gentamycin. Very concerned, the Procedures Nurse asks the doctor if
he’s sure if that is what’s wanted. Giving her a nasty look, he growls “well, that’s
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what I asked for, isn’t it?” Confident that the dose is way off base, her next action
should be to:
A.
B.
C.
D.

Say, “I’m very concerned about the safety of that dose, doctor. It’ much
higher than I’ve ever seen given.”
Walk away and indicate discouragement at being treated so rudely.
Say loudly, “That’s a huge mistake, doctor. Nobody uses a dose like that!”
Not say anything out of fear in making the doctor more angry.

11. For the real life situation in the previous question, the doctor did not
acknowledge the Procedure Nurse’s concern and ignored her questioning. Now, the
nurse should take the following course of action.
A.
B.
C.
D.

Say loudly, “You’re off your rocker!”
Not say anything out of fear in making the doctor even more angry.
Prepare the medication and say to the doctor, “Here you push this med.”
Challenge the doctor with assertive authority at least two times to
ensure your concern has been heard.

12. During the acute care delivery of a Trauma Alert case, the doctor utters: “Let’s go
ahead and give ‘em a little more Diprivan.” Having heard this, the nurse should?
A.
B.
C.
D.

Prepare for immediate administration of propofol because the patient
obviously needs it.
Ask the doctor to clarify the dose and then insist on a read back
technique to verify the information.
Call pharmacy and give the phone to the doctor.
Pass the ambiguous order on to the oncoming procedures nurse because it’s
0659 and you’ve got Happy Hour plans right after work.
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TRAUMA NURSE LEADERSHIP COURSE
POST TEST

1. In the concept of leadership, the assignment of a leader is not interchangeable
under any circumstances?
True
False
2. Why is assertive authority an important skill to learn and demonstrate when
appropriate during the resuscitation of the severely injured patient?
A. Because the physician doesn’t really know what he or she is doing so the nurse
has to tell them, especially if they aren’t board certified.
B. Because a nurse might observe something unsafe which other hierarchical
members of the team do not identify.
C. Because studies have shown the nurses are right more times than physicians so
it’s important to come down on the physicians with more authority.
D. Because the aerospace and aviation fields do it, so that really means we should.
Everything in aviation works in medicine anyway.
3. In the interest of care, quality, and safety, it is expected and mandatory that:
A.
B.
C.
D.

Conflict is avoided at all cost.
People always do the right thing.
Members speak up if they are concerned.
Leaders not make mistakes.

4. Who is the leader in trauma teams?
A.
B.
C.
D.

Doctor
Nurse
Patient
It depends on circumstances

5. The best communication tool or method to get critical information to the whole
team is:
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A.
B.
C.
D.

Call Out
Read Back
Write it on the white board
Write it in the orders

6. After a trauma case, the most helpful pathway towards team performance
improvement involves:
A.
B.
C.
D.

The leader telling everyone what they did wrong.
Meeting as a team to debrief the event.
Attending the autopsy.
Blaming the people who made the mistakes.

7. Why is it important to rely on the skills, knowledge, and abilities of the other team
members?
A.
B.
C.
D.

Because it’s less work with more people (aka social loafing).
Because you know who to go to later on when you need to borrow money.
Because others’ contributions can compensate for your inattentional
blindness.
It doesn’t matter, good teamwork is not important at all.

8. Choose the best option below that best describes the communication strategy of
CUS?
A.
B.
C.
D.

Communication, Unilateral decision making, Superiority.
Concerned, Utilitarian, Satisfactory
Communication, Understanding, Safety
Concerned, Uncomfortable, Safety

9. Which of the following statements regarding the use of checklists in the delivery
of acute trauma care is FALSE?
A.
B.
C.
D.

A well-designed checklist can be completed by a trauma team in less than
two minutes.
Checklists are designed for new procedures or practitioners with
relatively low experience.
Checklists create standardization of quality but not technique.
Checklists help ensure that every item is completed every time.

10. The team is making great progress with the procedure until the nurse recognizes
that the doctor is clearly making a dangerous mistake and asking for an unusually
high dose of Gentamycin. Very concerned, the Procedures Nurse asks the doctor if
he’s sure if that is what’s wanted. Giving her a nasty look, he growls “well, that’s
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what I asked for, isn’t it?” Confident that the dose is way off base, her next action
should be to:
B.
B.
C.
D.

Say, “I’m very concerned about the safety of that dose, doctor. It’ much
higher than I’ve ever seen given.”
Walk away and indicate discouragement at being treated so rudely.
Say loudly, “That’s a huge mistake, doctor. Nobody uses a dose like that!”
Not say anything out of fear in making the doctor more angry.

11. For the real life situation in the previous question, the doctor did not
acknowledge the Procedure Nurse’s concern and ignored her questioning. Now, the
nurse should take the following course of action.
A.
B.
C.
D.

Say loudly, “You’re off your rocker!”
Not say anything out of fear in making the doctor even more angry.
Prepare the medication and say to the doctor, “Here you push this med.”
Challenge the doctor with assertive authority at least two times to
ensure your concern has been heard.

12. During the acute care delivery of a Trauma Alert case, the doctor utters: “Let’s go
ahead and give ‘em a little more Diprivan.” Having heard this, the nurse should?
A.
B.
C.
D.

Prepare for immediate administration of propofol because the patient
obviously needs it.
Ask the doctor to clarify the dose and then insist on a read back
technique to verify the information.
Call pharmacy and give the phone to the doctor.
Pass the ambiguous order on to the oncoming procedures nurse because it’s
0659 and you’ve got Happy Hour plans right after work.
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Appendix M

Program Evaluation Form
You must stay for the entire length of the program as partial credit will not be given. You must
sign-in at the front table before the start of the program and return this completed evaluation form
to the same location to receive credit. The Educational Services Department reserves the right to
deny credit to participants who do not meet these criteria.

Trauma Nurse Leadership Training
Mr. Smith
Feb-May 2016
ACTIVITY EVALUATION

Strongly
Agree

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

The activity met the stated objectives

5

4

3

2

1

The information was current

5

4

3

2

1

The educational level was appropriate

5

4

3

2

1

The teaching method was appropriate

5

4

3

2

1

SPEAKER EVALUATION

Strongly
Agree

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

The panel was knowledgeable

5

4

3

2

1

The panel was effective

5

4

3

2

1

I would recommend this class again

5

4

3

2

1

Did you notice any commercial bias in speaker or the presentation material?

Yes

No

What did you learn from the presentation that will enhance your patient care or change how you
practice?
(Choose all that apply.)
_____ Improve patient safety

_____ Improve communication

_____ Change practice related to diagnostic interpretation _____ Enhanced coordination of care
_____ Update plan of care to evidence based standards _____ Regulatory process/changes
_____ Improved team coordination

_____ Improved teamwork capabilities

_____ Knowledge to reduce medical errors

_____ Other (please describe)

Other Comments:
What other topics would you like to see presented?
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Appendix N
Program Evaluation Form
You must stay for the entire length of the program as partial credit will not be given.
You must sign-in at the front table before the start of the program and return this
completed evaluation form to the same location to receive credit. The Educational
Services Department reserves the right to deny credit to participants who do not meet
these criteria.
Trauma Nurse Leadership Training
Mr. Smith
Feb 23 to June 21, 2016

Activity Evaluation

Strongly
Agree

Agree

The activity met the stated
objectives

81

5

The information was current

82

4

82

4

81

5

Speaker Evaluation

Strongly
Agree

Agree

The speaker was knowledgeable

82

4

The speaker was effective

82

4

I would recommend this speaker
again

81

5

The educational level was
appropriate
The teaching method was
appropriate

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

Did you notice any commercial bias in the presentation (verbal, print, or electronic)?
Yes
(No)
What did you learn from the presentation that will enhance your patient care or change
how you practice:
(72) Improve patient safety
(41) Change practice related to diagnostic interpretation

(80) Improve communication
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(68) Enhanced coordination of care
(47) Update plan of care to evidence based standards(51) Regulatory process/changes
(77) Improved team coordination
(78) Improved teamwork capabilities
(55) Knowledge to reduce medical errors
(9) General topic overview / Other
Comments and/or what topics would you like to see in the future?
Excellent- love the team readiness checklist!
Great class- maybe do a mock-trauma in the room with Belmont, etc if possible!
Very helpful information!
The role of staffing lends to + versus – outcomes!
Very informative class!
This class was very informative and helpful!
I would like to see a presentation on skills used while in trauma (use of kits, chest
tube tray, thoracotomy tray, etc.)
Tour of trauma room and procedure set up!
This class should be mandatory for surgeons and ED physicians!
Great forum to openly discuss leadership!
Keep track of time!
Very good presentation and evident of that by the way everyone felt they could
speak up and be heard. I think the presentation gives everyone a breath of fresh air
and helps remind us why we’re here!
The program was excellent but also applicable to some everyday high stress
situations (like codes, stroke alerts, etc.). Thank you again!
Good class- helpful information!
All members of the Trauma Team should take this course!
Good information!
Thank you! Very helpful!
Great presentation (as usual) by Mr. Smith!
Mr. Smith is the best instructor ever!
How a trauma is meant to be run!
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7/8/16
Dear Colleagues,
Likely, you will begin to see the human factors staff from Embry-Riddle returning to prospectively
observe trauma cases, and there may be some new faces as well. As usual, they will be out of the
way on the far north end of the room and you probably won’t even know they’ll be there. Now that
99% of RNs working trauma have taken the trauma nurse leadership course, please employ what
you’ve learned and practiced from the course.
Let me know if any questions.
Thank you for caring and for helping to optimize the care of the injured patient at X.
Mr. Smith
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Appendix P
Items to Capture
Trauma surgeon (name on whiteboard)
~Number of people in trauma bay before pt arrives
Is ED physician present? Is trauma surgeon present? (If not, note the time when they arrive)
Number of people NOT wearing a sticker or no name on it. Number of people NOT wearing PPE
Team activities before pt arrives. Pre-arrival brief completed? (If so, document who completed it
& was it properly done, meaning Steps 1, 2, & 3)
Is barrier arm (trauma in progress) in place?
Exact time the pt is rolled into trauma bay
As best you can, pt detail and mechanism of injury
Was stopclock started?
Team activities while EVAC is giving report
~Number of people in the trauma bay/pt field at the time the pt arrives
~Number of people in the trauma bay/pt field during course of treatment
Location of large trashcan/Is trashcan being used?
Exact time pt leaves the trauma bay
Exact time pt enters the CT scan room
~Number of people in the CT scan room at the time the pt arrives
Is scribe using special spotlight attached to table?
~Number of people in the CT scan room/during course of treatment
Exact time the pt leaves the CT room
Overall were standardized communication protocols used (call outs, read backs, etc.)?
Ask the primary nurse/scribe & the Trauma Surgeon as pt is being wheeled out of CT: How
would you rate the efficiency of this case on a scale from 1-10? Low, 1=very inefficient, High,
10=highly efficient (document rating and any comments)



